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Abstract 
Purpose: Researchers have recently demonstrated interest in interpretive bias, the 
tendency to interpret ambiguous information more negatively and/or less positively. The 
extent to which interpretive biases influence the occurrence of life stressors and 
potentially compound the negative effects of life stress in the development of depression 
is presently unknown. Hence, the purpose of this study was to investigate interpretive 
bias for ambiguous social information within the context of stress and depression. This 
study examined interpretive bias in the context of two theoretically and empirically 
supported models of depression – stress generation and diathesis-stress – to determine the 
mechanism through which interpretive bias influences depression. Method: Two hundred 
and seven young adult women participated in a two-wave prospective study. At Time 1, 
participants were asked to complete two measures of interpretive bias—the Scrambled 
Sentences Test and the Ambiguous Stories Task— as well as self-report questionnaires of 
their current depressive symptoms and depression symptom history. Five weeks later, 
participants were asked to complete a measure of their current depressive symptoms and 
a life events questionnaire. Results: Consistent with expectations, multiple indices of 
interpretive bias were directly predictive of Time 2 depression symptoms, over and above 
the effects of Time 1 symptoms. Some evidence was found for a role of interpretive bias 
in stress generation. In contrast to hypotheses, none of the interpretive bias variables 
interacted with life stress to predict depressive symptoms at follow-up (diathesis-stress 
model). Conclusion: Taken together, the findings suggest that a theoretically significant 
role exists for interpretive biases in depression vulnerability. Additionally, these findings 
offer initial evidence that individuals with a pre-existing cognitive vulnerability may be at 
 
 
iv 
 
risk of contributing to the occurrence of stressful life events in their lives. Future research 
should examine interpretive biases in the context of interpersonal behaviours to 
determine the specific pathways from interpretation of an ambiguous situation to stress 
generation and/or depression. 
 
Keywords: Interpretive Bias, Information Processing, Dysphoria, Depression, Stress, 
Life Events, Stress Generation, Diathesis-Stress 
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Introduction 
According to findings from the Global Burden of Disease study, Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) is the fourth leading cause of disease burden (e.g., disability 
and mortality) and the leading cause of non-fatal burden worldwide (Üstün, Ayuso-
Mateos, Chatterji, Mathers, & Murray, 2004). In Canada, MDD affects more than 1.35 
million people and accounts for $51 billion per year in direct treatment costs and indirect 
costs of disability claims and lost productivity (Lim, Jacobs, Ohinmaa, Schopflocher, & 
Dewa, 2008; Stephens & Joubert, 2001). By the year 2020, MDD is predicted to be 
second only to ischemic heart disease in terms of its overall cost to society (Keller & 
Boland, 1998; Lecrubier, 2001).  
Major depression affects 2 to 4% of adults at any given moment (World Health 
Organization [WHO] International Consortium in Psychiatric Epidemiology, 2000) and 
between 12 and 25% of adults at some point in their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2005; 
Kessler, Zhao, Blazer, & Swartz, 1997; Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, & Fischer, 1991; 
Patten et al., 2006). In Ontario alone, MDD affects 4.8% of the population over the age of 
15 years, which translates into half a million people per year (Patten et al., 2006).  
Women are twice as likely as men to experience a major depressive episode 
during their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2003; Patten, 2000). This gender difference in the 
prevalence and incidence rates of MDD emerges in early adolescence and remains 
significant until older adulthood (Akhtar-Danesh & Landeen, 2007; Kessler et al., 2003; 
Wade, Cairney, & Pevalin, 2002). Research has shown that the increased prevalence of 
MDD among women as compared to men is primarily the result of a greater number of 
first onsets of depression, and not the result of gender differences in duration of episodes 
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or recurrence of depression (Eaton et al., 1997; Hankin et al., 1998; Keller & Shapiro, 
1981; Kessler, McGonagle, Swartz, Blazer, & Nelson, 1993; Kovacs, 2001). Hence, it is 
critically important to understand the factors that may make women especially 
susceptible to the development of MDD.   
Introduction to the Current Study and Conceptual Framework 
The present study investigated one potential information processing risk factor for 
depression – interpretive bias – within the context of life stress in a sample of young 
women. Interpretive bias refers to the tendency to impose more negative interpretations 
on ambiguous information (e.g., Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002). This cognitive 
tendency may play a causal role in the onset and maintenance of depression (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). A basic conceptual model outlining the 
primary variables of interest is depicted in Figure 1. In the proposed conceptual model, 
interpretive biases are based upon an individual’s pre-existing vulnerabilities (e.g., 
genetic, neurobiological, temperamental, personality, cognitive, social) and previous life 
experiences (e.g., victimization, trauma), and are influenced by other information 
processing biases that the individual possesses (e.g., attention, memory, inhibition; A. 
Byrne & Eysenck, 1993; Chan, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2007; M. W. Eysenck, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1987; Gibb, Schofield, & Coles, 2009; Rijsdijk et al., 2009; Rusting, 1998). 
For example, both attention biases towards threat-relevant stimuli and memory biases for 
negative information would influence how someone interprets ambiguity (Ingram, 
Steidtmann, & Bistricky, 2008; White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011; Wisco & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). To date, there has been limited research examining interpretive 
bias relative to other forms of information processing (e.g., attention, memory) in the  
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Figure 1. Conceptual research model situating interpretive bias within the context of life 
stress and depression. Note. Bolded items are the variables of interest in the current 
investigation. Dashed lines indicate unique pathways investigated in the current study. 
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context of depression, despite the fact that it may be an independent contributor to 
depression (Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, & Maestas, 2010). At the same time, 
limited research has examined interpretive bias within the context of life stressors or life 
events – a well-known precipitant to the onset of dysphoria and depression (Hammen, 
2005; Mazure, 1998). Previous research suggests that cognitive factors influence the 
occurrence of life stressors, indirectly contributing to depression, and also interact with 
stressful life experiences, directly causing depression (for reviews, see Hammen, 2005, 
2006; Liu & Alloy, 2010).  However, interpretive bias has never been investigated in 
relation to the occurrence of life stressors, and no one has examined how these variables 
interact or influence each other in the development of depression (Ingram et al., 2008). 
Negatively biased interpretations may contribute to the creation of stressful life 
circumstances directly, and have an indirect influence on depression through the 
generation of life stressors (stress generation/mediation model). Alternately, biased 
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli may cause depression directly in the context of life 
stressors (diathesis-stress/interactional/moderation model). Because of these unexplored 
questions, the main objective of this dissertation research was to examine interpretive 
bias, life stress, and depression, in a prospective design.  
In the following sections, cognitive theories of depression are reviewed as an 
overall framework for understanding the role of information processing biases in 
depression. Subsequent to that, a brief summary of the existing research on information 
processing biases in depression, and a comprehensive review of the interpretive bias 
literature, are provided. After discussing the extant research on interpretive bias and 
depression, the role of stress in depression is examined. Two models incorporating stress 
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in depression—stress generation and diathesis-stress— are then discussed, and the 
hypothetical role of interpretive bias is situated within each of those proposed models. 
The final sections outline the rationale for the current study and provide a description of 
the specific study objectives and hypotheses.  
Cognitive Theories of Depression 
A vast body of research has tested the central tenets of cognitive theories of 
depression (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978; Beck, 1967, 1976; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Teasdale, 1983, 1988). According to 
these theories, various cognitive constructs, including perception, attention, recall, 
recognition, conceptualization, interpretation, and judgement, have an impact on the 
development, maintenance, and remission of depression (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 
1998). Each model situates the role of cognition at a different point, but they all define 
cognitive vulnerability to depression as an internal, stable characteristic of an individual 
that places him or her at risk for developing depression following the occurrence of 
stressful life events (Ingram et al., 1998). Hence, these models are diathesis-stress models 
(i.e., interactional/moderation models), in that maladaptive cognition contributes to the 
development of depression only in the context of stressful life circumstances. In other 
words, the presence of both a cognitive vulnerability factor and life stressors is required 
to lead to depression.  
Information processing bias and depression. Depression is characterized by 
cognition biases in information processing that are hypothesized to play a causal role in 
the onset and maintenance of disorder (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 
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2005). Such biases
1
 in attention, memory, interpretation, intrusive ideation, and inhibitory 
control for emotional information have been reported in both children and adults (for 
reviews, see Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Leppänen, 2006; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; 
Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010; Yiend, 2010). Specifically, process-based models of 
depression have shown that there are significant attentional biases toward negative 
information and away from positive stimuli. However, stimuli may need to be self-
referent or mood-congruent, and presentation durations may need to be longer ( ≥ 1,000 
ms) to allow for elaborative stimulus processing (Leppänen, 2006; Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Peckham et al., 2010; Yiend, 2010). Furthermore, there 
are relatively consistent memory biases characteristic of depression. In particular, 
individuals with dysphoria or depression show enhanced memory for negative 
information compared to neutral and positive information, whereas non-dysphoric 
participants or healthy controls show enhanced memory for positive information 
compared to neutral and negative information (Bower, 1981; Bradley, Mogg, & 
Williams, 1995; Denny & Hunt, 1992; Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 
2003).  
While the majority of research has focused on the memory and attentional biases 
specific to depression, less empirical attention has been paid to interpretive biases (Gotlib 
& Joormann, 2010; Ingram et al., 2008; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Mineka, Rafaeli, & 
Yovel, 2009). However, many emotional and behavioural reactions are at least partially 
                                                 
1
 The term “bias” is used throughout this document to denote a tendency to process information in a way 
that favours a particular emotional valence or meaning. It does not refer to the accuracy or inaccuracy of 
those information processing tendencies in reflecting objective reality, or suggest a dysfunctional 
characteristic of the individual in possession of the particular bias. In fact, everyone has biases in some 
form or another. For example, individuals who are emotionally stable have positively biased interpretations 
in ambiguous social contexts (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997, 2000). 
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mediated by the perceptions, thoughts, and interpretations an individual generates 
concerning a given event or situation (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1992). In many ways, 
interpretation is one of several higher-level cognitive processes, along with judgement, 
decision-making, and reasoning, that influence a person’s reactions to a given stimuli 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). At the same time, numerous everyday situations are 
ambiguous and can be interpreted in multiple ways. Ambiguity, for the purposes of this 
research, was defined as a situation involving a certain degree of uncertainty or 
vagueness that lends itself to multiple interpretations or meanings. Each possible 
interpretation or meaning may have a different emotional valence or consequence on 
affect, behaviour, or cognition. In the sensory domain, a slight touch on the skin could 
signal a mosquito bite (negative interpretation) or a strand of hair falling on the skin 
(benign interpretation; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). In the social realm, a friend who 
walks past you without acknowledging you might be understood to be ignoring you 
(negative interpretation) or preoccupied (benign interpretation; Holmes, Mathews, 
Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). In communication, a written or spoken sentence could 
be construed as sarcastically intended (negative interpretation) or taken at face value 
(benign interpretation; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Examining interpretive bias in the 
context of depression may provide a way to understand how the integral cognitive 
process of interpretation relates to and/or plays a causal role in the development of a 
significant emotional disturbance. The existing literature on interpretive bias in 
depression is reviewed in the following sections.  
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Interpretive Bias and Depression  
As stated earlier, interpretive bias generally refers to the tendency to impose more 
negative and/or less positive/benign interpretations on ambiguous stimuli, situations, and 
events (e.g., Lawson et al., 2002; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). 
Cognitive theories of depression would suggest that individuals vulnerable to depression 
or experiencing a depressive mood state should show an increased tendency to impose 
negative interpretations on ambiguous information due to underlying negative cognitive 
structures that influence information processing (e.g., Beck, 1967, 1987). In fact, 
previous research has suggested that depressed mood can influence how people interpret 
events, resulting in selective attention to negative aspects of social situations (Dodge, 
1993). Despite this theoretical claim, research on interpretive bias has been somewhat 
mixed with respect to whether or not an interpretive bias exists in dysphoria and 
depression. Researchers have used various methodologies and paradigms to determine if 
and how interpretive biases relate to depression and dysphoric mood states.  
Several studies have found evidence that depression is characterized by the 
presence of an interpretive bias. In their seminal work, Butler and Mathews (1983) 
presented participants with ambiguous written scenarios and asked them to rank order 
three interpretations in the order that they would most likely come to mind in a similar 
situation. Compared to non-depressed control participants, patients with clinical 
depression demonstrated a tendency to rank negative response options as more likely to 
come to mind. Other studies using questionnaire-based methods requiring participants to 
choose between alternative interpretations of ambiguous scenarios have yielded similar 
results in adults with clinical depression and elevated symptoms of depression (Nunn, 
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Mathews, & Trower, 1997; Voncken, Bögels, & Peeters, 2007). In children, similar 
methodologies have been used, including ambiguous story cards (Dineen & Hadwin, 
2004) and ambiguous scenarios (Eley et al., 2008) with forced-choice interpretation 
options. These studies have found further evidence for an association between negative 
interpretations of scenarios and stories, and depressive symptoms, in children.  
Other studies have applied homonym paradigms borrowed from the anxiety 
disorders literature. For example, Mogg and colleagues (2006) used a homophone task 
that required respondents to write down a list of orally presented words that included 
homophones (each with a negative and a non-negative meaning; e.g., die/dye, weak/week) 
and neutral filler words. Compared to control participants, outpatients with clinical 
depression made more negative interpretations on the homophone task (Mogg et al., 
2006). In contrast, other studies have found no association between self-reported 
depressive symptoms and negative interpretations using a similar homophone task (Pury, 
2002). Using a similar methodology adapted for young children, Eley and colleagues 
(2008) asked participants to listen to a homophone word (e.g., mug, leaves, patient) and 
then provide a sentence that used that word which was recorded and coded. Increased 
depressive symptoms were significantly related to greater numbers of negative 
interpretations of ambiguous homophones in 8-year-olds, even after controlling for 
anxiety symptoms (Eley et al., 2008). Another study used a homograph task in which 
participants were asked to generate an interpretation of an ambiguous single word, such 
as “break” (broken/rest) or “sentence” (prison/phrase). In this case, no differences were 
found in the frequency of positive or negative interpretations generated by high dysphoric 
10 
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and low dysphoric students (Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008). Hence, homonym 
paradigms are supported by evidence in clinical and youth, but not analogue, samples. 
One disadvantage of these formats of interpretive bias assessments is that they 
rely on participants’ self-report, which raises concerns about possible response biases and 
demand characteristics (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod, 1993; MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1991; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). For instance, individuals with dysphoria or 
depression may process both neutral/benign and negative interpretations of ambiguous 
material, but endorse or select the latter more often than control participants due to a 
reporting bias rather than an interpretive bias (Mogg et al., 2006; Wisco, 2009). This 
possibility was supported in a study that examined depressed participants’ sucrose taste 
sensitivity threshold using signal detection methods (Potts, Bennett, Kennedy, & 
Vaccarino, 1997). Potts and colleagues (1997) found that response bias rather than true 
differences in taste sensitivity were the cause of higher thresholds in individuals with 
depression. Additionally, dysphoric participants generate significantly more negative 
interpretations than do non-dysphoric participants, and are more likely to select a 
negative interpretation from their generated list, even though both groups are able to 
generate an equal number of possible interpretations for a given ambiguous situation 
(Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010, 2011). Self-report measures are also influenced by 
participants’ previous experiences and may be skewed because of anchoring and 
overestimation biases (Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002). 
To overcome limitations with these early methods of assessment, researchers have 
developed alternate techniques and methodologies to assess interpretation that do not 
require participants to endorse alternative response options. One information processing 
11 
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measure that has been frequently used to assess interpretive bias is the Scrambled 
Sentences Task (SST; Wenzlaff, 1988, 1993). In this task, participants are asked to 
construct a grammatically correct sentence using five out of the six words presented to 
them in a nonsensical manner (e.g., good feel very bad I usually). Each sentence can be 
unscrambled to form a negative sentence (e.g., I usually feel very bad) or positive/benign 
sentence (e.g., I usually feel very good). Negative interpretive bias is inferred based on 
the number of sentences a participant unscrambles using the negative solution, as a 
proportion of the total number of sentence unscrambled. As would be expected, 
currently-depressed individuals constructed a greater proportion of negative sentences 
than do never-depressed or previously-depressed individuals (Hedlund & Rude, 1995). 
Wenzlaff and colleagues (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & 
Zentner, 2001; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) hypothesized that biased information processing 
patterns remain active in previously-depressed and currently dysphoric individuals, but 
cannot be easily accessed using self-report measures because these individuals suppress 
negative thoughts using mental control. Increasing the cognitive load (e.g., rehearsing a 
series of numbers, counting aloud during the task) is believed to make volitional negative 
thought suppression more difficult, rendering vulnerable participants more likely to 
unscramble sentences using the negative solution. Indeed, dysphoric individuals were 
more likely than non-dysphoric individuals to unscramble sentences in a negative way, 
but only under cognitive load (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Interestingly, individuals with a 
history of major depression also tended to construct more negative sentences than did 
never-depressed persons, providing further evidence that interpretive bias may linger 
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even once depressive symptoms abate (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude et al., 2001; Van 
der Does, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2007).  
Interpretation biases in depression have also been investigated using priming 
paradigms. In a priming task, participants view an ambiguous prime stimulus and then an 
unambiguous semantically related stimulus. This experimental technique assumes that a 
particular meaning is activated in the participant’s mind when the ambiguous prime 
stimuli are presented. Interpretive bias is inferred by the degree to which the prime 
facilitates the processing of subsequent target words related to either possible prime 
meaning. By measuring the response latency to read a negative or neutral associated 
unambiguous stimulus, interpretive bias is calculated. In one of the first studies to use this 
approach, Lawson and MacLeod (1999) compared participants who were high versus low 
in depressive symptoms and who had been primed using a negative or positive Velten 
mood induction procedure. These researchers presented individuals with ambiguous 
sentences (e.g., The doctor examined little Emily’s growth), followed by either a negative 
target word (e.g., tumour) or a neutral target word (e.g., height). Participants were asked 
to read aloud the sentence and the word that followed as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. In the case of a negative interpretation, response latencies for the negative target 
word were expected to be faster than response latencies for the benign/neutral target 
words, suggesting that the negative words were primed by the sentence. Unfortunately, 
support was not found for this hypothesis. No evidence of naming facilitation for 
negative target words was shown in the group of participants with elevated depressive 
symptoms, whereas the group with fewer symptoms of depression demonstrated faster 
reaction times (facilitation) in naming negative target words. Hence, contrary to 
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expectations, participants with higher depressive symptomatology actually showed a 
decreased tendency to attach a negative interpretation to ambiguous written stimuli when 
compared to participants with lower depressive symptoms, and this effect held 
irrespective of the mood manipulation condition (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999).  
A second study replicated and extended Lawson and MacLeod’s (1999) semantic 
priming task, but used a video and musical negative mood induction procedure (Bisson & 
Sears, 2007). Instead of requiring participants to read the target words aloud, respondents 
were asked to listen to the prime sentences presented auditorily, and then were asked to 
make a lexical decision about whether the target was a word or non-word (yes/no 
response) by pressing one of two buttons. Response latencies were measured from the 
initial visual presentation of the target word until the participant’s button response. 
Bisson and Sears (2007) found no response latency evidence for an interpretive bias, and 
no differences in semantic priming effects between dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
participants. In other words, dysphoric individuals were no more likely than non-
dysphoric individuals to impose a negative interpretation, and were no more and no less 
likely to consider a positive interpretation, of the ambiguous prime sentences (Studies 1A 
and 1B) even following a negative mood induction procedure (Study 2).  
In a further modification of the priming paradigm, Mogg and colleagues (2006) 
used a sample of clinically depressed adult outpatients and compared them to matched 
non-depressed control participants. In their priming task, participants were initially 
presented with a negative (e.g., death) or benign/positive (e.g., marriage) word before the 
ambiguous sentence (e.g., Carol felt emotionally throughout the service). The response 
duration for participants to read aloud a continuation sentence was recorded. The final 
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sentence was a logical continuation of the ambiguous sentence, and was either negative 
(e.g., Funerals always made her cry) or benign/positive (e.g., Weddings always made her 
cry). The study authors hypothesized that faster reading latency for the negative 
continuation sentences would indicate a negative interpretive bias (i.e., facilitated 
processing of negative endings primed by the initial word and ambiguous sentence). 
Once more, the study failed to find support for a negative interpretive bias in depressed 
outpatients using this priming task (Mogg et al., 2006). Patients with depression did not 
differ from control participants in their reaction time responses to continuation sentences, 
irrespective of the prime cue word type, other than being slower across all conditions 
(benign, negative, and no cue). 
Taken together, these results suggest that there may not be a depression-related 
negative interpretive bias measurable in response times to ambiguous sentences. 
However, these null findings may be due to the type of ambiguous stimuli used in the 
studies. Because the negative self-schema is integral to depression (Dozois & Beck, 
2008), self-referent content may be necessary for appropriately exploring depressive 
cognitions, especially interpretive biases (Wisco, 2009). In fact, individuals with 
depression show stronger interpretive biases when presented with self-referent material 
than when presented with general or other-referent material (Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; 
Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; see Wisco, 2009 for a 
review). 
Bearing this criticism in mind, researchers have further attempted to examine 
response latencies as an index of interpretive bias using self-referent stimuli (Dearing & 
Gotlib, 2009; Sears, Bisson, & Nielsen, 2011). One sample that is known to be 
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particularly at-risk for developing depression is the children of mothers who themselves 
have been depressed (Goodman, 2007; Goodman & Gotlib, 1999). Previous research has 
shown that children of mothers with depression display depressotypic information 
processing and cognitive vulnerabilities when compared to daughters of never-depressed 
mothers (Hammen, 1988; Hammen & Goodman-Brown, 1990; Ingram & Ritter, 2000; 
Jaenicke et al., 1987; Murray, Woolgar, Cooper, & Hipwell, 2001; Taylor & Ingram, 
1999). Dearing and Gotlib (2009) were the first researchers to examine interpretive bias 
comparing 10- to 14-year-old never-disordered daughters of mothers with histories of 
recurrent major depression (high risk) and daughters of never-disordered mothers (low 
risk). These researchers compared interpretations of ambiguous stories using a priming 
paradigm in which participants were presented with three sentence self-referential 
scenarios (e.g., In math class, you are given time to work on an extra credit problem. You 
read the problem carefully but can’t figure out how to start it, so you decide to ask your 
teacher for help. As you ask for help, you’re sure your teacher will think you are 
____________) that remained ambiguous until the last word of the third sentence. The 
final word was either negative (e.g., dumb), benign (e.g., hardworking), or grammatically 
impossible (e.g., death), and participants were asked to indicate if the word was a 
grammatically possible ending to the story (yes/no response). In the case of a negative 
interpretation bias, response latencies for the negative words were expected to be faster 
than response latencies for the benign words or grammatically impossible story endings, 
suggestive that the negative interpretations were primed by the scenarios. High risk 
daughters were more likely than low risk daughters to interpret ambiguous stories 
negatively (i.e., showed faster reaction times for negative endings; Dearing & Gotlib, 
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2009). This study provides some support that interpretive biases may be present prior to 
the onset of depressive disorders in at-risk populations, suggesting that it may be a latent 
risk factor. However, this study did not examine interpretive bias in currently dysphoric 
or depressed samples.  
Sears and colleagues (2011) utilized self-referent stimuli in a semantic relatedness 
task. Similar to their earlier study (Bisson & Sears, 2007), participants were asked to 
listen to ambiguous sentences (e.g., My boyfriend said that I am unlike his past 
girlfriends), and required to respond to target words that were either related to negative 
(jealous), positive (attractive), or neutral (relationship) interpretations of the sentence or 
were unrelated (democracy). Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not the 
target word was related to the prime sentence (yes/no response). It was expected that a 
negative interpretive bias would be revealed as faster response latencies and lower error 
rates for target words related to negative interpretations of the prime sentences. Contrary 
to hypotheses, dysphoric participants did not show faster reaction times for negative 
target words relative to non-dysphoric participants, and instead showed consistently 
slower reaction times across all targets (Sears et al., 2011). The authors further examined 
participants’ error rates for failing to detect that the ambiguous prime sentence and target 
word were related. Dysphoric participants were more likely than non-dysphoric 
participants to miss targets related to positive interpretations and less likely to miss 
targets related to negative interpretation. These findings suggest that dysphoria is related 
to an increased tendency to interpret the ambiguous primes in a negative manner and 
decreased tendency to interpret the ambiguous primes in a positive manner (Sears et al., 
2011).  
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In summary, it remains unclear whether interpretive bias can be assessed reliably 
in depression. Studies using ambiguous scenarios with forced-choice options or 
homonym paradigms, while demonstrating the most consistent support, also seem most 
open to response bias (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; Eley et al., 
2008; Mogg et al., 2006; Nunn et al., 1997; Voncken et al., 2007; for exceptions see 
Holmes et al., 2008; Pury, 2002). The SST has had consistent success in revealing 
differences in clinical and non-clinical samples, yet has not been widely adopted beyond 
certain research groups (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude et al., 2001; Wenzlaff & Bates, 
1998). Response latency indices have shown no support for an interpretive bias in 
dysphoria and depression using non-self-referent stimuli (Bisson & Sears, 2007; Lawson 
& MacLeod, 1999; Mogg et al., 2006), but more promising results are obtained when 
self-referent stimuli are utilized (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Sears et al., 2011). However, 
further research is required to determine if and how interpretive bias may be related to 
stress and changes in mood state over time.  
Interpretive bias as a causal factor in depression. Aside from the equivocal 
nature of the cross-sectional research that has attempted to characterize interpretive bias 
in depression, there are theoretical reasons to predict that interpretive biases may lead to a 
worsening of emotional states, particularly when repeated over time (e.g., Beck & Clark, 
1991). Specifically, cognitive theory of depression posits that activation of enduring 
latent cognitive template or representation of the self, referred to as the self-schema, leads 
to negative information processing biases (e.g., attention, memory, interpretation, 
inhibition) which may initiate and/or maintain a dysphoric mood state, leading to greater 
negative thinking and worsening depressed mood (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; D. 
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A. Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Over time, this reciprocal 
exchange of negative information processing and the accompanying negative mood state 
lead to the downward spiral of depression. 
According to cognitive theories, stressful life events are the trigger that activates 
these latent cognitive vulnerabilities, in a diathesis-stress relationship (Abramson et al., 
1989, 1978; Beck, 1967, 1976; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Teasdale, 1983, 1988).  
However, the criteria for what constitutes a stressful life event may shift over the course 
of an individual’s life. For example, vulnerable individuals may become sensitized to 
stress over time, such that less life stress is required to trigger depressogenic cognitive 
patterns and the accompanying increases in dysphoria and onset of a depressive episode 
(Monroe & Harkness, 2005). This especially may be the case in instances where major 
life stressors occurred during childhood (Espejo et al., 2007; Hammen, Henry, & Daley, 
2000; Harkness, Bruce, & Lumley, 2006). A lowered threshold could lead to more 
frequent activation of negative information processing biases (i.e., interpretive bias) in 
the face of daily experiences (e.g., not getting an expected raise at work, being stuck in a 
traffic jam) and their accompanying negative mood state. Hence, major life events may 
not be required to trigger negative interpretive bias in the downward spiral to depression; 
daily experiences may be sufficient in and of themselves.  
In addition, vulnerable individuals may also perceive a wider range of events as 
stressful, leading to increased numbers of potential triggers for depressogenic information 
processing (Ingram et al., 1998). Repeated activation of negative interpretations of 
ambiguous events may lead individuals to develop a well-practiced tendency to view 
ambiguity in a negative light, such that they then perceive nonthreatening events as 
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stressful. When repeated on a day-to-day basis, these misperceptions help to self-
perpetuate the negative interpretations (Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Boss, 1989; Hill, 
Lewicki, & Neubauer, 1991; Lewicki, Hill, & Sasaki, 1989) and could lead to dysphoric 
emotional reactions and/or trigger other depressogenic cognitive vulnerabilities (e.g., 
rumination) and the onset of depression.  
Hence, over brief and longer duration longitudinal designs, one might find that 
interpretive bias predicts increases in depressive symptoms and/or the onset of a major 
depressive episode. For example, during the course of an experiment, dysphoric 
participants experienced increased negative mood in response to generating and selecting 
interpretations to ambiguity for self-referent situations (Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010, 
2011). Similarly, evidence shows that interpretive bias, as assessed by the SST, predicts 
increases in depressive symptoms over a four to six week period, controlling for past and 
concurrent depression (Rude et al., 2002). Furthermore, interpretive bias is predictive of 
the onset of clinically significant major depressive episodes over an 18 to 28 month 
follow-up period, controlling for baseline self-reported depressive symptoms and worst 
lifetime symptoms (Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003; Rude et al., 2010). Hence, 
there is some evidence that interpretive bias predicts negative shifts in mood and the 
onset of clinically significant episodes of depressive episodes over varying durations. 
Although the results of such prospective studies are encouraging, they are not 
definitive regarding the causal status of interpretive bias in the mediation of depression 
vulnerability. In theory, it is possible that both the information processing tendency 
manifested as interpretive bias and emotional vulnerability to depression may represent 
independent correlates of another third factor (such as neuroticism or negative affectivity; 
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Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Such an association would provide the impression that 
interpretive bias has predictive validity, without necessarily causal significance. A more 
powerful test as to whether or not interpretive bias plays a causal role in vulnerability to 
depression comes from experimental studies that directly manipulate interpretations and 
then observe the impact of such manipulations on emotion (for reviews, see Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994, 2005). As an alternate paradigm for exploring interpretive bias, some 
researchers have sought to experimentally manipulate and test whether particular forms 
of interpretive bias can be trained. In these cognitive bias modification of interpretation 
(CBM-I) paradigms, participants are intentionally trained to limit interpretations of 
ambiguous information in a particular direction (positive or negative; Grey & Mathews, 
2000; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011; for reviews, see 
Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Field & Lester, 2010). With sufficient practice, it is believed 
that habitual biases in interpretation will generalize to novel ambiguous information (Hill 
et al., 1989, see 1991; Lewicki et al., 1989 for details of the self-perpetuation of 
interpretation biases). Indeed, several studies of positive interpretation training have been 
able to increase positive affect and increase subsequent positive interpretations of 
ambiguity in adults and adolescents (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Holmes et al., 2006; 
Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, & Lau, 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011; Standage, Ashwin, & 
Fox, 2010; Tran et al., 2011), with some preliminary evidence emerging in child samples 
(Muris, Huijding, Mayer, & Hameetman, 2008; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, 
& Vreden, 2009). The results of these studies suggest that interpretive biases are directly 
associated with mood state and are modifiable. Interestingly, many of these studies use 
the SST as an index of interpretive bias (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009; Standage et al., 2010). 
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Therapeutically, repeated sessions of CBM-I have also shown promise at helping to 
improve mood, interpretive bias, and mental health in persons with current clinical 
depression (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010). 
Interpretive bias and the role of stress. The prospective and CBM-I studies 
suggest that interpretive bias may be a causal vulnerability factor for depression. Beyond 
this inference, there is also suggestion of a potential role of environmental context in 
helping to explain how interpretive bias may contribute to the development of dysphoria 
and depression. For example, there is evidence from CBM-I studies that the modification 
of interpretive bias can also lead to attenuated emotional reactivity when experiencing 
subsequent stressors. Specifically, in cases where participants were trained to interpret 
ambiguity in a nonthreatening or positive way, there is evidence of attenuated emotional 
reactions following subsequent video stressors or imagined social situations (Lester, 
Mathews, Davison, Burgess, & Yiend, 2011; Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & 
Cook, 2006; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). Additionally, there is 
evidence that training positive biases using imagery buffered the impact of a negative 
mood induction procedure in a nonclinical sample (Holmes et al., 2009). These CBM-I 
studies provide support for a protective influence of positive interpretations in preventing 
or alleviating the expected negative effects of stressors. On the other hand, the tendency 
to interpret ambiguous homonyms in a more negative manner predicted later dysphoric 
reactions in response to school examination stress one month later (Pury, 2002). Hence, 
there may be an interactional/moderation role (diathesis-stress model) for interpretive 
bias in the context of stress. More specifically, negative interpretive bias in the context of 
stress may contribute to dysphoric reactions. Likewise, the absence of negative 
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interpretive bias may attenuate or buffer against stress’s adverse consequences on mood. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the previously described cognitive diathesis-stress 
theory (interactional/moderation models), which proposes that individuals with particular 
cognitive tendencies will interpret and react to stressful life events in ways which 
increase the likelihood of developing depression (e.g., Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 
1987). 
At the same time, an individual’s exposure to stressors does not appear to be 
completely due to chance or fate (Hammen, 2006). Rather than viewing individuals as 
passive recipients of life experiences, one can view them as active participants in 
selecting or avoiding specific situations or environments, and evoking certain responses 
from others around them (Buss, 1987; Hammen, 1991; Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 
1993). Stress generation theory (mediation model) suggests that vulnerable individuals 
act in ways that inadvertently cause more stressful life experiences, and further worsen 
their mood (Hammen, 1991; see also Alloy, Liu, & Bender, 2010; Hammen, 2006; Liu & 
Alloy, 2010, for reviews). Hence, there may be a place for interpretive bias to act as the 
vulnerability factor that influences the generation of and/or interacts with life stress to 
predict depression. In the following sections, prior research on the relationship between 
stress and depression is reviewed, with particular focus on the role of cognitive 
vulnerabilities in stress generation and diathesis-stress models. Following this overview, 
the objectives of the current study are highlighted which situate interpretive bias as the 
cognitive vulnerability factor under examination.  
Stress and Depression 
The association between stressful life events and depression has been a focus of 
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research for some time. Depression is known to be a frequent outcome of exposure to 
stress (Brown & Harris, 1978; Hammen, 2005; Kessler, 1997); however, this relationship 
is not always consistent (e.g., Rutter, 2000). The vast majority of individuals with 
depression report having experienced acute stressors immediately prior to the onset of 
their depressive episode (Horesh, Klomek, & Apter, 2008; Mazure, 1998; Stroud, Davila, 
& Moyer, 2008). In particular, women report significantly more life events prior to the 
onset of depression than do men (Harkness et al., 2010). Nonetheless, not all individuals 
who experience a stressful life event go on to develop a depression, suggesting that there 
may be individual vulnerability factors (e.g., temperamental or personality 
characteristics, genetic factors, depressogenic cognitive styles) which make some people 
more susceptible to the negative impact of stressors. In fact, only 20% to 50% of 
individuals who experience a significant negative life event develop clinically significant 
levels of depression (Goodyer, Tamplin, Herbert, & Altham, 2000; Lewinsohn et al., 
1994). Furthermore, as stress generation theory suggests, individuals may be at increased 
risk of contributing to and/or causing the occurrence of stressors in their lives due to 
similar pre-existing vulnerability factors (Hammen, 1991, 2005, 2006). In particular, 
there is evidence that women experience higher levels of stressful life events, especially 
in the interpersonal area, than men (Hankin, Mermelstein, & Roesch, 2007; Kendler, 
Thornton, & Prescott, 2001; Shih, Eberhart, Hammen, & Brennan, 2006). Thus, stress 
and depression (or depressogenic vulnerabilities) likely share a transactional, 
bidirectional relation (Alloy et al., 2010). Stress may be a strongly implicated factor in 
the development of depression; however, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause 
depression without some other form of underlying vulnerability (Hankin & Abela, 2005). 
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In some instances, a diathesis-stress relationship exists wherein pre-existing 
vulnerabilities interact with the occurrence of stressors to produce depression 
(interactional/moderation model). In other cases, pre-existing vulnerabilities may lead to 
the generation of stressors, which in turn predict depression (stress generation/mediation 
model). Examining the possible convergence of these perspectives may provide insight 
into how interpretive bias leads to dysphoria and depression in women over time.  
Stress Generation and Depression 
The stress-generation hypothesis was originally investigated in relation to clinical 
depression, and deemed a potential mechanism for explaining the maintenance and 
recurrence of the disorder (Hammen, 1991, 1992). Compared to individuals without a 
psychiatric history, or those who experienced a first onset of the disorder, individuals 
with a history of depression reported a higher frequency and/or severity of life events that 
were (at least partially) dependent or contingent on their own behaviour (e.g., fired from 
job, break up with romantic partner). At the same time, the frequency and severity of 
events which were independent, fateful or non-contingent, (e.g., grandparent died, 
earthquake) did not differ among individuals with a history, in their first episode or 
without a history of depression (Brostedt & Pedersen, 2003; Chun, Cronkite, & Moos, 
2004; Cui & Vaillant, 1997; Daley et al., 1997; Hammen, 1991; Harkness, Monroe, 
Simons, & Thase, 1999; Holahan, Moos, Holahan, Brennan, & Schutte, 2005; Rudolph et 
al., 2000; Williamson, Birmaher, Anderson, Al-Shabbout, & Ryan, 1995). This result has 
been replicated in samples of both adults (Chun et al., 2004; Hammen, 1991; Harkness et 
al., 1999; Potthoff, Holahan, & Joiner, 1995) and youth (Daley et al., 1997; Davila, 
Hammen, Burge, Paley, & Daley, 1995; Rudolph et al., 2000; Rudolph, Flynn, Abaied, 
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Groot, & Thompson, 2009; Williamson et al., 1995) with diagnosed depression or 
interview-rated subclinical levels of depressive symptoms.  
More recently, researchers have begun to distinguish between stress generation 
that results from the spectrum of depressive symptoms or syndrome versus that which 
results from other factors, such as genetics, personality factors, life stressors, 
interpersonal behaviour patterns, and cognitive vulnerabilities (for reviews, see Alloy et 
al., 2010; Hammen, 2006; Liu & Alloy, 2010). For example, it has been well-established 
that genetic factors play a significant aetiological role in exposure to dependent life 
events, but not independent life events (Bemmels, Burt, Legrand, Iacono, & McGue, 
2008; Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999; Kendler & Karkowski-Shuman, 1997; 
Rijsdijk et al., 2001). Research also suggests that a large proportion of the genetic 
association between dependent stressors and risk of depression may be mediated by 
enduring personality characteristics, such as neuroticism, extraversion, and openness to 
experiences (Billig, Hershberger, Iacono, & McGue, 1996; Saudino, Pedersen, 
Lichtenstein, McClearn, & Plomin, 1997). Past experiences with stressful experiences, 
such as chronic stressors or childhood maltreatment, also are implicated in the generation 
of subsequent life events (Daley et al., 1997; Hammen, Kim, Eberhart, & Brennan, 2009; 
Harkness et al., 2006). At the same time, there are several interpersonal factors that are 
predictive of stress generation, including insecure attachment styles, excessive 
reassurance seeking, and sociotropy/dependency (Bottonari, Roberts, Kelly, Kashdan, & 
Ciesla, 2007; Eberhart & Hammen, 2009; Hankin, Kassel, & Abela, 2005; Nelson, 
Hammen, Daley, Burge, & Davila, 2001; Potthoff et al., 1995; Shahar, Joiner, Zuroff, & 
Blatt, 2004; Shahar & Priel, 2003; Shih, 2006; Shih, Abela, & Starrs, 2009; Shih & 
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Auerbach, 2010). 
Integrating this broadened application of the stress-generation hypothesis with the 
genetic, personality, cognitive, and interpersonal theories yields a new framework 
whereby individuals may be not only more reactive to stressors, but may also play a role 
in creating those very stressors through their thoughts, behaviours, interpersonal 
interactions, and situations they select (Caspi & Shiner, 2006; Kendler & Karkowski-
Shuman, 1997; Shih et al., 2009; Simons, Angell, Monroe, & Thase, 1993). Individuals 
with a pre-existing vulnerability to depression may be generating the stressors which will 
activate their vulnerability in a diathesis-stress context (e.g., Hankin & Abramson, 2001; 
Hankin, Kassel, et al., 2005; Shih, 2006). Individuals with a pre-existing cognitive 
vulnerability may be at risk of causing stressful life events in their lives and may be more 
reactive to those events when they do occur (Shih & Auerbach, 2010).  
Stress generation and cognitive vulnerabilities to depression. Notwithstanding 
the substantial evidence supporting the stress generation effect based on depressive 
symptoms/syndrome, genetics, personality, and interpersonal factors, researchers have 
now begun to explore what specific cognitive vulnerability factors might contribute to the 
generation of stressful life events. Numerous cognitive variables have been suggested as 
potential mechanisms explaining the generation of stress in depression-prone individuals. 
In this context, a handful of studies have examined the main cognitive factors proposed 
by cognitive theories of depression (Abramson et al., 1978; Beck, 1987; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). To date, however, no one has examined information processing biases, 
such as interpretive bias, in the context of stress generation. 
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In the earliest of the studies exploring cognitive predictors of stress generation, 
Simons and colleagues (1993) examined the cross-sectional relationships among two 
cognitive vulnerability factors – dysfunctional attitudes from Beck’s cognitive model 
(1987) and attributional/inferential styles from hopelessness theory (Abramson et al., 
1978) – and life events as assessed by both subjective self-report and objective interview-
based methods in a sample of participants experiencing clinical depression. Interpersonal 
and achievement attributions predicted a greater number of interview-derived dependent 
life events in the year prior to the onset of the index depressive episode, particularly for 
those individuals experiencing their first onset. Dysfunctional attitudes in the domain of 
achievement were significant predictors of self-reported achievement events, controlling 
for current self-reported depressive symptoms and objective stress. This relationship did 
not hold for interpersonal events or when using attributional style as a predictor.  
Prospective studies have also attempted to examine the role of various cognitive 
vulnerabilities in the generation of life stress. Using a high-risk sample of children of 
mood-disordered parents, Shih and colleagues (2009) found that children’s “weakest 
link” score on inferential style (i.e., children’s highest standardized subscale score or 
most depressogenic inferential style) predicted dependent interpersonal stress over a one 
year follow-up (as assessed by a combination of self-report and interview-based 
measures). In this study, “weakest link” inferential style did not predict level of 
independent stress, consistent with predictions of stress generation theory. In contrast, 
using a college sample Gibb and colleagues (2006) found no evidence that inferential 
style prospectively predicted subsequent stress over a six-week period. Thus, although 
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there is some support for the role of attributional/inferential styles in stress generation, 
the prospective research findings are mixed. 
Studies examining rumination as the cognitive vulnerability factor of interest have 
found more consistent support for a stress generation effect. In a multi-wave study of 
undergraduate students, Flynn and colleagues (2010) explored the role of depressive 
rumination in the generation of life stress, and their prospective contribution to 
depressive symptoms over a 27-month period. Depressive rumination was defined as the 
tendency to passively and repetitively focus on the experience of negative moods, as well 
as their causes and consequences (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991). Consistent with the stress generation hypothesis, depressive rumination was 
predictive of dependent interpersonal stress and dependent achievement stress, but not 
independent life events. A similar multi-wave study with adolescents found that higher 
levels of rumination were associated with a greater number of negative events in the 
future, and that rumination levels moderated the impact of negative events on the 
development of subsequent depressive symptoms and episodes (i.e., diathesis-stress 
model; Abela & Hankin, 2011). 
Studies using composite measures of cognitive vulnerabilities have also explored 
stress generational models in undergraduates and adolescents. One study, which utilized 
an interview-based measure of life events, found that undergraduate women with a more 
negative cognitive style (a composite measure combining attributional/inferential style 
and dysfunctional attitudes) experienced a greater number of dependent and interpersonal 
life events over a 6-month period than did women with a more positive cognitive style, or 
men with any form of cognitive style (Safford, Alloy, Abramson, & Crossfield, 2007). 
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Cognitive style was not related to the occurrence of independent or achievement-related 
life events. This pattern of relationships remained consistent, even when participants with 
current or past depression diagnoses were excluded from the analyses, providing stronger 
support for the link between cognitive vulnerability to depression and stress generation. 
Likewise, Kercher and Rapee (2009) tested an integrated diathesis-stress generation 
model using a large community sample of young adolescents. Consistent with the stress 
generation hypothesis, initial cognitive vulnerability (a composite measure combining 
negative attributional/ inferential style and ruminative response style) predicted 
dependent stressors at follow-up. This composite score also interacted with stressors to 
predict depressive symptoms at 6-month follow-up, partially mediating the relation 
between baseline and follow-up depression (i.e., diathesis-stress/interactional/moderation 
model). 
Many of these abovementioned studies, however, were limited because they failed 
to fully test the stress generation model (Abela & Hankin, 2011; Auerbach, Eberhart, & 
Abela, 2010; Gibb et al., 2006; Kercher & Rapee, 2009). More specifically, these 
researchers failed to differentiate between events that were dependent as opposed to 
independent of the participants’ behaviour, or did not test the whether the cognitive 
variable(s) of interest uniquely predicted dependent life stress but not independent life 
stress. Research has consistently shown that individuals with depression or those who are 
vulnerable to depression are exposed to a greater number of life stressors (e.g., Fergusson 
& Horwood, 1987; Magnus et al., 1993; Patton, Coffey, Posterino, Carlin, & Bowes, 
2003; Van Os & Jones, 1999). Hence, it would not be surprising for cognitively 
vulnerable individuals to also be exposed to a greater number of total stressors by virtue 
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of their underlying vulnerability. Stress generation theory specifies that such individuals 
are specifically exposed to greater levels of dependent stress, and do not differ from 
nondepressed individuals or individuals vulnerable to depression in their levels of 
exposure to independent events (Hammen, 2006). Hence, to truly test stress generation, 
multiple models comparing the prediction of dependent versus independent life stress are 
warranted. 
Overall, the above studies suggest that a variety of cognitive vulnerability factors 
may influence the generation of stress and subsequent depressive symptoms. 
Unfortunately, all previous studies in this area have relied exclusively on self-report 
questionnaires, which may only tap surface level cognitions that result from effortful 
information processing and may be influenced by participants’ expectation, motivation, 
and mood state (Beevers, 2005; Rude et al., 2010). For example, one of the more 
common used assessment tools for maladaptive beliefs is the Dysfunctional Attitudes 
Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978). These types of constructs often ebb and flow 
with depression itself (e.g., Dobson & Shaw, 1987; Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & 
Franklin, 1981), making it difficult to determine if they represent vulnerability factors, 
concomitants, or “scars” of depression (see Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991; Scher, Ingram, 
& Segal, 2005). This uncertainty potentially limits researchers’ ability to disentangle the 
influence of participant mood state from cognition, to examine the unique contribution of 
cognition to stress generation. Alternatively, depressive cognitions assessed using self-
report questionnaires may be actively suppressed by participants through mental thought 
control (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). In these instances, it is only under conditions of 
reduced cognitive capacity that depressive cognitions may become measureable. An 
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alternative to self-report measures involves the use of more automatic information 
processing, such as interpretive bias, which may less influenced by effortful mental 
control (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), may be taxed by experimental manipulations to 
decrease cognitive capacity (i.e., through the use of cognitive loads; Van der Does, 2005; 
Watkins & Moulds, 2007; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), and may continue to persist and be 
detectable even when participants are not currently in a dysphoric or depressed mood 
state (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude et al., 2001).  
Stress generation and information processing biases. Interpretation of 
ambiguity is one information processing variable that may impact stress generation. 
Certain cognitive predispositions may cause people to respond in positive or negative 
ways to vague or ambiguous social situations based on their previous experiences, 
personality traits, and pre-existing attentional and memory biases. For individuals who 
are in a dysphoric state or are vulnerable to depression by virtue of their depressive self-
schema, this tendency can involve noticing and attaching negativity and personal 
relevance to ambiguous events (Tse & Bond, 2004). In the context of ambiguous 
interpersonal interactions, the nonverbal behaviours of others may be interpreted as 
negative or rejecting (Demenescu, Kortekaas, den Boer, & Aleman, 2010; Hokanson, 
Hummer, & Butler, 1991; Marcus & Askari, 1999; Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006).  
Theoretically, interpretive bias may lead to the generation of life stressors, which 
in turn induces depression (see Figure 1). In this model, interpretive biases play a more 
proximal role in the creation of life stress. When a cognitively vulnerable individual 
experiences indifference from others, or subtle social ambiguities (e.g., not returning a 
phone call promptly, not waving hello from across campus, and not smiling 
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immediately), he or she may interpret these behaviours as intentional signs of dislike, 
displeasure, or disappointment, and react in ways that lead to additional stressors. For 
example, the individual may then give his or her friend the “cold shoulder”, behave in an 
irritated manner or withdraw from further social contact. All these behaviours have the 
unfortunate potential consequence of creating an argument or disagreement with a friend, 
simply because of the interpretation the individual attached to the original behaviour. If 
instead, he or she had thought “They are just busy” or “They must not have seen me”, 
such potential implications could have been prevented.  
Empirical evidence on interpersonal behaviours associated with stress generation 
supports some of these hypothetical pathways from negative interpretations of ambiguity 
to stress generation via specific interpersonal competencies and behaviours. For women, 
interpersonal behaviours such as excessively seeking reassurance, putting others needs 
first, and depending on interpersonal relationships are especially predictive of dependent 
life event stress generation (Eberhart & Hammen, 2009; Shih & Auerbach, 2010; Shih & 
Eberhart, 2010). Furthermore, lower interpersonal competence in the areas of initiating 
social interactions, conflict management, and hostility were predictive of stress 
generation at a daily level (Cummings, Hayes, Laurenceau, & Cohen, 2010; Sahl, Cohen, 
& Dasch, 2009). To the investigator’s knowledge, no research has yet examined any 
forms of information processes biases in the context of stress generation, despite the fact 
that cognitive theory purports that information processing pathways are the most 
proximal cognitive link to depression (Beck, 1967, 1987). Hence, one of the main 
objectives of the current study was to examine interpretive bias as a predictor of stress 
generation.  
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Diathesis-Stress, Cognitive Vulnerabilities, and Depression 
At the same time, it is important to situate the current study within the context of 
previous cognition and stress research. One of the most influential models integrating 
cognitive vulnerabilities and stress in the understanding of depression has been the 
diathesis-stress model (Beck, 1987; Riskind & Alloy, 2006). From a diathesis-stress 
perspective, individuals who are vulnerable to depression are indistinguishable in their 
responses on self-report measures compared to those who are not vulnerable, during 
regular circumstances (Segal & Ingram, 1994). Cognitive vulnerability emerges and is 
distinguishable from non-vulnerable individuals, however, when such individuals face 
situations that activate their depressive self-schemas (Ingram & Luxton, 2005; Monroe & 
Simons, 1991). From this perspective, the depressive self-schema influences how 
individuals interpret and experience stressful events, thereby moderating the impact of 
stressful events (Riskind & Alloy, 2006). When triggered by a stressful event, the 
depressive self-schema leads to automatic and systematic negative information 
processing biases (e.g., attention, memory, interpretation, inhibition) which may initiate 
and/or maintain a dysphoric mood state, leading to greater negative thinking and 
worsening depressed mood (Ingram et al., 1998). Stated another way, the diathesis-stress 
model proposes that individuals with particular cognitive tendencies will interpret and 
react to stressful life events in ways which increase the likelihood of developing 
depression (e.g., Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1987). Hence, the cognitive vulnerabilities 
moderate the impact of stressful life events on the development of depression.  
Empirically, a majority of studies have found support for this proposition in child, 
adolescent, and adult samples using a variety of cognitive vulnerability variables such as 
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dysfunctional attitudes, attributional/inferential style, and rumination (for reviews, see 
Abela & Hankin, 2008; Abramson et al., 2002; D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Garber & 
Hilsman, 1992; Haaga et al., 1991; Hankin & Abela, 2005; Ingram et al., 1998; 
Lakdawalla, Hankin, & Mermelstein, 2007; Scher et al., 2005; Segal & Ingram, 1994). 
For example, Seeds and Dozois (2010) found that the interaction of self-schema structure 
and negative life events in undergraduate students predicted depressive symptoms over a 
1-year period. Beyond simple two-point prospective assessments, multiwave, time-
lagged, and daily diary studies have also examined diathesis-stress models to provide a 
more stringent exploration of this hypothesis (e.g., Abela & Hankin, 2011; Abela & 
Skitch, 2007; Hankin, 2010; Hankin, Wetter, Cheely, & Oppenheimer, 2008; Klocek, 
Oliver, & Ross, 1997; Mezulis, Funasaki, Charbonneau, & Hyde, 2010). For instance, in 
a three-wave study with community youth, Mezulis and colleagues (2010) found that the 
interactions between attributional/inferential style and both total and dependent life stress 
were significant in predicting depression symptom trajectories in girls, but not boys, over 
a four-year period. The most compelling evidence supporting the diathesis-stress 
hypothesis, however, comes from studies that have examined the interaction between 
cognitive vulnerability and stressful life events to prospectively predict the onset of major 
depressive episodes (Alloy et al., 2006; Carter & Garber, 2011; Evans, Heron, Lewis, 
Araya, & Wolke, 2005; Hankin, Abramson, Miller, & Haeffel, 2004, study 2; Lewinsohn, 
Joiner, & Rohde, 2001). In the most recent of these, the interaction of negative cognitions 
and interpersonal stress predicted the first onset of a major depressive episode in 
adolescents (Carter & Garber, 2011). Together, these results provide strong support for a 
cognitive diathesis-stress model of depression.  
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Unfortunately, similar to the issue noted in the review of cognitive vulnerabilities 
and stress generation, no one has examined information processing biases, such as 
interpretive bias, in the context of diathesis-stress models (Ingram et al., 2008). As with 
the cognitive vulnerability research in the area of stress generation, all previous studies 
applying a diathesis-stress model have relied exclusively on self-report questionnaires 
which are open to response biases. Theoretically, interpretive biases may function as 
cognitive diatheses that interact with stress to produce increases in depressive symptoms 
and potential depressive episodes (diathesis-stress/moderation framework). One might 
imagine that a cognitively vulnerable individual interprets ambiguous social information 
in a persistently negative manner. Stressful life events may give rise to a pattern of 
maladaptive self-referent information processing and increased negative interpretation of 
ambiguity that begins the downward cycle toward depression (Riskind & Alloy, 2006). 
Such individuals may start to be more critical of themselves, their future, and others. 
They may start to view other’s indifference or subtle social ambiguities (e.g., not 
returning a phone call promptly, not waving hello from across campus, and not smiling 
immediately) as intentional signs of dislike, displeasure, or disappointment. These 
negative interpretations and subsequent catastrophic thinking would serve to further 
worsen the person’s mood. In contrast, individuals without interpretive biases would 
experience negative mood and related thoughts that are commensurate to the nature of the 
stressful life event (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 2006).  
As previously discussed, there is some indirect evidence from CBM-I studies that 
interpretive bias operates as a diathesis within this type of model, with experimental 
manipulation of interpretation resulting in attenuated emotional reactions following 
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subsequent stressors (Lester et al., 2011; Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2006), 
buffering against the impact of a negative mood induction procedure (Holmes et al., 
2009), and improving mood in individuals with clinical depression (Blackwell & Holmes, 
2010). Prospectively, interpretive bias, in the context of one form of stress (i.e., school 
examinations), has also been shown to predict dysphoric reactions up to one month later 
(Pury, 2002). Hence, a further objective of the current study was to examine interpretive 
bias in the context of a diathesis-stress model using the occurrence of naturalistic life 
events. 
Rationale and Objectives for the Current Study 
At this point, it is unknown if interpretive biases may lead to stress generation, 
and how the combination of interpretive biases and stress may contribute to depression. 
The main rationale for the current study is to investigate these two theoretically and 
empirically supported models, as a way of integrating the information processing variable 
of interpretive bias, with the broader cognitive vulnerability literature. Although some 
forms of interpretive bias appear to lead to depression, the mechanism by which this may 
occur and in what contexts is not known. Interpretive biases themselves may lead to the 
generation of life stressors, which in turn contribute to depression. Interpretive biases 
may also function as cognitive diatheses that interact with stress to produce increases in 
depressive symptoms and potential depressive episodes (diathesis-stress/moderation 
framework). While there is some evidence that interpretive bias may moderate 
individuals’ reactions to stress (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009; Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson 
et al., 2006), this has never been examined in non-experimentally manipulated samples or 
in the additional context of stress generation. Furthermore, no studies of interpretive bias 
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have examined both diathesis-stress and stress generation models in the same sample, 
despite the fact that studies of cognitive vulnerability routinely do so (e.g., Abela & 
Hankin, 2011; Gibb et al., 2006; Hankin, Stone, & Ann Wright, 2010; Kercher & Rapee, 
2009; Mezulis et al., 2010). Hence, the current study aims to examine interpretive bias in 
the context of these two models. If both models hold, it would provide further evidence 
for the problematic situation which cognitively vulnerable individuals face—not only are 
they more likely to develop depression following stressors, but they may, in part, be 
contributing to the creation of the stressors that will trigger, maintain, and/or exacerbate 
their depression.  
Therefore, the overarching goal of this project was to examine interpretive bias 
for ambiguous social information within the context of stress and depression. Two 
measures of interpretive bias were employed, as is standard in this research literature 
(Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Eley et al., 2008; Mogg et al., 2006). The currently most 
reliable and valid measures were selected assess the construct of interpretive bias. First, 
the Scrambled Sentences Task (SST) was selected since it is the most widely used 
measure of interpretive bias and had been shown to have a causal relationship with 
depressive symptoms and syndrome over time (Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010; 
Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 2010). Second, the ambiguous stories priming paradigm (called 
the Ambiguous Stories Task; AST) utilized by Dearing and Gotlib (2009) was selected 
because it used self-referent material and derived reaction-time indicators of interpretive 
bias which are least open to response bias and demand characteristics of participants 
(Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Wisco, 2009; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).  
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Given the importance of assessing whether interpretive bias could predict future 
stressful life events and depressive symptoms, the current study utilized a two-wave 
prospective design over a five-week period. This length of follow-up was selected based 
on previous research examining stress generation and changes in depressive symptoms 
(e.g., Abela & Hankin, 2008; Auerbach et al., 2010; Gibb et al., 2006; Shih, 2006). This 
design allowed for multiple points of measurement of depressive symptoms using a well-
validated instrument (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). To control for past lifetime 
experiences with depression, participants’ worst prior history of depressive symptoms 
was also ascertained using a psychometrically strong measure and current diagnostic 
criteria for MDD (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987). Additionally, this study utilized a 
comprehensive list of life events that was scored for independence and dependence by 
Ph.D.-level raters with experience in contextual rating systems (Brown & Harris, 1978). 
Young adult women were recruited for this study because of the heightened 
period of risk during the transition to adulthood, their higher likelihood of exposure to 
stressful life events, and their increased risk of developing depression (e.g., Burke, Burke, 
Regier, & Rae, 1990; Hankin et al., 1998; Harkness et al., 2010; Safford et al., 2007; 
Shih, 2006; Shih et al., 2006). Many studies on stress generation or interpretive bias have 
focused their investigations solely on women (e.g., Daley et al., 1997; Davila et al., 1995; 
Eberhart & Hammen, 2009; Hammen, 1991; Rude et al., 2010). Consequently, sampling 
exclusively women provided a promising starting point to detect stress generation and 
diathesis-stress effects, if they existed. 
Question 1 - Does interpretive bias predict changes in depressive symptoms? 
Given mixed findings in previous research (e.g., Bisson & Sears, 2007; Dearing & 
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Gotlib, 2009; Lawson et al., 2002; Mogg et al., 2006; Nunn et al., 1997; Sears et al., 
2011), the first objective of the current study was to explore whether interpretive bias, as 
measured by the SST and AST, was related to concurrent depressive symptoms and 
depression symptom history. The extent to which interpretive biases predicted changes in 
depressive symptoms over the 5-week follow-up was also examined (e.g., Rude et al., 
2002). In the prospective analyses, both prior depression symptom severity and baseline 
depressive symptoms were controlled statistically, which is consistent with previous 
studies in this area (Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 2010). This procedure allowed for an 
investigation of the unique effects of interpretive bias above and beyond the effects of 
previous depressive symptomatology (e.g., Rude et al., 2002).  
In general, interpretive biases assessed at Time 1, as measured by the SST and 
AST, were expected to be related to Time 1 depressive symptomatology and depression 
symptom history. More specifically, concurrent depressive symptoms and positive 
depression symptom history were expected to be related to a greater proportion of 
negative sentences constructed on the SST and to faster response latencies for negative 
story endings (and slower reactions times for benign or positive story endings) on the 
AST. 
Interpretive biases were also hypothesized to predict Time 2 depression 
symptoms, over and above the effects of Time 1 depression symptoms and depression 
symptom history (Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 2010). In particular, a higher proportion of 
negative sentences constructed on the SST, as well as faster response latencies for 
negative story endings and slower response latencies for benign or positive story endings 
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on the AST, were hypothesized to predict greater increases in depressive symptoms over 
the 5-week period.  
Question 2 - Does interpretive bias predict stress generation? The second 
objective of this project was to examine interpretive bias for ambiguous social 
information as a contributor to stress generation. More specifically, whether interpretive 
biases to ambiguous scenarios contribute to the generation of dependent (but not 
independent) life events was examined over a prospective interval of five weeks. Given 
that prior depression (e.g., Davila et al., 1995) and current depressive symptoms (Potthoff 
et al., 1995) both predict stress generation, these variables were controlled statistically. 
This procedure helped to safeguard against potential mood-congruent biases in reporting 
and allowed for an examination of the effects of interpretive bias beyond any effects of 
depression.  
Generally, interpretive bias was expected to uniquely predict the occurrence of 
dependent life events, and be unrelated to the frequency of independent life events 
reported by participants. Specifically, a higher proportion of negative sentences 
constructed on the SST, as well as faster response latencies for negative story endings 
and slower response latencies for benign or positive story endings on the AST, were 
hypothesized to predict the occurrence of more life stressors at least partially dependent 
on participants’ behaviours (i.e., dependent events) by Time 2. The indices of interpretive 
bias were not expected to be predictive of the occurrence of fateful stressors (i.e., 
independent events), as is consistent with the stress generation hypothesis (Hammen, 
1991, 1992, 2006). These relationships were hypothesized to exist, controlling for the 
effects of Time 1 depression symptoms and depression symptom history.  
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Question 3 - Does interpretive bias interact with stressful life events to 
predict changes in depressive symptoms? As a complement to the stress generation 
model, the third aim of this study was to examine interpretive bias within the context of a 
diathesis-stress framework (interactional/moderation model; Beck, 1987). Within this 
model, interpretive biases were expected to interact with life stressors to predict increases 
in depressive symptoms across time. In particular, individuals with negative interpretive 
biases, in the context of heightened life stressors, were expected to experience greater 
increases in depressive symptomatology compared to those with fewer life stressors or 
with more adaptive forms of interpretive bias (i.e., moderation). More specifically, 
participants who solved a higher proportion of sentences with negative solutions on the 
SST, and participants who displayed faster response latencies for negative story endings 
and slower response latencies for benign or positive story endings on the AST, in the 
context of higher frequencies of life events, were hypothesized to be at the most elevated 
risk for increases in depressive symptoms, compared to participants with lower 
frequencies of life events or more positive patterns of interpretive bias. Given the well-
known fact that past depression is the best predictor of future depression (Hankin et al., 
1998; Harrington, Fudge, Rutter, Pickles, & Hill, 1990; Lewinsohn, Zeiss, & Duncan, 
1989; Rao, Hammen, & Daley, 1999; for review, see Burcusa & Iacono, 2007), the 
analyses for this hypothesis also statistically controlled for prior depression symptom 
severity and baseline depressive symptoms.   
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Method 
Participants 
 Two-hundred-and-sixteen first-year psychology undergraduate women
2
 
completed the first wave of data collection of this study (Time 1). This sample size was 
selected to be consistent with previous sample sizes used in cognitive vulnerability to 
depression studies using undergraduate student populations (e.g., Gibb et al., 2006; 
Hankin, 2010; Shih et al., 2009; Uhrlass & Gibb, 2007), as well as sample sizes typically 
utilized in our research laboratory (e.g., Brinker & Dozois, 2009; Covin, Dozois, 
Ogniewicz, & Seeds, 2011; Frewen & Dozois, 2006a, 2006b). At the second wave of data 
collection (Time 2), 209 participants completed at least a portion of the measures and 207 
participants completed all Time 2 measures (96% retention rate)
3
. Psychology 1000/1200 
students were recruited using the Psychology Research Participant Pool (nTime 1 = 205; 
nTime 2 = 196). Other students enrolled in first-year courses (nTime 1 = 11; nTime 2 = 11) were 
recruited using posters that were distributed at different locations throughout the  
  
                                                 
2
 The rationale for the gender-specific sampling method is fourfold: (1) the transition period from late 
adolescence to early adulthood is a heightened period of vulnerability for depression in women (Burke, 
Burke, Regier, & Rae, 1990); (2) women are twice as likely to encounter significant experiences with 
depression compared to men in general (Hankin et al., 1998); (3) vulnerable women are more likely to 
experience life events and the stress generation effect compared to men (Safford, Alloy, Abramson, & 
Crossfield, 2007; Shih, 2006; Shih, Eberhart, Hammen, & Brennan, 2006); (4) young adulthood is the main 
period when the women’s rates of life events prior to the onset of a depressive episode are particularly 
elevated compared to men (Harkness et al., 2010). Many studies on stress generation or interpretive bias 
have focused their investigations solely on women (e.g., Daley et al., 1997; Davila, Hammen, Burge, Paley, 
& Daley, 1995; Eberhart & Hammen, 2009; Hammen, 1991; Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, & 
Maestas, 2010). Consequently, sampling exclusively women provided a promising starting point to detect 
stress generation effects, if they existed.  
3
 Comparison statistics were conducted to investigate any differences between those participants who 
completed both waves of data collection and those who did not. For details of these analyses, please refer to 
Appendix A. Based on the very small attrition rate and the minor differences found, it is unlikely that the 
results of this study were significantly influenced by the 9 dropouts. 
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university campus
4
.  
Measures 
 Demographic Questionnaire. A standard questionnaire was administered to 
participants to assess various demographic (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, marital status) 
and clinical (i.e., personal history of previous mental disorder; previous treatment 
received) characteristics (see Appendix C for a copy).  
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II). The BDI-II was completed by all 
participants to assess the current severity of their depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 
1996). The BDI-II is a standardized 21-item self-report measure of depression. 
Participants rate each item on a 4-point (0 to 3) scale by selecting the statement for a 
given question that best matches their experience in the preceding two weeks. An 
example of these types of questions is "sadness", and the participants choose one of “I do 
not feel sad”, “I feel sad much of the time”, “I am sad all of the time”, or “I am so sad or 
unhappy that I can’t stand it” (Beck et al., 1996). A total score is calculated by summing 
across the items, with higher scores indicating a greater severity of depression. The BDI-
II has excellent internal reliability (average coefficient alpha = .91; Dozois & Covin, 
2004) and good test-retest reliability (ranging from .60 to .83 for non-psychiatric 
samples; Dozois & Covin, 2004), as well as excellent content, construct, concurrent, and 
discriminant validity (see Dozois & Covin, 2004, for a comprehensive review of the 
psychometric properties). The BDI-II exhibited excellent internal consistency in the 
current study (α = .91 for Time 1 and α = .93 for Time 2).  
                                                 
4
 Comparison statistics were conducted to investigate any differences between participants recruited via 
different methods. For details of these analyses, please refer to Appendix B. Based on the very small 
sample size and minor differences found, it is unlikely that the results of this study were significantly 
influenced by the 11 participants recruited by posters on campus. 
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Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version (IDD-L). The IDD-L was 
used to assess participants’ worst prior experience of depression (Zimmerman & Coryell, 
1987). For the purposes of the current study, 21 symptom items and 21 duration items 
from the IDD-L were used (out of the original 22), which are originally based on the 
diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders-III (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980). 
Only the items consistent with the more recent edition of the DSM (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for depression were used. Participants 
were asked to recall the most depressed week in their lives and then rate the 21 symptom 
items on a 5-point scale, by choosing the statement that best matched the symptom 
severity during the time in their lives when they “felt the most depressed.” Participants 
also indicated whether this symptom lasted for two weeks or longer, using the duration 
items. For the purposes of the current study, the IDD-L was scored in a continuous 
format. Only those symptoms which were endorsed for longer than 2 weeks were 
included in the total score, as is consistent with previous utilization of this measure 
(Cummings et al., 2010; Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 2010). The IDD-L has strong reliability 
and validity (e.g., Goldston, O’Hara, & Schartz, 1990; Sakado, Sato, Uehara, Sato, & 
Kameda, 1996; Sato et al., 1996; Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987). Internal reliability in the 
current study was excellent (α = .94). 
 Scrambled Sentences Test (SST). The SST (Wenzlaff, 1988, 1993) was used to 
measure participants’ tendency to interpret ambiguous information (e.g., winner born I 
am loser a) in a positive (e.g., I am a born winner) or negative (e.g., I am a born loser) 
manner. Several studies have shown differences between currently depressed, previously 
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depressed, and never-depressed participants on this task (e.g., Hedlund & Rude, 1995; 
Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & Zentner, 2001; Wenzlaff, 1988; Wenzlaff & Bates, 
1998). Participants were presented with two blocks of up to 20 scrambled sentences (in 
random order) and were instructed to click a number below five of the six words of each 
scrambled sentence to produce a grammatically correct sentence (see Appendix D for 
these stimuli). Participants were instructed to complete as many of the sentences as 
possible during each 2.5-minute block, consistent with previous studies utilizing this task 
(e.g., Holmes et al., 2009; Rude et al., 2002, 2003). A count-down clock and number of 
trials completed out of 20 was presented at the top of the computer screen which allowed 
participants to see their progress. The purposes of the time limit was to create consistency 
across participants in their available time to solve the sentences and to encourage them to 
work as quickly as possible, thereby interfering with effortful deliberation on their 
solutions to the sentences (Phillips et al., 2010).  
 Consistent with previous uses of the SST (e.g., Rude et al., 2002, 2003; Wenzlaff, 
1993), a cognitive load procedure was used in either the first or second block of the task. 
The rationale for providing a cognitive load to participants (versus no-load) was to help 
mitigate against potential demand characteristics and self-presentation biases and access 
more fundamental information processing vulnerability (e.g., Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 
2010; Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, & Sweatt, 2001). In the cognitive load condition, 
participants were given a six-digit number to remember while they completed the task. 
Although the size of the cognitive load was not calibrated for each participant 
individually, the current procedure had the advantage of allowing group administration 
and has shown the predicted effects in previous studies (e.g., Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
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Participants were asked to provide the six-digit cognitive load number at the end of the 
2.5-minute block and their accuracy was examined. Eighty-seven percent of participants 
reported the number with perfect accuracy.
5
  
The order of the load and no-load conditions was counterbalanced, with 
approximately half of the participants (n = 103) completing the first block of scrambled 
sentences under cognitive load followed by the second block without load. A negativity 
score for each block was calculated by computing the ratio of negative sentences divided 
by total sentences completed (out of 20 possible). Consistent with previous studies using 
this measure, interpretive bias for the SST was operationally defined as a higher 
negativity score on the cognitive load and no-load conditions (Holmes et al., 2009; Rude 
et al., 2003, 2002).  
Ambiguous Stories Task (AST). The AST was adapted from Dearing and Gotlib 
(2009) and derived from a procedure used by Mathews and his colleagues (e.g., Hirsch & 
Mathews, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). In this task, participants were presented 
with short stories in which the emotional valence remained ambiguous until the final 
word was presented. On some trials, the target word resolved the ambiguity in a valenced 
manner (positive or negative), whereas in other trials grammatically impossible foil items 
were presented. Participants were asked to indicate with a key press whether the word 
presented was grammatically correct, and response latencies were recorded.  
 Participants were provided with 65 three-sentence stories written in a self-
referent, second-person narrative style (e.g., “You are…”). The application of a self-
                                                 
5
 Participants who made errors in the recall (n = 28) were excluded from all subsequent analyses using this 
measure of interpretive bias. In most instances, participants either substituted one or more of the 6 digits for 
a different digit, or only recalled 5 out of 6 digits. 
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referent narrative is important because information processing biases in depression are 
stronger when stimuli are self-referent (Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; Nunn et al., 1997; 
Wisco, 2009). Stories were presented one sentence at a time, self-paced by having the 
participant press the space bar to move to the next sentence. Each story’s final word was 
missing from the third sentence, and participants were encouraged to think of an ending 
for each story. Once they had the ending in mind, participants were instructed to press the 
space bar to see a single probe word appear on the screen. At this point, participants had 
to press a key to indicate whether or not the word represented a grammatically possible 
ending to the story. After the probe word, participants were asked to respond to a 
comprehension (yes/no) question that was unrelated to the story ending. Answers to the 
comprehension questions were followed by immediate feedback (e.g., “Right!” or 
“Wrong, try again next time”) in order to emphasize the importance of reading and 
understanding the story. In other words, the expected semantic meaning of the stories was 
primed by asking participants to think of a possible ending. This true purpose was veiled 
by requiring participants to make grammatical and reading comprehension decisions 
during the task, rather they semantic ones (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 
1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Please refer to Appendix E for a complete version 
of the stories and their possible endings.  
 Control items on this task consisted of unambiguously neutral stories with a 
neutral final word (n = 5) or grammatically impossible foil (n = 10). An example of a 
control story reads: 
1. You have planned to meet a friend at the mall. 
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2. When you arrive, she’s not there, so you call her cell phone to find out where she 
is. 
3. She explains that her mom was late picking her up because she got stuck in 
________________. 
4. Probe word: traffic (participant should press “yes” key) 
5. Comprehension check: Did you call your friend to find out where she was? 
(participants should press the “yes” key). 
Test items allowed for a positive or negative interpretation of the story. An example of a 
test item reads: 
1. You have been writing to your new roommate over the summer. 
2. Tomorrow you are going to meet your roommate for the first time. 
3. As you think about meeting her for the first time, you feel that she will think you 
are ____________________. 
4. Probe word: Friendly (friendly - positive ending; annoying - negative ending; 
pleasure – grammatically impossible foil) 
5. Comprehension check: Had you met your roommate before? (participants should 
press the “no” key). 
The number of possible and impossible endings was counterbalanced across the entire 
stimulus set. For test items, one third of the test sample set contained endings that 
resolved the story in a negative, positive, or grammatically impossible manner. Stories 
from Dearing and Gotlib’s study (2009) of pre-adolescent girls were adapted for the 
current study to be more age-appropriate for a post-secondary school sample. This task 
was evaluated in a pilot study to ensure that the control stimuli were indeed unambiguous 
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and that the test stimuli were amenable to both positive and negative interpretations. 
Sixteen graduate-level students were presented with all 65 stories and asked to fill in the 
blank at the end of each story with a positive and/or negative word that would complete 
the story in a grammatically possible way. Pilot responses to control stories were 
completely consistent with the developed endings, with participants recording the 
expected ending or a grammatically equivalent synonym 93% of the time. Responses to 
test (ambiguous) stories showed that alternate interpretations were possible, with 
participants writing down identical or similar positive and negative endings 62% and 
38% of the time, respectively. These findings suggested that control stimuli were 
unambiguous and test stimuli were amenable to multiple interpretations (Dearing & 
Gotlib, 2009). 
 Positive, negative, and impossible endings were randomized across participants, 
and the order of presentation of stories was fully randomized for each participant. Stimuli 
were presented in three blocks, each consisting of 21 or 22 trials, on an IBM-compatible 
personal computer and a Samsung 17 inch colour monitor. Interpretation bias for this task 
was operationally defined in relation to the response latencies for test trials. Participants 
were expected to be slower to respond “yes” to grammatically possible endings that were 
inconsistent with their interpretation of the story than grammatically possible endings that 
were consistent with their interpretation (see MacLeod & Cohen, 1993). Therefore, the 
main trials of interest were response latencies on test trials in which participants 
responded “yes” to negative endings or “yes” to positive endings (Dearing & Gotlib, 
2009). Responses in which they replied “no” to possible endings (either negative or 
positive), or “yes” to grammatically impossible endings, were considered errors and were 
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not relevant to the current investigation. In the current study, it was expected that 
interpretive bias would be manifested as faster response times for test trials with negative 
endings (facilitation) and slower response times for test trials with positive endings 
(interference). Previous work has shown that girls at-risk for depression are more likely 
to impose negative interpretations and less likely to impose positive interpretations on 
ambiguous information, compared to girls at low-risk for depression (Dearing & Gotlib, 
2009).  
 Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire (SLEQ). A 260-item measure of 
negative life events and hassles was created for the current study. Items for this 
composite measure were drawn from existing life event checklists and interviews, to 
ensure that coverage of all potential themes and domains of life events (e.g., school, 
home, family and friends, marriage and dating, parenting, crime/legal, work, finances, 
migration, bereavement, other) were captured and to ensure that a sufficient number of 
events could be differentiated clearly as dependent and independent. Dependent events 
were operationalized as at least in part dependent on the actions of the individual (e.g., 
intentional act by participant, negligence, argument, end of contact/breakup; Brown & 
Harris, 1978). Independent events were operationalized as events that are independent of 
the participant’s actions (e.g., family moves away, victim of natural disaster, witness to 
fight but not involved, physically ill).  
Life events and hassles were drawn from the Adolescent Life Events 
Questionnaire – Revised (Hankin & Abramson, 2002), the College Student Life Event 
Schedule (Sandler & Lakey, 1982), the Daily Hassles and Uplifts Scale (Kanner, Coyne, 
Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981), the Hassles and Uplifts Scale (DeLongis, Folkman, & 
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Lazarus, 1988), the Life Experiences Survey (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978), the 
Negative Daily Stressors Checklist (Sahl et al., 2009), the Negative Life Events 
Questionnaire (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992) and the Positive and Negative Event Scales 
(Maybery, 2003). For each of the items on the life events measure, participants were 
asked to indicate if the event occurred during the five weeks between the Time 1 and 
Time 2 assessment and, if so, the degree of its impact on their lives. To reduce potential 
response bias associated with depressive symptoms, the number of events endorsed over 
the 5-week period (rather than the subjective impact ratings) was emphasized. A sum of 
dependent and independent events was calculated.  
Using a procedure similar to several previous studies that have utilized 
questionnaire-based methods to assess life events, the final list of life events was coded a 
priori for independence/dependence (e.g., Auerbach et al., 2010; Iacoviello, Grant, Alloy, 
& Abramson, 2009). Ratings were independently conducted by the study author and a 
Ph.D. level psychologist, both with experience and training as raters for the gold standard 
contextual life event rating system (i.e., The Life Events and Difficulties Schedule 
[LEDS; G. W. Brown & Harris, 1978]) and highly familiar with concepts of 
independence and dependence of life events. The LEDS rating system provides over 
5,000 examples of contextual life events and rating rules, with which rating teams must 
apply ratings based on a specific example that seems most similar to the event being 
currently rated. In the present study, both raters had over two years of experience 
working on consensus teams, making ratings about independence/dependence based on 
the context of events using the LEDS-II manual with adolescent and adult samples 
(Bifulco et al., 1989; Brown et al., 1992; Brown & Harris, 1989; Frank, Matty, & 
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Anderson, 1997). Items whose coding was agreed upon were retained. Items which were 
not categorized into dependent versus independent were excluded from statistical 
analyses (see Appendix F). Cohen’s kappa coefficient, as calculated for these 
independent, dependent, and neither/unsure event codes, was 0.72, indicating a moderate 
to substantial level of agreement among raters (Fleiss, 1971; Landis & Koch, 1977; 
Posner, Sampson, Caplan, Ward, & Cheney, 1990; Shrout, 1998; Sim & Wright, 2005). 
Including the combination of major life events and hassles in the assessment of life stress 
ensured that there were sufficient events experienced by participants over the 5-week 
interval, thereby enhancing statistical power (e.g., Alloy, Reilly-Harrington, Fresco, 
Whitehouse, & Zechmeister, 1999).  
An overall total number of life events endorsed was calculated (out of a possible 
160 events). Of those items, 34 were coded as independent and 105 as dependent (20 
items were not categorized and were excluded from the life event subscales). Item 
response on the life event checklist varies according to the type and frequency of the life 
stress experiences; thus, the calculation of internal consistency coefficients is not 
appropriate for this type of scale. However, other researchers have sometimes calculated 
internal consistency as a proxy of degree of stressfulness of individuals’ lives and/or their 
tendency to report life events (e.g., Wingate & Joiner, 2004) and hence they can be 
calculated; in the current study, the internal consistency (α) for the SLEQ dependent 
events and SLEQ independent events were .92 and .77, respectively. The frequency of 
life events in the current study is relatively consistent with previous studies using self-
report checklists to assess life event occurrence of a similar time interval (Gibb et al., 
2006; Hankin et al., 2010; Uhrlass & Gibb, 2007). Length of time between Time 1 and 
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Time 2 appointments was not related to the number of overall life events, r(206) = -0.04, 
p = 0.58, number of independent life events, r(206) = -0.03, p = 0.72, or number of 
dependent life events , r(206) = -0.03, p = 0.70, which participants reported during the 5-
week interval.  
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited through the Psychology Research Participant Pool or 
through posters on campus at the University of Western Ontario. Permission to conduct 
this investigation was provided by the university Institutional Ethics Review Board (see 
Appendix G). Those individuals willing to participate were provided with a letter of 
information and completed the process of informed consent, which was confirmed by 
signing a consent form. Participants completed a 2-hour protocol (Time 1), in groups of 
one to five. A clinical psychology graduate student or undergraduate volunteer student, 
who had received training on all of the measures, conducted this assessment. Subsequent 
to that assessment, participants were asked to complete an online Time 2 assessment 5 
weeks (M = 34.93 days, SD = 2.13 days, Range = 32 - 46 days) later which was 
approximately 30 minutes in duration (M = 23.14 minutes, SD = 12.26 minutes, Range = 
6 - 88 minutes). For the second assessment point, participants were emailed a link to a 
webpage where they could complete the follow-up portion of this study. A 5-week 
follow-up period was selected based on past research (e.g., Abela & Hankin, 2008; 
Auerbach et al., 2010; Gibb et al., 2006; Shih, 2006). This time interval appears to be 
useful for examining the generation of life events and prospective changes in depressive 
symptoms. 
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 At Time 1, participants completed all symptom questionnaires and computer tasks 
at the in-person assessment meeting. At the start of the administration session, the 
computer-based information processing tasks (AST and SST), as well as other 
information processing measures that are not applicable to the current investigation, were 
presented to participants in random order. During the second portion of the experiment, 
self-report questionnaires were presented in random order along with additional measures 
that are not the focus of the current study. At the 5-week follow-up session (Time 2), 
participants were asked to complete a subset of the measures that they completed at the 
Time 1 (including the BDI-II and the life events questionnaire) using a secure website. A 
benefit of this procedure was that the exact date and time when the assessments took 
place could be determined which ensured that the questionnaires were completed as 
scheduled (e.g., Gibb et al., 2006). Upon completion of the study, participants were 
debriefed regarding the study’s purpose, thanked for their participation, and provided 
with participant credit for their introductory psychology class. For participants who 
completed only the first in-person assessment, 2.0 participant credits or $20 was awarded 
depending on their method of recruitment. If participants opted to complete the follow-up 
assessments, they earned an additional 1.0 credit for their participation (for those in the 
Research Participant Pool) or were entered in a draw for one of several $100 gift cards to 
a local shopping centre with a 1 in 10 chance of winning.  
Data Analytic Strategy 
Only data for participants who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 assessments 
were included in the analyses. All variables were standardized prior to analyses, where 
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appropriate. To address each of the research questions, the following data analytic 
approaches were utilized. 
Question 1 - Does interpretive bias predict changes in depressive symptoms? 
Bivariate and partial correlation analyses were performed to investigate the cross-sectional 
relationships among interpretive bias variables (SST and AST) and Time 1 depressive 
symptomatology (BDI-II) and depression symptom history (IDD-L). A series of hierarchical 
linear regression analyses were conducted to examine whether interpretive bias predicted 
follow-up depressive symptoms. In these regressions, scores on the BDI-II at Time 2 
served as the criterion variable, and any correlated demographic characteristics (based 
upon preliminary analyses), BDI-II at Time 1, and IDD-L at Time 1 were entered as 
covariates. Separate regression analyses were run for each of the indices of interpretive 
bias (e.g., average RT for positive target trials on the AST, negativity ratio for the 
cognitive load condition on the SST).  
Question 2 - Does interpretive bias predict stress generation? A series of 
negative binomial regressions were conducted using Stata 11.0 to investigate whether 
interpretive bias measures predicted stress generation. Hierarchical models involving a 
count outcome variable (e.g., number of dependent events) are typically conducted using 
a Poisson distribution rather than a normal distribution (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
Negative binomial regressions belong to Poisson-class regression models, and were 
deemed to be most appropriate in the current study (please refer to Appendix H for a 
detailed description). Two sets of regressions were conducted, one with each of the count 
data of independent and dependent life events serving as the criterion variable. In all 
regressions, any correlated demographic characteristics (based upon preliminary 
analyses), BDI-II at Time 1, and IDD-L at Time 1 were entered as covariates. Similar to 
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hypothesis 1, separate regression analyses were conducted for each of the indices of 
interpretive bias.  
Question 3 - Does interpretive bias interact with stressful life events to 
predict changes in depressive symptoms? To examine a diathesis-stress/moderation 
model of depression, a series of hierarchical linear regression analyses was conducted 
according to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) guidelines. In these analyses, the interaction 
between each baseline interpretive bias variable and dependent stress was examined as a 
predictor of follow-up BDI-II scores. Consistent with Friedrich’s (1982) procedure, the 
cross-product of the standardized independent variables was used as the interaction term. 
The main effects of each interpretive bias variable, dependent stress, baseline BDI-II 
scores, previous depression symptom history and independent life stress were controlled 
statistically. Follow-up analyses were conducted, as necessary, according to Aiken and 
West’s (1991) procedure. 
Influential observations. Sample sizes in the regression analyses vary due to 
exclusions of influential cases (i.e., outliers), based on Cook’s D statistic (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). In regression analyses, if the removal of an observation produces 
substantial changes in the estimates of the regression coefficients, then that observation is 
considered influential (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Influence is the product of leverage 
and discrepancy, with leverage referring to how far away an observed predictor is from 
its mean and discrepancy referring to how unusual an observed outcome score is given 
the combination of predictor variables (Fox, 2008). Cook’s D statistic provides a 
summary index of the influence that an observation has on the regression coefficients. In 
all subsequent linear regression analyses, Cook’s D statistic was used to identify 
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participants who could be excluded from analyses to produce more stable regression 
coefficients. In each instance, analyses were rerun removing cases with extreme values of 
Cook’s D to determine whether the results changed with the removal of the influential 
case(s). In most analyses, the removal of the most influential cases did not alter the 
significance of the model statistics but did alter the level of significance for the regression 
coefficients. As such, participants were excluded from each analysis repeatedly and 
systematically, until no significant influential cases were detected using Cook’s D 
statistic.
6
 
 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Some researchers suggest that all statistical analyses should also be conducted including any observations 
that were eliminated (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). As such, each of the main statistical 
analyses was repeated including all observations (n = 207). Please see each hypothesis in the results section 
for the outcome of these analyses.    
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Results 
Descriptive Characteristics of the Sample 
 The average age of participants was 18.57 years (SD = 2.83, Range = 16 - 47). 
Consistent with the ethnic variability within the university, most of the students reported 
that their ethnicity was White/Caucasian (n = 142; 68.6%). Other ethnicities represented 
in the sample included Asian (n = 42; 20.3%), Black/African Canadian (n = 7; 3.2%), 
East Indian (n = 4; 1.9%), and Aboriginal/Native Canadian (n = 2; 1.0%). Ten 
participants (4.8%) categorized themselves in an “Other” ethnic group, and provided 
descriptions of ethnic categories not covered in the main questionnaire (e.g., Muslim, 
Middle Eastern, Arabic) or mixed ethnicities (e.g., Part Lebanese/Part Indian; 
Canadian/Trinidadian). Most of the women reported that they were single (n = 202; 
97.6%), but a few were married/common-law/engaged (n = 3; 1.4%) or 
divorced/separated (n = 2; 1.0%). 
Ten participants (4.8%) reported that they have been diagnosed with one or more 
mental disorders in the past. The description of these diagnoses included depression, 
obsessive compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia. Sixteen 
participants (7.7%) reported that they had received medication(s) for an emotional or 
psychological problem. Thirty-nine participants (18.8%) reported that they had received 
therapy or counselling for an emotional or psychological problem.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Data reduction. Response latencies on the AST were analyzed to test the 
hypotheses that interpretations bias, defined as a greater tendency to impose negative 
interpretations and a decreased tendency to impose positive interpretation on ambiguous 
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information, would predict depressive symptoms and life stressors. Only response 
latencies from correct responses to both the target word and the comprehension question 
were analyzed (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009). Error rates across all conditions were low 
(mean for target word accuracy = 0.09; mean for comprehension accuracy = 0.08). Error 
rates did not differ as a function of Time 1 BDI-II scores (ps ranging from .06 to .11) or 
depression symptom history as assessed by the IDD-L at Time 1 (ps ranging from .37 to 
.87). The proportion of data lost due to errors was inspected for each participant; based 
on these data, 23 participants were excluded due to an unusually high number of incorrect 
answers to the questions (fewer than 70% of the target and comprehension questions 
were both answered correctly), suggesting that these participants had difficulty 
comprehending the task requirements or were not attentive to the task.  
Furthermore, to prevent outlier data from unduly influencing participant means, 
latencies greater than three standard deviations above and below each participant’s mean 
were excluded. In addition, response latencies lower than 300 ms were considered 
anticipation errors and were also excluded from further analyses. Response latencies 
greater than 3,000 ms were excluded because they likely reflected lapses in attention to 
the task. The proportion of data lost due to outliers was inspected for each participant; 
based on these data, no participants were excluded due to an unusually high number of 
response latencies classified as outliers. The proportion of data lost due to outliers was 
less than 3%, and is comparable to the rates lost due to errors and outliers found in 
similar text comprehension paradigms (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Mogg et al., 2006). 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to examine whether participants differed in 
their overall reaction times depending on the valence of the probe word (i.e., the way in 
60 
 
 
6
0
 
which the stories resolved; positive or negative) and whether participants as a whole 
responded more rapidly in affirmative conditions than in conditions in which the ‘no’ 
response was correct. There was a significant difference in the mean reaction time for 
negative target trials and positive target trials on the Ambiguous Stories Task; 
participants, in general, were slower to react to possible negative target trials as compared 
to possible positive target trials, paired t(183) = -10.98, p < 0.001. This finding is 
consistent with previous research utilizing this measure (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009). 
Participants in this study responded equally quickly in the affirmative conditions (M = 
1.11, SD = 0.35) and in the conditions in which a ‘no’ response was indicated (M = 1.11, 
SD = .35), paired t(183) = -0.05, p = .96. This result stands in contrast to the previous 
work with this measure, where it is typically found that an affirmative answer is faster 
than a ‘no’ response (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009). 
Study variables and demographic characteristics. Only data for participants 
who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 assessments were included in the analyses. 
Descriptive statistics for the symptom and interpretive bias variables are presented in 
Table 1. Table 2 contains the stressful life event data, including a breakdown of the 
frequency of life event occurrences for dependent and independent events.  
The average level of current depressive symptoms reported on the BDI-II at Time 
1 and Time 2 was somewhat higher than what is typically found in undergraduate 
samples (see Kendall & Sheldrick, 2000). At Time 1, 126 participants reported total 
scores on the BDI-II that reflected a level of depression in the minimal range (0-13   
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Symptom and Interpretive Bias Variables 
 
Variable n M SD Min Max 
BDI-II – Time 1 207 12.86 8.80 1 44 
BDI-II – Time 2 207 12.69 9.96 0 55 
IDD-L – Time 1 207 13.71 16.53 0 64 
SST – Time 1      
     No-Load Condition 207 0.23 0.22 0.00 0.90 
     Cognitive Load Condition
a 
180 0.24 0.23 0.00 0.82 
AST – Time 1b      
     Average RT for Positive Target Trials 184 0.96 0.25 0.51 1.72 
     Average RT for Negative Target Trials 184 1.10 0.29 0.64 1.94 
 
Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II; IDD-L 
= Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time (in 
seconds); SST = Scrambled Sentences Test 
 
a
 Sample size varies for this measure because only participants who correctly recalled the 
6-digit cognitive load number and who completed both assessments were included. 
 
b 
Sample size varies for this measure because of participants who were excluded due to an 
unusually high number of errors, suggestive of difficulty comprehending the task 
requirements or inattentiveness during the task. 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Stressful Life Event Variables 
 
Variable n % M SD Min Max 
SLEQ total overall events – Time 2  207  10.28 10.86 0 129 
     SLEQ independent events
 – Time 2a 207  1.57 2.24 0 27 
          No. participants with 0 57 27.5     
          No. participants with 1 67 32.4     
          No. participants with 2 41 19.8     
          No. participants with 3 23 11.1     
          No. participants with 4 13 6.3     
          No. participants with 5+ 6 2.9     
     SLEQ dependent events – Time 2b 207  6.91 7.69 0 88 
          No. participants with 0 7 3.4     
          No. participants with 1 16 7.7     
          No. participants with 2 26 12.6     
          No. participants with 3 21 10.1     
          No. participants with 4 23 11.1     
          No. participants with 5 12 5.8     
          No. participants with 6 19 9.2     
          No. participants with 7 11 5.3     
          No. participants with 8 17 8.2     
          No. participants with 9 9 4.3     
          No. participants with 10+ 46 22.3     
 
Note. SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire 
 
a
 Out of a possible 34 events coded as independent of the participants’ behaviour or 
actions. 
 
b
 Out of a possible 105 events coded as at least partially dependent on the participants’ 
behaviour or actions.  
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points); 36 reported scores in the mild range (14-19 points); 32 reported scores in the 
moderate range (20-28 points); and 13 reported scores in the severe range (29-63 points; 
Beck et al., 1996). Applying Dozois, Dobson, and Ahnberg’s (1998) BDI-II cutoffs for 
the classification of undergraduate samples, 119 would be in the nondepressed category 
(BDI-II scores from 0-12), 43 would be in the dysphoric category (BDI-II scores from 
13-19) and 45 would be in the dysphoric-depressed category (BDI-II scores from 20-63). 
At Time 2, similar numbers of participants fell into the BDI-II ranges as delineated 
above: 129 in the minimal range, 32 in the mild range, 33 in the moderate range, 13 in the 
severe range. There was not a significant difference in the average level of depressive 
symptoms reported from Time 1 to Time 2, paired t(206) = 0.30, p = .76. The average 
level of symptom severity as reported by the IDD-L in the current study was similar to 
that reported in other studies using undergraduate students (e.g., Goldston et al., 1990; 
Haaga, McDermut, & Ahrens, 1993). 
Overall, participants solved a greater average number of sentences in the no-load 
condition of the SST (M = 10.29, SD = 2.25) than in the cognitive load condition (M = 
10.00, SD = 2.26), paired t(179) = -1.98, p < 0.05. This finding is consistent with the 
assumption that the presence of a cognitive load should have increased the cognitive 
demands on the participants, thereby making it more difficult for them to descramble the 
sentences as quickly as in the no-load condition. The average negativity ratios on the 
cognitive load, t(179) = 8.75, p < .001, and no-load conditions, t(206) = 8.09, p < .001, 
were significantly higher compared to previous studies using these measures (e.g., Rude 
et al., 2002), and were more consistent with ratios of individuals who were subsequently 
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder after an 18 to 28 month interval (Rude et al., 
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2003). Hence, the current sample and/or their responses to the interpretive bias measures 
captured by the negativity ratios of the SST in the current study may be different in some 
way from those previously examined in the literature. 
As stated earlier, Time 1 BDI-II scores and Time 1 IDD-L scores were used as 
covariates in all analyses to control for baseline depressive symptoms and prior 
depression symptom severity, as is consistent with previous studies in this area (e.g., 
Cummings et al., 2010; Rude et al., 2002; Shih & Eberhart, 2010). To examine whether 
age, ethnicity, marital status, past diagnosis history, history of medication use, and/or 
history of therapy use were related to any of the pertinent study variables, appropriate 
preliminary tests were conducted. Please refer to Appendix I for the detailed outcomes of 
these statistical analyses. To minimize the number of covariates required in subsequent 
analyses to prevent residual confounding due to mismeasurement, preliminary tests to 
ascertain the most ‘potent’ or necessary variables were conducted (Christenfeld, Sloan, 
Carroll, & Greenland, 2004). In general, in any of the main analyses including IDD-L 
symptom scores as a covariate, self-reported diagnosis, medication, or therapy history 
were not also included as covariates. Based on the preliminary analyses, the following 
covariates were used in conjunction with the main study variables in statistical analyses: 
(a) age, marital status, and ethnicity were covariates with negativity ratio for the no-load 
condition on the SST; (b) self-reported diagnosis, therapy, and medication history were 
covariates with Time 1 IDD-L scores and Time 2 BDI-II scores (and were used only as 
covariates when IDD-L scores were not also used as a covariate); (c) self-reported 
therapy history was a covariate with Time 1 BDI-II scores (and was used only when 
IDD-L scores were also not included as a covariate); and (d) diagnosis history was a 
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covariate with SST ratios for the no-load and cognitive load conditions (and was used as 
a covariate only when general psychological distress history, as assessed by the IDD-L, 
was included as an additional covariate). 
Correlations among study variables. Bivariate and partial correlations (where 
applicable), controlling for any relevant covariates as described previously, were 
calculated for all study variables (see Table 3). The bivariate correlations between the 
baseline measures of interpretive bias ranged from |.05| to |.09| across interpretive bias 
tasks (i.e., AST versus SST indices) and from |.58| to |.80| within interpretive bias tasks 
(i.e., different indices from the AST or SST). Once age, marital status, ethnicity (for SST  
no-load condition), and diagnosis self-reported diagnosis history (for both SST no-load 
and cognitive load conditions) were controlled for, the magnitude of these associations 
shifted slightly (see upper diagonal in Table 3). Previous studies using similar 
interpretive bias measures have noted significant associations among measures (e.g., r = 
.13, p < .001; Eley et al., 2008) and between different indices from the same measure 
(e.g., r = -.28, p < .05; Hindash & Amir, 2012). Of note, the negativity ratios on the SST 
cognitive load and no-load conditions typically correlate anywhere between r = .67 and r 
= .74 (Rude et al., 2002, 2003). Overall, the pattern of correlations in the current study 
suggested that the different measures of interpretive bias represented conceptually 
related, but empirically distinct constructs.  
The magnitude of the correlation observed between independent and dependent 
life events in the current study (r = .79) was consistent with other stress generation 
studies that have utilized questionnaire-based life event assessment (e.g., r = .76, Hankin 
et al., 2010; r = .80, Sahl et al., 2009). Although these indexes are statistically related in  
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Table 3 
Bivariate and Partial Correlations Between Depressive Symptoms, Interpretive Bias 
Measures, and Stressful Life Event Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. BDI-II – Time 1      --    .64***    .32***    .42***    .41*** 
2. BDI-II – Time 2    .66***      --    .28***    .42***    .40*** 
3. IDD-L     .34***    .36***      --    .20**    .18* 
4. SST – No-Load Condition    .43***    .41***    .20**      --    .57*** 
5. SST – Load Conditiona    .42***    .41***    .22***    .58***      -- 
6. AST – Average RT Positiveb    .02   -.09    .04    .06    .08 
7. AST – Average RT Negativeb   -.10   -.14   -.02   -.09   -.05 
8. SLEQ Total – Time 2    .11    .36***    .08    .23***    .10 
9. SLEQ Independent – Time 2    .07    .30***    .07    .22**    .08 
10. SLEQ Dependent – Time 2    .11    .36***    .08    .23***    .10 
 
Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II; IDD-L 
= Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time (in 
seconds); SST = Scrambled Sentences Test; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences 
Questionnaire. 
Note. Bivariate correlations are on the lower diagonal; partial correlations are on the 
upper diagonal. Partial correlations with Time 1 BDI-II covaried out the effects of 
participants’ self-reported diagnosis history. Partial correlations with Time 2 BDI-II 
covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported diagnosis, therapy, and medication 
history. Partial correlations with IDD-L covaried out the effects of participants’ self-
reported diagnosis, therapy, and medication history. Partial correlations with SST no-load 
condition covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported age, marital status, 
ethnicity, and diagnosis history. Partial correlations with SST cognitive load condition 
covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported diagnosis history. 
a
 Only included the participants who correctly recalled the 6-digit remember load number 
for the purposes of all analyses in this paper (n = 180).  
b 
Only included the participants who were not excluded because of an unusually high 
error rate (n = 184).  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
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Table 3 continued 
Bivariate and Partial Correlations Between Depressive Symptoms, Interpretive Bias 
Measures, and Stressful Life Event Variables 
Variable 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. BDI-II – Time 1    .03   -.10    .11    .07    .11 
2. BDI-II – Time 2   -.11   -.15*    .38***    .31***    .37*** 
3. IDD-L     .04   -.03    .09    .08    .08 
4. SST – No-Load Condition    .06   -.09    .24***    .23**    .24** 
5. SST – Load Conditiona    .09   -.04    .10    .08    .11 
6. AST – Average RT Positiveb      --    .80***   -.02   -.01   -.03 
7. AST – Average RT Negativeb    .80***      --   -.10   -.07   -.10 
8. SLEQ Total – Time 2   -.02   -.10      --    .87***    .98*** 
9. SLEQ Independent – Time 2   -.01   -.07    .87***      --    .79*** 
10. SLEQ Dependent – Time 2   -.03   -.10    .98***    .79***      -- 
 
Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II; IDD-L 
= Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time (in 
seconds); SST = Scrambled Sentences Test; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences 
Questionnaire. 
Note. Bivariate correlations are on the lower diagonal; partial correlations are on the 
upper diagonal. Partial correlations with Time 1 BDI-II covaried out the effects of 
participants’ self-reported diagnosis history. Partial correlations with Time 2 BDI-II 
covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported diagnosis, therapy, and medication 
history. Partial correlations with IDD-L covaried out the effects of participants’ self-
reported diagnosis, therapy, and medication history. Partial correlations with SST no-load 
condition covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported age, marital status, 
ethnicity, and diagnosis history. Partial correlations with SST cognitive load condition 
covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported diagnosis history. 
a
 Only included the participants who correctly recalled the 6-digit remember load number 
for the purposes of all analyses in this paper (n = 180).  
b 
Only included the participants who were not excluded because of an unusually high 
error rate (n = 184).  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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the current study, they are conceptually different according to stress generation theory 
(Hammen, 1991, 2006). In fact, previous researchers have suggested that vulnerable 
individuals may live in family contexts and choose friends that increase their risk of both 
dependent life and independent life events (e.g., family member’s poor health; Harkness 
& Stewart, 2009). Hence, if broader social circumstances contribute to independent life 
events beyond the individual’s control, they may also increase the risk of dependent life 
events within that same environment. 
Question 1 - Does Interpretive Bias Predict Changes in Depressive Symptoms? 
The first objective of this study was to explore whether interpretive biases, as 
measured by the SST and AST, were related to concurrent depressive symptoms and 
depression symptom history at Time 1, and if they predicted increases in depressive 
symptoms at Time 2. More specifically, concurrent depressive symptoms and depression 
symptom history were expected to be related to a greater proportion of negative sentences 
constructed on the SST and to faster response latencies for negative story endings (and 
slower reactions times for benign or positive story endings) on the AST. Furthermore, a 
higher proportion of negative sentences constructed on the SST no-load and cognitive 
load conditions, as well as faster response latencies for negative story endings and slower 
response latencies for benign or positive story endings on the AST, were hypothesized to 
predict greater increases in depressive symptoms over the 5-week period.  
Bivariate and partial correlations were used to investigate the concurrent 
relationship among interpretive bias and Time 1 depressive symptom measures. 
Consistent with hypotheses, negativity ratios on the SST for both the no-load and 
cognitive load conditions were significantly related to higher scores on the BDI-II and 
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IDD-L at Time 1, both with and without covariates. Contrary to hypotheses, neither the 
average reaction time for positive target trials nor the average reaction time for negative 
target trials on the AST, were significantly related to Time 1 BDI-II scores or Time 1 
IDD-L scores, with or without demographic covariates.  
Hierarchical linear regression analyses controlling for demographic covariates 
(i.e., age and marital status, where applicable), as well as Time 1 BDI-II and IDD-L, were 
used to examine whether baseline interpretive bias factors predicted depressive symptoms 
at five-week follow-up. In the first step, demographic covariates related to the criterion 
variable or interpretive bias predictor variable were entered, where applicable (see Tables 
4 through 7).
7
 In all instances, Time 1 depressive symptomatology (BDI-II scores) and 
Time 1 depressive symptom history (IDD-L scores) predicted Time 2 BDI-II 
significantly. In the final step, the interpretive bias variables were entered individually in 
a series of separate regressions predicting Time 2 depression.  
Results indicated that negativity ratios for both the no-load
8
 and cognitive load 
conditions on the SST (ps < .05) significantly predicted follow-up depressive symptoms, 
as did the average reaction time for positive target trials on AST (p < .05). Consistent 
with hypotheses, higher negativity ratios (i.e., higher proportion of scrambled sentences 
solved in a negative way, relative to the total number of sentences solved) on the SST 
predicted increased levels of depressive symptoms at Time 2, over and above baseline 
covariates and Time 1 symptoms. In contrast to expectations, faster average reaction 
                                                 
7
 No demographic covariates were necessary in the analyses contained in Tables 5 through 7, since Time 1 
IDD-L scores served as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See Appendix L for further 
details. 
8
 The pattern of results was identical in analyses conducted without any demographic covariates included 
(Simmons et al., 2011). 
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Table 4 
Hierarchical Linear Regression Prospectively Predicting Depressive Symptoms from Negativity Ratio on SST No-Load Condition 
Step and variable entered F ∆F R ∆R2 df B SE of B β t 
Step 1: Demographic Covariates 1.03 1.03 .12 .02 3, 199     
     Age      -0.43 0.36 -.13 -1.20 
     Marital Status      2.90 4.45 .07 0.65 
     Ethnicity      0.54 0.43 .09 1.28 
Step 2: Baseline Depression 46.30*** 112.47*** .74 .52 2, 197     
     BDI-II – Time 1      0.73 0.06 0.66 12.67*** 
     IDD-L       0.08 0.03 0.14 2.66* 
Step 3: Interpretive Bias Variable – SST 40.64*** 6.21* .74 .01 1, 196     
     No-Load Condition      5.94 2.38 0.14 2.49* 
 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; SST = Scrambled 
Sentences Test  
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
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Table 5  
Hierarchical Linear Regression Prospectively Predicting Depressive Symptoms from Negativity Ratios on SST Cognitive Load 
Condition 
Step and variable entered F ∆F R ∆R2 df B SE of B β t 
Step 1: Baseline Depression 86.39*** 86.39*** .71 .50 2, 172     
     BDI-II – Time 1      0.69 0.06 0.65 11.49*** 
     IDD-L       0.07 0.03 0.13 2.28* 
Step 3: Interpretive Bias Variable – SST 63.23*** 8.93** .73 .02 1, 171     
     Cognitive Load Condition      6.66 2.23 0.17 2.99** 
 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; SST = Scrambled 
Sentences Test  
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 6 
Hierarchical Linear Regression Prospectively Predicting Depressive Symptoms from Average Reaction Time for Positive Target 
Trials on the Ambiguous Stories Task 
Step and variable entered F ∆F R ∆R
2
 df B SE of B β t 
Step 1: Baseline Depression 104.57*** 104.57*** .73 .54 2, 179     
     BDI-II – Time 1      0.77 0.06 0.66 12.28*** 
     IDD-L       0.09 0.03 0.16 3.00** 
Step 2: Interpretive Bias Variable – AST 72.93*** 4.99* .74 .01 1, 178     
     Average RT for Positive Target Trials      -4.40 1.97 -0.11 -2.23* 
 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time  
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 7 
Hierarchical Linear Regression Prospectively Predicting Depressive Symptoms from Average Reaction Time for Negative Target 
Trials on the Ambiguous Stories Task 
Step and variable entered F ∆F R ∆R
2
 df B SE of B β t 
Step 1: Baseline Depression 109.42*** 109.42*** .74 .55 2, 177     
     BDI-II – Time 1      0.75 0.06 0.66 12.44*** 
     IDD-L       0.10 0.03 0.18 3.32** 
Step 2: Interpretive Bias Variable – AST 74.93*** 3.21† .75 .01 1, 176     
     Average RT for Negative Target Trials      -2.93 1.64 -0.09 -1.79
†
 
 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time  
 
†
p = .07; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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times on AST test trials that were completed with a positive ending were also predictive 
of higher levels of depressive symptomatology at Time 2, over and above the effects of 
Time 1 symptoms. There was also a trend-level effect for average reaction time for 
negative target trials on the AST (p = .07). This trend was in the direction hypothesized; 
faster average reaction times on AST test trials completed with a negative ending were 
predictive of higher levels of depressive symptomatology at Time 2, above and beyond 
the effects of Time 1 symptoms.
9
 
Question 2 - Does Interpretive Bias Predict Stress Generation?  
The second primary objective was to examine interpretive bias for ambiguous 
social information as a contributor to stress generation. Generally, interpretive bias was 
expected to uniquely predict the occurrence of dependent life events, and be unrelated to 
the frequency of independent life events reported by participants. Specifically, a higher 
proportion of negative sentences constructed on the SST, as well as faster response 
latencies for negative story endings and slower response latencies for benign or positive 
story endings on the AST, were hypothesized to predict the occurrence of more life 
stressors at least partially dependent on participants’ behaviours (i.e., dependent events) 
by Time 2. The indices of interpretive bias were not expected to be predictive of the 
occurrence of fateful stressors (i.e., independent events).  
Four sets of negative binomial regression analyses were conducted to test whether 
interpretive bias would predict dependent life stress, but not independent life stress, over 
the 5-week follow-up. In each regression analysis, dependent and independent life stress 
                                                 
9
 Inclusion of all observations (n = 207) resulted in a similar pattern of results, with a greater degree of 
statistical significance across all variables. 
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variables were regressed onto relevant demographic characteristic covariates (where 
applicable), baseline BDI-II symptoms, and baseline IDD-L symptoms all entered in the 
same step. In a second iteration of the models, an individual interpretive bias variable was 
separately added to the model and the incremental gain in prediction was compared 
against the initial model that did not include the interpretive bias variable. 
Please refer to Appendix J for a detailed explanation of how model fit and gain in 
prediction were examined in the negative binomial regression models. Appendix J also 
contains the summary tables (Tables A through C) of the baseline negative binomial 
models for the prediction of independent and dependent life stress from relevant 
demographic covariates and baseline depressive symptoms and depression history. The 
omnibus test (i.e., the LR χ2) for all of these analyses was statistically significant, 
indicating that individual regression coefficients should be inspected to determine 
whether any variables were significant predictors of independent and dependent life 
events. In each set of negative binomial regression models, Time 1 depressive symptom 
scores assessed by the BDI-II were significant predictors of both independent and 
dependent life events reported at Time 2. Specifically, for each point increase in the 
participants’ BDI-II scores at Time 1 (e.g., from a total symptom score of 0 to 1), 
participants were expected to report 1.02 times as many independent and dependent life 
events at Time 2. No other demographics or clinical covariates were significant 
predictors of the frequency of independent and dependent life events reported at Time 2.   
The critical test of stress generation compares the relative gain in prediction of 
independent and dependent life stress by adding in the various interpretive bias variables. 
The comparison of the baseline model (e.g., model with all covariates and baseline 
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control variables) versus the model with the addition of an interpretive bias variable 
(Table 8) yields this information. According to stress generation theory, factors that 
increase vulnerability to stress generation should uniquely relate to dependent, but not 
independent, life stress (Hammen, 2006; Liu & Alloy, 2010). As can be seen in Table 8, 
the average reaction times for positive trials on the AST uniquely and significantly 
improved prediction for dependent life stress, but not independent life stress, according to 
both the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC). Specifically, the model including the average reaction times for positive trials on 
the AST had a lower AIC and BIC than that of the model that did not contain this 
additional predictor (e.g., model containing baseline depressive symptoms and depression 
history), suggesting that the inclusion of the AST variable significantly improved 
prediction of the occurrence of dependent life stress, but not the prediction of 
independent life stress. A participant with an average reaction time score of 0.00 seconds 
to positive target trials would be expected to report 0.59 times as many dependent life 
events as a participant with an average reaction time of 1.00 seconds. In other words, 
faster responses to ambiguous stories completed with a positive ending were associated 
with greater numbers of dependent life events. In contrast, in the model containing the 
average reaction times for negative trials on the AST, as well as the models for the SST 
negativity ratios for the no-load and cognitive load conditions, there was no evidence that 
the interpretive bias variables contributed significantly to the prediction of the outcome. 
There was no evidence from decreases in the AIC or BIC scores for an improvement in 
prediction, and the z-tests for the individual interpretive bias indices did not indicate 
significant prediction, despite the statistically significant   
77 
 
 
7
7
 
Table 8 
Negative Binomial Models Predicting Life Stress from Interpretive Bias Variables 
Model 
IRR 
(95% C.I.) 
z LR χ2 AIC BIC 
Predicted Outcome: Rate ILS    
SST Negativity  
   - No Load
a, 10 
1.37 
(0.72-260) 
 
0.97 16.24* 
 
548.51 
 
675.09 
 
SST Negativity  
   - Cognitive Load
b 
0.80 
 (0.40-1.58) 
 
-0.64 8.18* 
 
554.84 
 
570.74 
 
AST Mean RT for  
   Positive Trials
c 
0.69 
(0.40-1.20) 
-1.32 12.35** 
 
579.02 
 
595.04 
 
AST Mean RT for  
   Negative Trials
c 
0.83 
(0.52-1.33) 
 
-0.77 
 
11.18* 
 
580.18 
 
596.20 
 
      
Predicted Outcome: Rate DLS  
 
 
 
SST Negativity  
   - No Load
a, 10 
1.25 
(0.74-2.12) 
0.82 25.44*** 
 
1151.13 1177.71 
SST Negativity  
   - Cognitive Load
b 
1.05 
(0.62-1.78) 
0.18 12.41** 
 
988.79 1004.70 
 
AST Mean RT for  
   Positive Trials
c 
0.59 
(0.38-0.92) 
-2.31* 
 
21.00*** 1020.66 
 
1036.68 
 
AST Mean RT for  
   Negative Trials
c 
0.81 
(0.56-1.16) 
-1.14 
 
17.06*** 
 
1024.60 
 
1040.62 
 
      
 
Note. Each row represents a separate model for the prediction of frequency of life 
stressors. To avoid redundancy, the relevant statistics for the necessary covariates 
included in each model (i.e., as described in Tables A through C in Appendix J, e.g., age, 
baseline depression) are not shown. z = b/SE. IRR = incidence rate ratio (i.e., the 
exponentiated unstandardized regression coefficient, e
b
). LR = likelihood ratio. AIC = 
Akaike’s information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information criterion. ILS = independent 
life stress. DLS = dependent life stress. SST = Scrambled Sentences Test. AST = 
Ambiguous Stories Task. AIC and BIC values in bold are those that are less than the 
values obtained from the model containing only the covariates and control variables (see 
Tables A through C in Appendix J for the relevant AIC and BIC for each interpretive bias 
variable model).  
a 
n = 205, df = 8 for LR χ2; b n = 178, df = 5 for LR χ2; c n = 182, df = 5 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
                                                 
10
 The pattern of results was identical in analyses conducted without any demographic covariates included. 
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omnibus tests for all models (LR χ2).11 This suggests that the models including the 
interpretive bias variables were equally as predictive of Time 2 stressors, as the more 
simplified models containing only the relevant demographic covariates and baseline 
depressive symptomatology and depression symptom history; the inclusion of 
interpretive bias variables did not provide increased prediction in the outcome variable.    
Question 3 - Does Interpretive Bias Interact With Stressful Life Events to Predict 
Changes in Depressive Symptoms? 
The third, and final, objective of this study was to examine interpretive bias 
within the context of a diathesis-stress framework (interactional/moderation model; Beck, 
1987). Moderation hypotheses were tested according to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
guidelines. Consistent with Friedrich’s procedure (1982), the cross-product of the 
standardized independent variables was used as the interaction term, and all independent 
and dependent variables were standardized. This study examined whether individuals 
high in certain interpretive biases would experience higher levels of depressive symptoms 
in response to dependent life events, as compared to individuals with lower levels of 
these variables. If this model fits the data, the variance in depressive symptoms accounted 
for by the interaction term would be significant, even after controlling for the main 
effects of the interpretive bias variable and dependent life stress over a five-week period. 
In particular, participants who solved a higher proportion of sentences with negative 
                                                 
11
 Inclusion of all observations (n = 207) resulted in a similar pattern of results. The differences in 
these analyses (including the 2 participants with extreme responding patterns on the SLEQ) were 
that the significant effect of AST positive trials on dependent life stress fell to trend-level (p = 
.064), the effect of SST cognitive load condition on dependent life stress increased to trend-level 
(p = .065), and SST no-load condition significantly predicted both independent and dependent life 
stress (p < .001).  
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solutions on the SST, and participants who displayed faster response latencies for 
negative story endings and slower response latencies for benign or positive story endings 
on the AST, in the context of higher frequencies of life events, were hypothesized to be at 
the most elevated risk for increases in depressive symptoms, compared to participants 
with lower frequencies of life events or more positive patterns of interpretive bias. 
A series of hierarchical linear regression analyses were used to examine the 
interaction between each baseline interpretive bias variable and dependent stress, 
predicting BDI-II at five-week follow-up. For each linear regression equation, the 
standardized version of each interpretive bias variable, dependent stress, and the 
interaction between interpretive bias variable and dependent stress (controlling for 
baseline BDI-II, IDD-L, and independent life stress) were entered (see Tables 9 through 
12 for a list of the interpretive bias indices variables used in the separate equations). 
Consistent with earlier analyses, baseline depressive symptoms, previous depressive 
symptom history, independent life events, and dependent life events were significant 
predictors of depressive symptoms at follow-up. Additionally, negativity ratios for the 
no-load and cognitive load conditions from the SST, but not average reaction times for 
trials from the AST, were significant predictors of Time 2 BDI-II scores even after 
controlling for other symptom and life event variables. In contrast to expectations, none 
of the four interpretive bias variables was a significant predictor of depressive symptoms 
in interaction with dependent stress (p > .05), when the main effects, baseline BDI-II, 
baseline IDD-L and independent life stress were controlled for statistically.
12
  
                                                 
12
 As per Simmons et al.’s (2011) recommendations, these analyses were also re-conducted without any 
demographic covariates or including all observations (n = 207). The pattern of results was identical to those 
reported above and below. 
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Table 9 
Diathesis-Stress (Moderation) Analyses Predicting Depressive Symptoms: SST Negativity No-Load Condition 
Step and variable entered F ∆F R ∆R2 df B SE of B β t 
Step 1:  1.14 1.14 .13 .02 3, 198     
     Age      -0.05 0.04 -0.15 -1.40 
     Marital Status      0.38 0.47 0.09 0.82 
     Ethnicity      0.05 0.04 0.09 1.22 
Step 2:  41.85*** 81.17*** .75 .55 3, 195     
     BDI-II – Time 1      0.62 0.05 0.62 12.16*** 
     IDD-L       0.12 0.05 0.12 2.43* 
     SLEQ Independent Life Stress      0.28 0.05 0.28 5.83*** 
Step 3:  35.50*** 7.76*** .77 .03 2, 193     
     SST No-Load Condition      0.12 0.05 0.12 2.18* 
     SLEQ Dependent Life Stress      0.24 0.08 0.24 3.11** 
Step 4:  31.93*** 1.96 .77 .00 1, 192     
     SST No-Load x SLEQ Dependent      -0.06 0.04 -0.11 -1.40 
 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; SST = Scrambled 
Sentences Test; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 10 
Diathesis-Stress (Moderation) Analyses Predicting Depressive Symptoms: SST Negativity Cognitive Load Condition 
Step and variable entered F ∆F R ∆R2 df B SE of B β t 
Step 1: 
13
 78.78*** 78.78*** .76 .58 3, 172     
     BDI-II – Time 1      0.63 0.05 0.63 11.97*** 
     IDD-L       0.13 0.05 0.13 2.54* 
     SLEQ Independent Life Stress      0.31 0.05 0.31 6.18*** 
Step 2:  55.10*** 8.83*** .79 .04 2, 170     
     SST Cognitive Load Condition      0.13 0.05 0.13 2.47* 
     SLEQ Dependent Life Stress      0.27 0.08 0.27 3.34** 
Step 3:  45.66*** 0.03 .79 .00 1, 169     
     SST Load x SLEQ Dependent      -0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.17 
 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; SST = Scrambled 
Sentences Test; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire 
  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
  
                                                 
13
 No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See 
Appendix L for further details. 
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Table 11 
Diathesis-Stress (Moderation) Analyses Predicting Depressive Symptoms: AST Average Reaction Time for Positive Target Trials  
Step and variable entered F ∆F R ∆R2 df B SE of B β t 
Step 1:
14
 87.16*** 87.16*** .77 .60  3, 177     
     BDI-II – Time 1      0.63 0.05 0.63 12.34*** 
     IDD-L       0.16 0.05 0.16 3.12** 
     SLEQ Independent Life Stress      0.29 0.05 0.29 6.00*** 
Step 2: 58.00*** 6.35** .79 .03 2, 175     
     Average RT for Positive Target Trials      -0.08 0.05 -0.08 -1.67 
     SLEQ Dependent Life Stress      0.24 0.08 0.24 3.01** 
Step 3:  48.18*** 0.29 .79 .00 1, 174     
     AST Positive x SLEQ Dependent      0.05 0.09 0.3 0.54 
 
Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime 
Version; RT = Reaction Time; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire 
  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
  
                                                 
14
 No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See 
Appendix L for further details. 
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Table 12 
Diathesis-Stress (Moderation) Analyses Predicting Depressive Symptoms: AST Average Reaction Time for Negative Target Trials  
Step and variable entered F ∆F R ∆R2 df B SE of B β t 
Step 1:
15
 87.16*** 87.16*** .77 .60 3, 177     
     BDI-II – Time 1      0.63 0.05 0.63 12.34*** 
     IDD-L       0.16 0.05 0.16 3.12** 
     SLEQ Independent Life Stress      0.29 0.05 0.29 6.00*** 
Step 2: 57.90*** 6.25** .79 .03 2, 175     
     Average RT for Negative Target Trials      -0.08 0.05 -0.08 -1.61 
     SLEQ Dependent Life Stress      0.24 0.08 0.24 3.10** 
Step 3:  47.98*** 0.01 .79 .00 1, 174     
     AST Negative x SLEQ Dependent      -0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.12 
 
Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime 
Version; RT = Reaction Time; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire 
  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
                                                 
15
 No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See 
Appendix L for further details. 
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Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate interpretive bias for ambiguous social 
information within the context of stress and depression. Two-hundred-and-seven young 
women participated in a prospective study with a five-week period between the two 
assessment points. This study had several methodological advantages, including the 
utilization of multiple forms of assessment of interpretive bias using process-based 
measurement; multiple points of measurement of depressive symptoms and depression 
symptom history using well-validated instruments; and a comprehensive list of life events 
that was scored for independence and dependence by Ph.D.-level raters with experience 
in contextual rating systems. Importantly, this was the first study to explore interpretive 
bias in the context of life stress. This research is also the first to examine both stress 
generation and diathesis-stress models within the same sample as a way of integrating the 
information processing variable of interpretive bias, into the broader cognitive 
vulnerability literature.  
Does Interpretive Bias Predict Changes in Depressive Symptoms?  
To begin with, two measures of interpretive bias—the SST and AST—were 
examined in relation to concurrent depressive symptoms and depression history. 
Consistent with hypotheses, negativity ratios on the SST in the cognitive load and no-
load conditions were significantly related to Time 1 depressive symptoms and Time 1 
self-reported history of depression. Specifically, increased negativity ratios (i.e., greater 
negative interpretive bias) for the load and no-load conditions were related to higher 
BDI-II symptoms and greater lifetime depression symptom endorsement on the IDD-L. 
These results are consistent with previous studies that have examined the SST in relation 
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to concurrent depression (Rude et al., 2002, 2003). Contrary to expectations, average RTs 
for positive and negative target trials on the AST were unrelated to either concurrent 
depressive symptoms or depression history at Time 1. This finding is consistent with 
previous work that has shown that RTs on this task are not contingent on participant’s 
past or current mental disorder, but instead may distinguish participants in their 
vulnerability to subsequent depression (e.g., risk status as the daughter of a mother with a 
history of depression versus the daughter of a never-disordered mother; Dearing & 
Gotlib, 2009). This finding is also consistent with many of the negative results of 
researchers who have used reaction time indices with non-self-referential stimuli (Bisson 
& Sears, 2007; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg et al., 2006). However, RTs on the 
AST, while not related to depression concurrently, may predict depression over time or 
predict the stressors which subsequently lead to later depression. 
 Beyond concurrent relationships, the extent to which interpretive biases predicted 
changes in depressive symptoms over the 5-week follow-up was also examined. 
Consistent with expectation, the results demonstrated that three of the four indices of 
interpretive bias were significantly predictive of Time 2 depression symptoms, over and 
above the effects of baseline covariates and Time 1 symptoms. As would be expected, 
higher negativity ratios on the SST cognitive load and no-load conditions predicted 
increases in depressive symptomatology over the follow-up interval. Thus, increased 
negative bias in the interpretation of ambiguity was related to changes in depressive 
symptoms over the 5-week period. This finding suggests that negative interpretive bias 
may be a risk factor for the development of depression, and is consistent with previous 
studies that have shown that interpretive bias can predict negative shifts in mood (Wisco 
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& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010, 2011), changes in depressive symptoms (Rude et al., 2002), 
and the eventual onset of major depressive episodes (Rude et al., 2003, 2010).  
These results provide additional support for the theoretical claim of cognitive 
models of depression that information processing biases—in this case, biases in resolving 
ambiguous social information—predict subsequent symptoms of depression (Beck, 1964; 
D. A. Clark et al., 1999). Importantly, these results were obtained while controlling for 
concurrent depressive symptoms (Time 1 BDI-II scores) and reported worst lifetime 
symptoms of depression (Time 1 IDD-L scores). This finding is significant, given that 
prior depression is the single best predictor of subsequent depression (e.g., Hankin et al., 
1998; Harrington et al., 1990; Lewinsohn et al., 1989; Rao et al., 1999). These results 
suggest the importance of the presence of a negative processing bias in predicting 
subsequent depression. Moreover, scores on the SST did predict changes in depressive 
symptoms, despite the fact that a relatively short follow-up period was used. This finding 
suggests that a theoretically significant role exists for interpretive biases in depression 
vulnerability. Further, it provides additional rationale for the importance of therapeutic 
efforts, through CBM-I (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes et al., 2009) and 
cognitive behavioural therapy (Beck & Dozois, 2011), to modify interpretive bias to treat 
and/or prevent the onset and recurrence of MDE. 
At the same time, one cannot conclude definitively that these interpretive biases 
caused subsequent depressive symptoms. For instance, the results may have been 
impacted by remnant “scars” from previous experiences with dysphoria and depression 
(Lewinsohn et al., 1981; Rohde, Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1990; Zeiss & Lewinsohn, 1988). 
According to the “scar” hypothesis, depression may remit but leave psychological scars, 
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such as negative cognitive patterns, that were not present prior to the depressive episode 
and therefore could not have caused it in the first place. Unfortunately, almost all studies 
that have examined this hypothesis in depression have failed to find evidence of scars 
despite the theoretical and conceptual logic for the existence of them (for review, see 
Wichers, Geschwind, van Os, & Peeters, 2010). In the current study, interpretive biases 
would not be expected to add uniquely to the prediction of subsequent depression 
symptoms if they were simply the result of past experiences of dysphoria or depression, 
especially given that the most powerful predictors of depression – concurrent and worst 
lifetime symptom reports – were statistically controlled for in earlier steps of the analyses 
(e.g., Hankin et al., 1998; Harrington et al., 1990; Lewinsohn et al., 1989; Rao et al., 
1999). Hence, the results found may provide important information about the role of 
interpretive bias in depression risk.  
These results could also be suggestive of a common causal risk factor for both 
interpretive bias and depression. One such third factor could be the personality or 
temperamental predisposition of neuroticism or negative affectivity/negative emotionality 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Individuals high on neuroticism are more emotionally 
reactive; have a proclivity for experiencing negative mood states, such as anxiety, 
depression, and anger; have difficulty regulating their negative emotional reactions; and 
may interpret ordinary situations in a threatening manner (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; 
Espejo et al., 2011; H. J. Eysenck, 1970). Indeed, by its very definition, the personality 
disposition of neuroticism can be manifested as a cognitive process (M. Martin, 1985). 
Research examining other forms of information processing biases (e.g., attention, 
memory) have found support for the association between neuroticism and cognitive 
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biases (e.g., Chan et al., 2007; M. Martin, Ward, & Clark, 1983; Reed & Derryberry, 
1995; Ruiz-Caballero & Bermúdez, 1995). In the two studies that have examined 
personality and interpretive bias, results have been mixed (Dodd, Hudson, Morris, & 
Wise, 2012; Muris, Meesters, & Rompelberg, 2007), but there is the suggestion that 
personality may be positively associated with interpretive bias in child samples. 
Furthermore, recent research demonstrates that cognitive factors may be a proximal-
specific mechanism mediating the relationship between distal temperamental 
vulnerabilities and depression (e.g., Barnhofer & Chittka, 2010; Hong & Paunonen, 2011; 
Kercher, Rapee, & Schniering, 2009; Lakdawalla & Hankin, 2008). Hence, it may be the 
case that interpretive bias is one such mediator variable in this type of relationship. At the 
same time, current research examining the distinctness and independent contribution of 
personality traits and cognitive vulnerability factors to depression supports the notion that 
they are separate, distinguishable and not a theoretically overlapping, single generic 
vulnerability to depression (L. A. Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Hankin, Fraley, & 
Abela, 2005; Hankin, Lakdawalla, Carter, Abela, & Adams, 2007; Zuroff, Mongrain, & 
Santor, 2004). Future studies should examine the relationship between 
temperament/personality vulnerabilities and interpretive bias in adult samples to gain a 
better understanding of their unique and combined influences in the development of 
depression.  
Interestingly, faster average reaction times on positive AST trials were related to 
higher levels of depressive symptoms at Time 2, above and beyond the effects of 
covariates and Time 1 symptoms. This result suggests that individuals vulnerable to 
depression have enhanced processing of ambiguous information, such as social stories 
89 
 
 
8
9
 
that resolve in a positive manner, and hence may be quicker to resolve the ambiguity in a 
positive way. The direction of this result was opposite to what was predicted, based on 
the hypothesis that participants should be slower to response to positive endings which 
are inconsistent with their negatively biased interpretation of the scenarios (Dearing & 
Gotlib, 2009; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993). Follow-up analyses, examining general 
information processing tendencies on this measure, revealed that participants were 
somewhat atypical in their response patterns compared to previous work using this 
measure (e.g., Dearing & Gotlib, 2009).  
Similarly, the apparent facilitated processing of positive story endings in those 
individuals who went on to experience increases in depressive symptoms is inconsistent 
with previous work on interpretive biases (e.g., Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Sears et al., 
2011) and other information processing tendencies in depression (e.g., Azorin, Benhaïm, 
Hasbroucq, & Possamaï, 1995; Bruder, Yozawitz, Berenhaus, & Sutton, 1980; D. G. 
Byrne, 1976; Siegle, Granholm, Ingram, & Matt, 2001). Specifically, depression is 
associated with a general slowing of reaction times to execute voluntary responses 
(Azorin et al., 1995; Bruder et al., 1980) and greater variability in individuals’ response 
latencies (D. G. Byrne, 1976). Hence, some researchers have suggested that reaction time 
indices may be insensitive to cognitive processing biases in depressed populations 
(Moretti et al., 1996). Furthermore, depression is more typically characterized by both a 
presence of negative biases and absence of protective biases that facilitate the processing 
of positive information (for review, see Trew, 2011). Hence, it may be the case that the 
current sample is anomalous and this result is uninterpretable, or that this statistically 
significant result is due to chance or Type I error.  
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This counterintuitive result also may be indicative of the variability and 
inconsistency related to examining interpretive bias in the context of depression. 
Numerous other studies have had difficulty finding expected relations between 
interpretive bias and depression, especially in studies that rely on reaction time indices 
(Bisson & Sears, 2007; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg et al., 2006; Sears et al., 2011). 
This may be because individuals currently in a dysphoric state demonstrate repressor 
effects or attempts at mood repair when faced with ambiguous social information 
(Creswell & Myers, 2002; Kovacs, Rottenberg, & George, 2009; Weinberger, Schwartz, 
& Davidson, 1979). For example, those individuals with a repressive coping style 
(repressors) tend to avoid negative affect. As a result, direct self-report measures may not 
be able to elicit accurate information about interpretive bias from individuals with this 
tendency (see Myers, 2000, for a review) and reaction time measures may be 
systematically biased towards increased latencies for repressors (e.g., Weinberger et al., 
1979). However, if mood repair or repressor effects were impacting these results 
participants would display longer rather than shorter reaction times in relation to 
depressive symptoms (Detweiler-Bedell & Salovey, 2003; Joormann & Siemer, 2004; 
Josephson, 1996; Rusting & DeHart, 2000; Weinberger et al., 1979).  
These findings, together with the results of other studies that have failed to 
support the validity of reaction time based assessment, suggest that alternate methods for 
assessing interpretive bias may be necessary. One potential avenue that has recently been 
investigated is differential error rates in response to positive and negative targets (Sears et 
al., 2011) and psychophysiological correlates of interpretive bias (Lawson et al., 2002). 
Future studies, using multiple indices of interpretive bias, are needed to determine under 
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what circumstances reaction times provide a good indicator of interpretation of ambiguity 
tendencies. 
Does Interpretive Bias Predict Stress Generation? 
Interpretive bias was also examined as a contributor to the generation of 
dependent, but not independent, life stress. Because of the strong relationship between 
previous experiences of depression and stress generation (e.g., Davila et al., 1995; 
Hammen, 1991; Potthoff et al., 1995), all analyses statistically controlled for Time 1 
depressive symptoms and Time 1 depression history to eliminate the potential of 
confound due to mood-congruent effects of depression on memory. This analytic strategy 
provided a powerful way to test the unique contribution of interpretive bias on stress 
generation beyond any effects of depression.  
The current study found evidence for a role of interpretive bias in stress 
generation. In particular, facilitated processing of positive endings to ambiguous stories 
(i.e., faster reaction times) was associated with increases in the occurrence of dependent 
life stressors, but not independent life stressors. This result was found, even after 
controlling for the significant influence of past depression symptom history and baseline 
depressive symptoms. This finding suggests that individuals’ tendencies in reacting to 
positive story endings were related to an increase in reporting subsequent dependent life 
events, preferentially, over the 5-week study interval. This facilitation for processing of 
positive story endings stands in opposition to what was originally hypothesized and may 
be due to anomalies with this particular index of interpretive bias (see discussion in 
previous section about potential challenges with this index of interpretive bias and the 
possibility of Type I error). It also contrasts the general body of literature supporting 
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compromised information processing of positively-valenced affective material in those 
at-risk for depression and those currently depressed (e.g., Joormann & Gotlib, 2006, 
2007; Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; Suslow, Junghanns, & Arolt, 2001), who may 
also be at-risk for stress generation by virtue of that same information processing 
vulnerability.  
At the same time, if this result is replicable, it presents a novel finding that may be 
related to research demonstrating that dysphoric individuals are particularly vigilant in 
their social-information processing (Weary & Edwards, 1994; Yost & Weary, 1996). In 
the current sample, facilitated reaction times to positive story endings could be one 
manifestation of motivated information-seeking and -processing required for the 
enhanced ability to draw inferences following ambiguous social information in those who 
may be dysphoric or at-risk for depression (Harkness, Jacobson, Sinclair, Chan, & 
Sabbagh, 2011; Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005). In contrast to 
the hypothesized interference effect due to a greater tendency to make negative 
interpretations, it may be the case that faster response times for positive story endings 
represent an indicator of hypersensitivity to the personality and behaviour of others that 
enables them to more accurately decode their mental states. However, if this were the 
case, response facilitation to all valences of story endings (i.e., for both positive and 
negative story endings) would be expected, given a generalized social information 
processing hypervigilance. Theoretically, this hypersensitivity could inadvertently lead to 
dependent life stress through problematic interpersonal behaviours related to social-
cognition that are already known to be related to stress generation and/or depression, such 
as excessive reassurance seeking and negative feedback seeking (Borelli & Prinstein, 
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2006; Evraire & Dozois, 2011; Joiner & Metalsky, 2001; Joiner, Metalsky, Katz, & 
Beach, 1999; Nepon, Flett, Hewitt, & Molnar, 2011; Pettit & Joiner, 2001; Potthoff et al., 
1995; Shih & Eberhart, 2008, 2010). Future research should explore the possible 
associations between interpretive bias, theory of mind, and interpersonal behaviours to 
determine if the suggested pathways from interpretation of an ambiguous situation to 
stress generation are valid. Additionally, studies should examine the convergence and 
discrepancy between interpretive bias for positive and negative information to ascertain if 
and under what circumstances one or both relate to stress generation. 
Alternately, this facilitation for positive story endings on the AST could be a 
manifestation of the perfectionistic tendency for facilitated information processing of 
stimuli that is not self-descriptive of the ideal-self (Hewitt & Genest, 1990). Individuals 
with high levels of self-criticism or perfectionism may have developed an expertise and 
heightened sensitivity for the ideal outcome to situations. Their interpretations of 
ambiguity may be coloured by this perspective of what they believe should happen. They 
may generate life stress inadvertently due to these overly self-critical or perfectionistic 
personality features, which result in difficulties in their interpersonal relationships 
(increased conflict, lack of social support) or academic/occupational functioning (trying 
to accomplish too much and becoming overloaded; Priel & Shahar, 2000; Shahar et al., 
2004; Shahar & Priel, 2003). Future studies should examine the role of perfectionism and 
other personality factors to determine potential moderating and mediating relationships 
with interpretive bias and life stress. 
In contrast, no additional evidence for a role of interpretive bias in stress 
generation was found. Instead, negative proportion scores for the no-load and cognitive 
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load conditions on the SST, as well as the reaction times for negative target trials on the 
AST, did not contribute additional prediction to either independent or dependent life 
stress. Contrary to hypotheses, there was no association between the tendency to 
unscrambled sentences in a negative manner or in facilitated processing of negative 
endings to ambiguous stories and the likelihood of experiencing stressful life events over 
the 5-week interval. However, this is consistent with the bivariate and partial correlations 
(see Table 3) which also suggest that these indices of interpretive bias may not all be 
related to life stress, especially once the impact of past depression history and baseline 
depressive symptoms were controlled for statistically (Rude et al., 2002). The lack of 
results for the other indices of interpretive bias as significant predictors of stress 
generation was somewhat surprising, given the extant empirical support for other 
cognitive factors (Abela & Hankin, 2011; Auerbach et al., 2010; Flynn et al., 2010; 
Kercher & Rapee, 2009; Safford et al., 2007; Shih et al., 2009; Simons et al., 1993). 
Upon closer inspection, the current study differed from previous work in that the sample 
consisted of undergraduate students and the method of life assessment was a self-report 
checklist. The majority of studies with affirmative results for the stress generation effect 
were conducted on younger adolescent samples, did not fully examine stress generation 
per se (e.g., tested on the prediction of general life stress and failed to 
differentiate/compare the prediction of dependent versus independent life events), or 
were over lengthy time periods (e.g., 1 year). Any of the previous studies with positive 
results in undergraduate samples used an interview measure of life events and were 
conducted over a much longer time interval (e.g., 27 months, Flynn et al., 2010; 6 
months, Safford et al., 2007). Hence, it may be the case that alternate length intervals and 
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additional methods for assessing life stress may be required to detect the stress generation 
effect in undergraduates. For example, Gibb and colleagues (2006) failed to show that 
inferential style predicted stress generation over a 6-week period, despite demonstrating 
the basic stress generation effect of dysphoria and diathesis-stress effects in 
undergraduates.  
Together, the current results may also provide evidence that interpretive biases do 
not directly predict stress generation. Instead, interpretive bias may represent an 
intermediate step towards depression that is enacted via alternate pathways. For example, 
interpretive biases may contribute to the development of subsequent memory biases and 
associated negative self-relevant information processing (Hertel & Brozovich, 2010; 
Salemink, Hertel, & Mackintosh, 2010; Tran et al., 2011). Alternately, interpretive biases 
may lead to maladaptive interpersonal behaviours and reactions, which may themselves 
contribute to stressful life circumstances or directly to dysphoria (Barrett & Holmes, 
2001; Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Cummings et al., 2010; Sahl et al., 2009). 
Future studies should investigate these possibilities to gain a more full understanding of 
the relationships between interpretive bias and stress. 
Does Interpretive Bias Interact With Stressful Life Events to Predict Changes in 
Depressive Symptoms? 
As a complement to the stress generation model, this study also examined 
interpretive bias within the context of a diathesis-stress framework (Beck, 1987). None of 
the interpretive bias variables interacted with dependent life stress to predict depressive 
symptoms at follow-up. The lack of significant results is surprising given the history of 
prior empirical research that has found support for diathesis-stress models of the 
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relationship between cognition, stress, and depression (e.g., Abela & Hankin, 2011; 
Abela & Skitch, 2007; Gibb et al., 2006; Hankin et al., 2004, 2008; Lewinsohn et al., 
2001; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Seeds & Dozois, 2010). These null findings are also 
contrasted against the promising research on cognitive bias modification of interpretation 
(CBM-I) techniques and their associated outcomes (for reviews, see Hallion & Ruscio, 
2011; Field & Lester, 2010). While there is mounting evidence that modifications in 
interpretive bias may moderate individuals’ reactions to stress (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009; 
Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2006), this does not necessarily imply that 
interpretive bias is itself a diathesis. Perhaps the current investigation uncovered 
contradictory findings because it focused on a particular form of cognitive bias one that 
has rarely been investigated in the context of diathesis-stress models (Ingram et al., 
2008). Future research should investigate alternate roles of interpretive bias in the context 
of stress and the trajectory towards depression, and examine potential moderating 
variables in more integrated models.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
As with all empirical research, this study is not without its strengths and 
limitations. In the present study, the 5-week interval between Time 1 and Time 2 was 
selected to optimize participant retention and responding (e.g., Auerbach et al., 2010; 
Gibb et al., 2006; Shih, 2006). This time frame was selected based on the knowledge that 
variability in participants’ reporting of life events depends on the time interval being 
asked about (e.g., participants tend to respond “yes” to fewer events the longer the 
interval; Klein & Rubovits, 1987). Additionally, the life stressors inquired about in the 
current study included both major life events and minor hassles to maximize statistical 
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power (e.g., Alloy et al., 1999). However, the relatively short interval between Time 1 
and Time 2 may have prevented the discovery of significant effects due to the length of 
time that it sometimes takes for stress generation effects to unfold (Abela & Hankin, 
2011; Flynn et al., 2010; Kercher & Rapee, 2009; Safford et al., 2007; Shih et al., 2009). 
At the same time, the opposite may also have been true—that the biases captured by the 
interpretive bias indices at Time 1 reflected early indicators of an impending depression 
or a prodromal phase. A longer follow-up interval would provide a more powerful test of 
these hypotheses.  
Given that the current study presented an novel preliminary examination of 
interpretive bias in the context of life stress and depression, the experiment-wise/family-
wise error rate was not modified a priori from α = .05. Although it is possible that some 
of the findings may be due to Type I error, if reliable and valid, these findings offer an 
innovative examination of multiple indices of interpretive bias in the context of life stress 
and depression. In part, providing evidence for the problematic situation which 
cognitively vulnerable individuals face—not only are they more likely to develop 
depression following stressors, but they may, in part, be contributing to the creation of 
the very stressors that will trigger, maintain, and/or exacerbate their depression. It will be 
important for future research to examine the replicability of the current study’s findings 
to ascertain their validity. 
The relationship between interpretive bias, life stress, and depression is complex 
and not necessarily unidirectional (Hankin & Abramson, 2001; Simons et al., 1993). In 
the current study, the interval of the prospective assessment periods differed, such that 
depressive symptoms were rated over the past 2 weeks and negative life events over a 5-
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week period. While this methodology is consistent with the different measurement 
intervals used in previous studies (e.g., Cole et al., 2008; Gibb & Alloy, 2006; Hankin et 
al., 2004 study 2; Holahan & Moos, 1991; Kwon & Oei, 1992), this timing does not 
allow one to precisely determine the temporal sequence of interpretive bias, stressors, and 
changes in depressive symptoms. Other research using multiple waves of data collection 
has demonstrated that stressors do, indeed, precede and predict prospective changes in 
internalizing symptomatology (e.g., Hankin, 2008a, 2008b; Hankin et al., 2008; Hawley, 
Ho, Zuroff, & Blatt, 2007; Lee, Hankin, & Mermelstein, 2010). In the current study, 
elevations in dysphoria may have preceded interpretive biases and contributed to the 
occurrence of life stressors. Multiple time points of measurement follow-up or macro-
level examination of daily fluctuations in stress, mood, and interpretive biases would 
allow for a more thorough exploration of the direction and nature of these pathways to 
elucidate temporal precedence and causal directionality in the generation of dependent 
life stressors and onset of depressive mood (e.g., Cummings et al., 2010; Hankin, 2008a, 
2010; Hankin et al., 2008; Sahl et al., 2009).  
The use of multiple methods for assessing interpretive bias represented a 
particular strength in the design of the current study; however, there were also limitations 
inherent with this methodology. The interpretive bias indices themselves may be called 
into question, as the current study’s results were sometimes counterintuitive. 
Furthermore, the results of the current study did not demonstrate the expected 
differentiation between the no-load and cognitive load conditions on the SST, suggesting 
that performance in both conditions was associated with concurrent symptoms and 
predictive of subsequent depressive symptoms. This result, while opposing the theorized 
99 
 
 
9
9
 
impact of volitional thought control on responses to the SST (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), is 
consistent with previous work that has used similar undergraduate student samples (Rude 
et al., 2002). It may be the case that differences in the predictive significance of the 
cognitive load condition only emerge with clinically significant depressive episodes, and 
not merely subthreshold depressive symptom changes (Rude et al., 2003, 2010). 
Compared to previous undergraduate samples, the current study’s participants had 
significantly higher negativity ratios across conditions, suggesting that they may have 
been particular adept at unscrambling sentences. Given that the participants were drawn 
from a university student population, higher average levels of intelligence could have 
impacted the effectiveness of the cognitive load (Fink & Neubauer, 2001). Additionally, 
the cognitive load used in the current study may have been insufficient in size to interfere 
with participants’ cognitive-processing capacity (Engle, 2002). Future studies should 
examine the effect of more complex cognitive loads on results on the SST and should 
investigate whether participants’ cognitive ability (i.e., intelligence) moderates the 
effectiveness of cognitive load manipulations.  
There may also be concerns about the ecological validity of laboratory-based 
measures of interpretive bias. Individuals make interpretations of ambiguous information 
in the social world. Laboratory measures, such as unscrambling sentences or being asked 
the put yourself in the place of the narrator of stories, unfortunately cannot necessarily 
reflect the full scope of contextual factors that contribute to an interpretation. 
Furthermore, even though experimental stimuli were presumed to be self-referent or were 
worded in second-person narrative (“you are...”), participants likely varied in the extent 
to which they typically found themselves in the described situations and contexts. As a 
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result, the findings of the current investigation may not generalize to the types of 
interpretations that young women make in real life situations. Other studies have 
struggled with concerns about the ecological validity of assessing interpretive biases in 
anxiety disorders and have refined their methodologies to increase generalizability (e.g., 
Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Voncken, Bögels, & de Vries, 2003; Wilson et al., 2006). 
Future studies on interpretive bias should investigate the comparability of written stimuli 
to other forms of socially-relevant stimuli (e.g., faces, pictures), stimulus presentation 
methods (e.g., video, audio), and real life events and situations to determine how alternate 
forms of interpretive bias assessment can predict stress generation and depression 
(Peckham et al., 2010). 
According to Beck’s cognitive theory, cognitive vulnerability factors are latent 
until activated, and are therefore undetectable in current asymptomatic individuals (Beck 
et al., 1979; D. A. Clark et al., 1999). Hence, negative mood induction procedures have 
been used prior to the assessment of interpretive bias in some previous studies (Bisson & 
Sears, 2007; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999). In real-world settings, 
however, interpretive bias could be activated by the mere presence of ambiguity. In a 
sense, the presence of ambiguity itself may act as a mood prime. There is some empirical 
work to support this notion. For example, ambiguity in social situations generally leads 
individuals to engage in information seeking or tension reducing activities (Ball-
Rokeach, 1973). Furthermore, ambiguity or uncertainty appears to intensify affective 
reactions to events (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; A. R. Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 
1955). Furthermore, intolerance of ambiguity interacts with negative life events to predict 
depressive symptoms over time (Andersen & Schwartz, 1992). Neurological 
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investigations have also uncovered enhanced prefrontal activation in brain areas known 
to be associated with task-induced ambiguity in individuals with depression compared to 
healthy controls (Diener, Kuehner, Brusniak, Struve, & Flor, 2009). Overall, these results 
suggest that ambiguity itself is distressing and stressful for individuals, and may thereby 
potentially be sufficient to activate any latent diathesis, such as interpretive bias. 
However, empirical research has yet to investigate whether mood induction is necessary 
prior to the assessment of interpretive bias. Future research should disentangle the 
activating effects of ambiguity on interpretive bias, and its potential moderation by other 
relevant trait-like factors such as intolerance of uncertainty (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; 
Deschenes, Dugas, Radomsky, & Buhr, 2010; Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquin, 2008), 
intolerance of ambiguity (Frenkel‐Brunswik, 1949; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995; 
Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005), or indecisiveness (Rassin & Muris, 2005). In 
doing so, studies may determine the necessity of activating stimuli and importance of 
moderating variables, which may help to explain the equivocal nature of interpretive bias 
in depression research. 
The current study relied on a self-report measure of depressive symptoms (i.e., 
BDI-II) in a sample of undergraduates. As such, the effects observed here may not 
necessarily generalize to the prediction of diagnosable episodes of depression. Moreover, 
adolescents and young adults who attend university may differ in important ways from 
those who do not, and may consequently show differences in their information processing 
tendencies, exposure to stressful life events, and dysphoria (e.g., Coyne, 1994; J. Ruscio, 
Brown, & Ruscio, 2009; J. Ruscio, Zimmerman, McGlinchey, Chelminski, & Young, 
2007; Solomon, Ruscio, Seeley, & Lewinsohn, 2006). Notwithstanding this criticism, 
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samples such as the current one are appropriate to study in their own right, given the 
reasonable continuity of depression between student and clinical samples and the 
incidence of depression for individuals in this age range (e.g., Flett, Vredenburg, & 
Krames, 1997; Hankin, Fraley, Lahey, & Waldman, 2005; A. M. Ruscio & Ruscio, 
2002). It is also prudent to examine such samples, given the broader research that 
supports depression as a continuous, rather than discrete, construct across the lifespan 
(Ayuso-Mateos, Nuevo, Verdes, Naidoo, & Chatterji, 2010; Franklin, Strong, & Greene, 
2002; Holland, Schutte, Brennan, & Moos, 2010; Klein, 2008; Prisciandaro & Roberts, 
2005, 2009; J. Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000; Slade, 2007; Slade & Andrews, 2005; for recent 
review, see Haslam, Holland, & Kuppens, 2012). In addition, the conceptual questions 
raised in this study pertain to the prediction of future depressive symptoms vis-à-vis 
cognition via stress generation or cognition by stress interactions. The extent to which 
these findings generalize to clinical samples (although interesting) does not detract from 
the importance of understanding stress generation and diathesis-stress models themselves 
(cf. Haaga & Solomon, 1993). We know, for instance, that subthreshold depression 
results in significant disruption in functioning (Boulenger, Fournier, Rosales, & Lavallée, 
1997; Judd, Paulus, Wells, & Rapaport, 1996; Rai, Skapinakis, Wiles, Lewis, & Araya, 
2010; Rivas-Vazquez, Saffa-Biller, Ruiz, Blais, & Rivas-Vazquez, 2004), and predicts 
future diagnosable depression (Fergusson, Horwood, Ridder, & Beautrais, 2005; Gotlib, 
Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1995; Iacoviello, Alloy, Abramson, & Choi, 2010; Judd et al., 
2000) and, as such, is an important entity to test using diathesis-stress models. Future 
studies in this area should incorporate semi-structured diagnostic interviews, such as the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders (SCID; First, Spitzer, 
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Gibbon, & Williams, 2005) or clinician-rating scales of symptoms, including the 
Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression (HAM-D; Hamilton, 1960), when conceptualizing 
depression in this context. This would allow for greater certainty about the causal 
sequence from cognitive biases to diagnosable episodes of depression. 
For decades, there has debate around the theoretical and methodological issues 
related to the assessment of life stress (Depue & Monroe, 1986; Monroe & McQuaid, 
1994; Monroe & Roberts, 1990; Paykel, 1983; Tausig, 1982). Reliance on self-report 
measures of stress is a common methodological limitation of stress generation and 
diathesis-stress studies (Liu & Alloy, 2010). In addition to a general concern that 
depressive mood state biases affect the retrospective recall of life events, is the issue 
regarding the reliability of self-report checklists to quantifying stressors objectively (for 
reviews, see Dohrenwend, 2006; Mazure, 1998; Monroe, 2008). Compared to interview-
based assessments, self-report measures of stress are more susceptible to participants’ 
biases in over-reporting of life events, and do not allow researchers to differentiate 
between actual versus perceived events (Brown & Harris, 1978; Monroe & Simons, 
1991; Simons, 1992). For example, some studies have shown that individuals with 
depression and those with vulnerabilities to depression have a tendency to perceive or 
report benign events as stressful (e.g., Joiner, Wingate, Gencoz, & Gencoz, 2005). In a 
sense, depression and cognitive vulnerability to depression generate the perception that 
life has become more stressful, whereas in actuality it may not. However, many studies 
have found no mood-state association between depressed mood and increased reporting 
or severity ratings on life event checklists (e.g., Lakey & Heller, 1985; Siegel, Johnson, 
& Sarason, 1979; Wagner, Abela, & Brozina, 2006), although some have (e.g., L. H. 
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Cohen, Towbes, & Flocco, 1988; Shrout et al., 1989). At the same time, self-report 
measures allow for a greater ease in collecting data, with less intensive time involvement 
and burden for participants. Some recent research even suggests that self-reported 
checklists of stressors and interviewer-based measures of negative life events may be 
comparable for the purposes of research studies (e.g., Lewinsohn, Rohde, & Gau, 2003; 
Wagner et al., 2006). In the current investigation, baseline depressive symptoms and 
worst lifetime depression history were controlled for in all the aforementioned analyses to 
address the concern of mood state biases. Furthermore, analyses were conducted to 
compare the frequency of life events in the current study against other studies using 
similar follow-up periods. The rates of life event endorsement in the present study were 
consistent with previous empirical work (e.g., Gibb et al., 2006; Hankin et al., 2010; 
Uhrlass & Gibb, 2007). Future studies should obtain informant data on participants life 
events to corroborate the occurrence and impact of actual life stressors (Joiner et al., 
2005; Lakey & Heller, 1985), and should gather measures of perceived levels of stress in 
addition to stressor frequency data to compare the unique role of each (Linn, 1986; 
Masuda & Holmes, 1978) . Alternately, research could incorporate semi-structured 
contextual life stress interviews, such as the LEDS (Brown & Harris, 1978), to assess for 
objective stressors in different thematic domains (e.g., achievement and interpersonal) 
and of differing severities and durations (e.g., severe vs. mild; chronic vs. acute).  
A second concern is that self-report measures of life stress do not allow for gold-
standard assessment of the dependence or independence of events because they fail to 
provide the rich contextual information essential to differentiate precisely between 
dependent and independent life events. For example, “getting laid off from a job” can 
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result both from poor performance by the employee—an example of a clearly dependent 
event—or from downsizing of the company in general—an example of a clearly 
independent event. To try to compensate for this limitation, the comprehensive list of life 
events in the current study was scored for independence and dependence by Ph.D.-level 
raters with experience in contextual life event rating systems, and any events that did not 
fit clearly into a category were excluded from all analyses. Contextual stress interviews, 
such as the LEDS, or newer hybrid systems combining self-report formats with follow-up 
probes (Slavich, personal communication) may also help to ascertain and categorize 
events more precisely. A more fine-grained analysis of the severity or perceived impact 
of particular stressors may elucidate the instances or mechanisms through which 
diathesis-stress interactions lead to depression (Hammen, 2005; Monroe & Simons, 
1991).  
Because this sample consisted only of women, it is difficult to determine whether 
the results of the current investigation would generalize to men as well. There is some 
evidence that cognitive vulnerabilities display gender-specific associations with stress 
generation and depression, especially for women (e.g., Safford et al., 2007; Shih, 2006; 
Shih & Eberhart, 2010). Future studies would need to examine gender as a moderator to 
determine if men display the same associations between interpretive bias, stress, and 
depression. At the same time, other moderators should be considered. For example, not 
all individuals who experience a stressful life event go on to develop depression. 
Therefore, it would not be expected that everyone with a negative interpretive bias would 
develop depression to the same degree in response to similar stressors. Hence, protective 
factors (e.g., social support, coping strategies; S. Cohen & Wills, 1985; Coyne & 
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Downey, 1991; Paykel, 1994) or other risk factors (e.g., maladaptive personality traits, 
increased sensitivity to stress; Flett, Blankstein, & Hewitt, 2009; Kendler, Kuhn, & 
Prescott, 2004; Kercher et al., 2009; Monroe & Harkness, 2005) may need to be 
considered in an integrated model of interpretive bias in the context of life stress and 
depression. 
Conclusion 
This study advances the literature, first by extending the knowledge base on the 
influence of cognitive vulnerability to depression and information processing factors that 
may more directly lead to stress generation and depression. Importantly, the influence of 
interpretive bias on stress generation has never been investigated previously, and its 
exploration offers a more fulsome understanding of the manner in which cognitive factors 
potentially have their influence on the generation of life stress. Furthermore, by 
incorporating multiple forms of assessment of interpretive bias using self-referential 
stimuli, this study improves upon previous studies which have relied on primarily self-
report measures that are influenced by participant mood state and accompanying response 
biases (Beevers, 2005; Rude et al., 2010) or have utilized non-self-referential stimuli 
(Bisson & Sears, 2007; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg et al., 2006). By examining 
interpretive bias in the context of life stress and depression we may better understand 
how pre-existing cognitive vulnerabilities may be enacted through thoughts and actions 
in real life situations.  
From a practical standpoint, understanding what thoughts individuals might 
exhibit in ambiguous situations may provide a target for intervention by helping clients to 
see how their thoughts and behaviour to situations may be biased or more negative than 
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they should be, given the amount of information they are presented with. Clinically, 
working with clients to generate alternative explanations, and teaching them to determine 
an appropriate reaction to the most likely explanation based on evidence, may help to 
alleviate some of the stress generation in their lives. In fact, recent research on children 
with clinical anxiety disorder diagnoses has shown that successful treatment with 
cognitive behavioural therapy was also associated with significant decreases in negative 
interpretation biases (Creswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005; Waters, Wharton, Zimmer-
Gembeck, & Craske, 2008). Beyond conventional clinical work, CBM-I techniques also 
pose a promising experimental therapeutic intervention that may also help to prevent the 
generation of life stress, the negative consequences of stress, and the development of 
depression. For example, in cases where participants were trained to interpret ambiguity 
in a nonthreatening or positive way, there is evidence of attenuated emotional reactions 
following subsequent video stressors or imagined social situations (Lester et al., 2011; 
Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2006). Furthermore, repeated sessions of CBM-I 
have also shown promise at helping to improve mood, interpretive bias, and mental 
health in persons with current clinical depression (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010). 
Beyond its role in stress generation, interpretive bias has never been incorporated 
into diathesis-stress models of depression. Integrating interpretive bias into these well-
established cognitive models provides a preliminary step toward understanding how 
information processing biases may lead to depression (Ingram et al., 2008). Such 
integration may also provide a starting point for helping to move research beyond merely 
characterizing the forms of interpretive bias possessed by individuals with current 
depression/dysphoria or depression histories. Other idiosyncratic factors, such as the 
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occurrence of stressors, may help to explain the equivocal nature of interpretive bias in 
the depression literature. As many researchers have pointed out, simplistic models that 
fail to account for the environment may not be sufficient to describe the complexities of 
human experience or psychopathology (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Hammen, 1992; Rutter & 
Sroufe, 2000; Sameroff, 2000; Zahn-Waxler, Klimes-Dougan, & Slattery, 2000). It is 
only by understanding the risk factors for depression that we can ever hope to prevent 
and intervene with one of the most economically, socially, and interpersonally costly of 
all disorders (Richards, 2011).  
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Appendix A 
Statistical Comparisons Between Dropouts and Completers of Time 2 
A total of 9 participants (4% of the original sample) participated at Time 1 but did not 
complete any portion of the Time 2 assessment. This attrition rate is somewhat lower 
than the typical attrition rates observed in other prospective studies using similar follow-
up intervals (e.g., 8-11% across Studies 1 to 3, Joiner et al., 2005; 11%, Metalsky & 
Joiner, 1992). Participants who opted not to complete the Time 2 assessment had a 
significantly higher average level of depressive symptomatology at Time 1 (M = 19.11, 
SD = 10.54) than did those who completed the Time 2 assessment (M = 12.85, SD = 
8.80), t(214) = -2.07, p = 0.04. Not surprisingly, participants who failed to complete the 
Time 2 assessment were also more likely to have reported a history of a mental disorder 
diagnosis, χ2(1) = 22.33, p < 0.001, Phi = -0.32, and history of therapy or counselling 
treatment for an emotional or psychological problem, χ2(1) = 7.17, p = 0.01, Phi = -0.18, 
than those who completed both Time 1 and Time 2. The students who did not complete 
the follow-up assessment did not differ from the final sample on any of the other 
demographic characteristics, cognitive tasks, or symptoms measures at Time 1. Because 
of the very small attrition rate and the minor differences, it is unlikely that the results of 
this study were significantly influenced by the 9 dropouts.  
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Appendix B 
Statistical Comparisons Based on Participant Recruitment Source 
A total of 11 participants (5% of the Time 1 and Time 2 samples) were recruited using 
posters on the university campus requiring that they be registered in a first-year class at 
the University of Western Ontario, as compared to the majority of the sample which was 
recruited through the Psychology Research Participant Pool for students enrolled in the 
Psychology 1000/1200 course (95% of the Time 1 and Time 2 samples). Participants who 
were recruited from posters on campus had significantly lower average depression 
symptom history levels (M = 3.91, SD = 8.72), as assessed by the IDD-L, compared to 
participants who were recruited through the Psychology Research Participant Pool (M = 
14.60, SD = 16.98), t(14.45) = 3.71, p = 0.002. Additionally, participants who were 
recruited from posters were more likely to be of non-Caucasian ethnic descent (e.g., 
Asian, Black/African Canadian, etc.) than students recruited through the PSYC 
1000/1200, χ2(5) = 14.99, p < 0.05, Phi = 0.26. The students who were recruited using 
posters on campus did not differ from the participants recruited through the Psychology 
Research Participant Pool on any of the other demographic characteristics or study 
measures at Time 1 or Time 2. Because of the very small sample size and the minor 
differences, it is unlikely that the results of the current study were significantly influenced 
by the 11 general campus recruits. 
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Appendix C 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
 
Participant #: __________________________  Date of Testing: _________________ 
 
 
Date of Birth: _____________________________   Age: ________ 
      Day/Month/Year 
 
Gender:  □ Male □ Female 
 
Ethnicity: □ Black/African Canadian    □ Asian   □ Hispanic or Latino  
□ Aboriginal/Native Canadian  □ East Indian  □ White/Caucasian   
□ Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
□ Other  please specify: ______________________________ 
 
Marital Status:  □ Single     □ Married/Common-law/Engaged   
□ Divorced/Separated   □ Widowed 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental disorder?  □ Yes  □ No 
 
If so, which one(s)? -
________________________________________________________ 
 
Have you ever received any therapy or counselling for an   □ Yes  □ No 
emotional or psychological problem? 
 
Please describe what type of therapy or counselling you received: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Have you ever received any medication for an emotional or  □ Yes  □ No 
psychological problem? 
 
Please describe what type of medication you received: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix D 
 
Scrambled Sentences Test Stimuli 
 
water is sometimes very hot cold  
cat the has fur black yellow  
arrived she home after six before  
movie the somewhat funny tragic was  
interesting life my boring generally is  
usually like people not me do  
equal am others I inferior to  
worthwhile I worthless am a person  
failure I a am generally success  
love I others' don't deserve generally  
about do care people me don't  
have I my friends lost helped  
is appearance physical my unchanged worsening  
well me people of poorly think  
am I ruining life improving my  
person an am inadequate I adequate  
others' cannot I can meet expectations  
I little offer to have much  
my wasted I utilized have opportunities  
have life succeeded failed I at  
happy miserable be I expect to  
curious I person bad a am  
will goals I cannot achieve my  
me to is life cruel good  
disappointed have I friends pleased my  
trying keep to stop want I  
good feel very bad I usually  
myself in disappointed am confident I  
life makes good nothing me feel  
I fail will once succeed more  
something I give nothing to have  
usually feel I energetic tired very  
who I dislike I am like  
good mostly memories my sad are  
is stressful life interesting my very  
personal satisfying my disappointing relationships are
things can't I get can together 
born I loser a winner am  
quite generally incapable I capable am  
person good a am defective I  
my boring is interesting life usually  
often crying like I laughing feel  
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seldom death often of think I  
decisions problems making I confidence have  
is my good health physical poor  
concentration worse now my is better  
ruining I life improving am my  
think I future worry the about  
acceptable physical appearance worsening my is  
most happy me unhappy things make  
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Appendix E 
 
Ambiguous Stories Task Stimuli 
 
Item 
# 
Sentence 1 Sentence 2 Sentence 3 Negative 
Target 
Positive 
Target 
Foil Comprehension 
Check 
Comp 
Answer 
(Y=1, 
N=0) 
1 As you are 
walking into 
the cafeteria, 
you see your 
friend sitting 
on the other 
side.  
You call out 
her name, but 
she does not 
answer you.  
You think that she 
doesn’t answer 
because she is 
____________ . 
Annoyed Busy Successful Was your friend 
sitting on the 
other side of the 
cafeteria? 
1 
2 When you 
walk into the 
arena for a 
hockey game, 
you see your 
friends sitting 
toward the 
front.  
You call to 
them from the 
door, but no 
one looks at 
you.  
You think no one 
responds because 
they are __________.  
Annoyed Occupied Smile Were your 
friends sitting 
in the back of 
the arena? 
0 
3 One day, you 
walk into the 
crowded 
cafeteria 
looking for a 
place to sit. 
Your friends 
are all sitting 
together but 
there are no 
seats next to 
them for you 
to sit in.  
The fact that they 
don't have a seat 
saved for you is 
______________.  
Rude Fine Misery Was the 
cafeteria 
crowded? 
1 
4 You have plans She says she Her reason for Fake Believable Excited Did she call 0 
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to go to a 
movie with a 
friend of yours, 
and you are at 
home getting 
ready to meet 
her when she 
calls you.   
can’t make it 
after all 
because she 
needs to 
study.  
cancelling seems 
____________. 
you the day 
before to 
cancel? 
5 Recently, you 
had a fight 
with a friend of 
yours, and you 
decide to invite 
her over to 
watch a movie 
as a way of 
making up.  
At first, she 
says she’ll 
come, but 
then later she 
calls to say 
she can’t 
make it.  
You think she 
cancelled because 
she is __________. 
Angry Busy Guilt Did you invite 
your friend over 
to play a game? 
0 
6 In your first 
lecture, your 
professor 
informs the 
class that you 
will be doing 
group projects.  
Your 
professor 
picks group 
leaders, and 
tells them to 
take turns 
picking group 
members.  
You are certain that 
you will be picked 
___________. 
Last First Funny Did your 
classmates elect 
the group 
leaders? 
0 
7 One day, you 
notice your 
best friend 
sharing notes 
with a stranger 
in class.  
They smile at 
each other 
and giggle, 
and then your 
friend looks at 
you.  
You think your friend 
wants you to feel 
____________.  
Jealous Included Loser Did your friend 
and the stranger 
smile at each 
other? 
1 
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8 One day, you 
are walking 
down the hall, 
when you see 
your best 
friend talking 
to a girl you 
really dislike.  
As you walk 
toward them, 
you hear them 
talking and 
laughing, and 
then your 
friend looks at 
you.   
Because of the way 
she looks at you, you 
think she is trying to 
make you feel 
____________. 
Excluded Welcomed Caring Was your friend 
talking to 
someone you 
like? 
0 
9 You are giving 
a presentation 
in your a class 
and during 
your 
presentation, 
you hear a few 
students 
whispering to 
each other.  
When you are 
through, you 
take your seat 
in class.  
The student next to 
you passes you a note 
that says, “Your 
report was really 
____________.” 
Boring Great Ashamed Did you sit 
down after you 
finished your 
presentation? 
1 
10 You are in 
class and your 
instructor is 
handing back 
tests.  
When you 
look at your 
test grade, 
you are 
surprised 
because it is 
not the grade 
you had 
expected.  
Your instructor leans 
over and tells you 
that this is because, 
on this test, your 
work was 
___________. 
Dreadful Terrific Pleasure Did you look at 
your test after 
the instructor 
handed it to 
you? 
1 
11 In psychology 
class, you are 
given an extra 
credit 
You read the 
assignment 
carefully but 
can’t figure 
As you ask for help, 
you’re sure your 
professor will think 
you are 
Dumb Hardworking Death Did you read 
the assignment 
before you 
asked for help? 
1 
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assignment.  out how to 
start it, so you 
decide to ask 
your professor 
for help.  
____________. 
12 In psychology 
class, you are 
feeling tired 
when, 
suddenly, your 
instructor asks 
a question and 
calls on you to 
give the 
answer.  
As everyone 
looks at you 
waiting for 
you to 
answer, you 
think hard and 
fast.  
After stating your 
answer, you are sure 
that everyone in the 
class thinks you 
sounded 
___________. 
Stupid Smart Loved Were you in 
psychology 
class? 
0 
13 Your TA gives 
an assignment 
in class to be 
completed by 
the end of the 
tutorial, and 
you are the 
first student to 
finish it and 
turn it in.  
You worked 
very hard on 
it, but after 
you turn it in, 
you realize 
you made one 
small mistake.  
As you think about 
this, you are sure that 
your TA will think 
you are __________. 
Careless Hardworking Ugly  Did other 
students turn in 
their 
assignments 
before you? 
0 
14 You are 
required to 
give a 
presentation in 
class.  
The morning 
of your 
presentation, 
you practice 
in front of the 
mirror before 
You think that your 
professor will judge 
your work as 
____________. 
Sloppy Terrific Happy Did you 
practice your 
presentation 
before class? 
1 
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you head to 
class.  
15 You are 
supposed to 
write a 1000 
word essay for 
a class, and 
you start to 
work on it a 
week before it 
is due.  
At first, you 
have a hard 
time coming 
up with a 
topic, but then 
work hard and 
finish it in 
time.  
As you think about 
how you will do, you 
feel that the grade 
you will get will be 
______________. 
Bad Good Talent Did you wait 
until the night 
before it was 
due to start 
your essay? 
0 
16 You just got a 
new haircut, 
and your hair is 
shorter than it 
used to be.  
When you see 
your friends 
for the first 
time, you 
notice them 
looking at 
your hair.  
You can tell by their 
faces that they think 
your hair looks 
____________. 
Horrible Stylish Bored  Did you change 
the color of 
your hair? 
0 
17 You arrive in 
class one 
morning in a 
new outfit.  
Everyone 
turns around 
to look at you 
as you walk 
in.  
Because of their 
stares, you decide 
that they must think 
you look 
__________. 
Awful Great Talent Did everyone 
ignore you 
when you 
entered the 
classroom? 
0 
18 A 
neighbourhood 
friend of yours 
invites you to a 
party.  
You’ve never 
met any of her 
other friends 
before.  
As you take one last 
look at yourself in 
the mirror, you’re 
sure that her friends 
will think you look 
______________. 
Ugly Pretty Smelly Were you 
expecting to see 
someone you 
know at the 
party? 
0 
19 You and a 
neighbour of 
You try on a 
dress at one 
She looks at the dress 
on you and says, 
Bad Cute Glad Did you show 
the dress to 
1 
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yours decide to 
go to the mall 
to shop for 
clothes.  
store and 
come out of 
the dressing 
room to show 
it to her.  
“That dress looks 
really  
___________.” 
your 
neighbour? 
20 It’s the first 
day of the new 
school year.  
Over the 
summer, your 
hair grew a lot 
and think you 
look really 
different.  
You are sure that 
your classmates will 
think that, compared 
to last year, you look 
__________. 
Worse Better Hated Did you hair 
grow over the 
summer? 
1 
21 You arrive at 
school one day 
wearing a new 
outfit that you 
got for your 
birthday.  
As you walk 
into class, two 
guys sitting in 
the back of 
the room look 
at you and 
whisper 
something to 
each other.  
One of them waves at 
you and says, “You 
look really 
___________.” 
Awful Cute Kind Did you get the 
new outfit for 
Christmas? 
0 
22 It is Halloween 
and your 
residence is 
having a huge 
costume party.  
You spend all 
week working 
on your 
costume, and 
when you 
arrive at the 
party, all the 
people turn to 
look at you.  
Because of their 
stares, you decide 
that they must think 
your costume is 
_________________. 
Ridiculous Creative Helpless Was the 
Halloween 
party for your 
residence? 
1 
23 You were 
recently a 
Since you 
don’t usually 
As you look at the 
picture you are taking 
Ridiculous Beautiful Successful  Was the 
wedding for 
0 
  
 
1
5
7
 
bridesmaid in 
your cousin’s 
wedding and 
the dress you 
wore was very 
fancy.  
dress up, your 
friend wants 
to see pictures 
of you in the 
dress.  
to show her, you are 
certain she’ll think 
you look 
_________________. 
your sister? 
24 It’s your first 
day of class 
and you don't 
know anyone 
there.  
Your 
instructor asks 
you to 
introduce 
yourself and 
tell the class 
something 
about 
yourself.  
After you speak, you 
guess the others think 
you seem 
____________. 
Shy Nice Doom Did you know 
anyone in the 
class? 
0 
25 On your first 
day of a new 
class, you 
realize that you 
don’t know 
anyone there.  
You spot a 
group of guys 
talking on one 
side of the 
room.  
When you say “hi” to 
them, you can see 
that they look 
_____________. 
Irritated Friendly Joyful Was it your 
first day in 
class? 
1 
26 You arrange to 
meet a new 
classmate at 
the movie 
theater, and 
when you 
arrive at the 
theater, she's 
not there.  
While you 
wait, you 
think about 
how you 
sounded when 
you made 
plans with her 
to meet.  
You decide that she 
must think you are 
___________. 
Strange Kind Guilty Were you the 
first one to 
arrive for the 
movie? 
1 
27 You have been Tomorrow, As you think about Annoying Friendly Pleasure  Had you met 0 
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writing to your 
new roommate 
over the 
summer. 
you are going 
to meet your 
roommate for 
the first time.  
meeting her for the 
first time, you feel 
that she will think 
you are 
____________. 
your roommate 
before? 
28 On your floor 
there is a new 
foreign 
exchange 
student.  
Your resident 
advisor has 
asked you to 
show him 
around the 
campus.  
After spending 
almost the entire day 
with him, you feel 
that he must think 
you are 
___________. 
Boring Funny Cry Did your 
resident advisor 
ask you to show 
him around 
campus? 
1 
29 Today in class, 
your teacher 
assigns a new 
group project 
where you 
have to pretend 
you are 
married to 
another student 
and having a 
baby.  
You get 
paired with 
the cutest guy 
in class.  
You are sure that, 
after working on the 
assignment together, 
he will think you are 
___________. 
Weird Cool Colourful Does the 
project require 
you to work 
with another 
student? 
1 
30 Your family 
just moved 
here from 
Newfoundland 
and you talk 
differently than 
the students.  
One day, your 
neighbour 
invites you to 
go to a 
hockey game 
with her and 
some of her 
friends.  
While getting ready, 
you think about how 
the night will go, and 
you decide that your 
neighbour’s friends 
will think the way 
you talk is 
___________. 
Strange Cool Crying Did you move 
here from 
Newfoundland? 
1 
31 For your class, As you You decide that Nervous Confident Sorrow Did you have to 1 
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you have to 
give an oral 
presentation in 
front of your 
class of 400 
students.  
practice, you 
think about 
what all the 
other students 
will think 
when you do 
your 
presentation.  
everyone will think 
you seem 
______________.  
give your 
presentation in 
front of the 
whole class? 
32 You are taking 
a writing class, 
and your 
teacher wants 
everyone in the 
class to read 
their work out 
loud.  
After you 
read your 
essay to the 
class, one of 
the other 
students 
whispers 
something to 
you.  
She says that she 
thought your essay 
was  ___________.  
Boring Funny Pretty Were you the 
only one who 
had to read 
your work to 
the class? 
0 
33 Last week you 
took your 
midterm in 
psychology 
class.  
When you 
walk into 
class today, 
you see that 
the exam 
grades are 
posted at the 
front of the 
classroom and 
everyone is 
looking at 
them.  
You know other 
students will look at 
your grade, and you 
are sure they will 
think you did 
___________. 
Well Badly Tired Was the exam 
you took in 
psychology? 
1 
34 During class 
you learn that 
Your friends 
look over 
Because of this, you 
are sure your friends 
Nerdy Brainy Athletic Did you receive 
the lowest mark 
0 
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you received 
the highest 
grade on the 
midterm. 
your shoulder 
and see your 
test mark.  
will think you are 
___________. 
in the class? 
35 Your best 
friend is 
having a pool 
party for her 
birthday and 
has invited lots 
of people from 
school.  
Before you go 
to the party, 
you try on 
your swimsuit 
and look at 
yourself in the 
mirror.  
You think the other 
people will think you 
look ___________.  
Fat Skinny Sloppy Was your friend 
having a roller 
skating party? 
0 
36 As an 
assignment, 
you have to 
give a short 
speech to the 
whole class.  
After you 
give your 
speech, you 
are packing 
up your 
backpack 
when a guy 
from class 
comes up to 
you.  
He tells you that, 
when you gave your 
speech, you seemed 
really 
_____________.  
Nervous Confident Skinny Did you give a 
speech? 
1 
37 Your instructor 
just gave you a 
surprise quiz.  
Now she 
wants 
everyone to 
trade quizzes 
with the 
person sitting 
next to them 
for grading.  
As you give your 
quiz to another 
student, you are sure 
you got most of the 
questions 
___________.  
Wrong Right Fat Was the quiz a 
surprise? 
1 
38 You are asked Your team They all say you Terribly Brilliantly Deadly Did your team 1 
  
 
1
6
1
 
to join a game 
of beach 
volleyball with 
your floor.  
loses and 
afterwards, 
your 
teammates 
talk about 
how everyone 
played.  
played 
_____________. 
lose the game? 
39 You are asked 
to play a solo 
at open mike 
night at the 
Spoke.  
While 
rehearsing, 
you make two 
or three 
mistakes.  
Afterwards, your 
roommate tells you 
your playing was 
___________. 
Shaky Promising Caring Did you 
perform 
perfectly while 
rehearsing? 
0 
40 Your professor 
asks you to 
organize a 
sign-up system 
for mentoring 
high school 
students.  
After you put 
it on the 
Facebook, 
several of 
your 
classmates 
comment 
about the way 
it is 
organized.  
They say that the 
way your sign-up 
sheet is organized is 
very ____________. 
Confusing Clear Deadly Did your 
professor ask 
you to create 
the sign-up 
system? 
1 
41 You are 
playing 
softball.  
While you are 
up at bat, you 
see two of the 
outfielders 
talking and 
looking in 
your 
direction.  
You think they might 
be talking about your 
skill at batting and 
saying that you are 
___________. 
Terrible Talented Clean Were the 
students who 
were talking 
sitting in the 
dugout? 
0 
42 Your swim This is the As you get out of the Badly Well Hated Was this the 1 
  
 
1
6
2
 
team coach 
asks you to 
swim a new, 
much shorter 
race in the next 
competition.  
first time you 
have ever 
raced in a 
sprint, and 
you finish 
fourth.  
pool, one of your 
teammates walks up 
to you and tells you 
that you swam 
__________. 
first time you 
had raced in a 
sprint? 
43 You join the 
debating club 
and are asked 
to participate 
in a debating 
competition 
with ten other 
students.  
The debating 
competition is 
held in front 
of a large 
audience, and 
in the end, 
you finish 
fifth.  
Later one of your 
teammates tells you 
that he thinks your 
performance was 
_______________. 
Terrible Great Happy Did you finish 
last in the 
debate? 
0 
44 In philosophy, 
your professor 
assigns a 
debate about 
assisted suicide 
(euthanasia).  
You have to 
debate against 
the smartest 
student in the 
class.  
After the debate you 
are sure the other 
students will think 
you are 
______________. 
Stupid Smart Angry Did you debate 
gun control? 
0 
45 You are sitting 
at a table in the 
library working 
hard on an 
assignment.  
Suddenly, one 
of your 
classmates 
walks by and 
knocks the 
book you are 
reading on the 
floor.  
You think her actions 
were 
_______________. 
Intentional Accidental Protected Were you 
sitting in the 
library when 
your classmate 
walked by? 
1 
46 After standing 
in line at lunch 
to get your 
You are 
talking to a 
friend as you 
You think that the 
person who pushed 
you was being 
Mean Clumsy Tired Were you 
walking alone 
when your tray 
0 
  
 
1
6
3
 
food, you are 
entering the 
cafeteria to 
find a place to 
sit.  
walk when, 
suddenly, you 
get pushed 
from behind, 
and your tray 
of food falls 
to the floor.  
____________. was knocked to 
the floor? 
47 You are talking 
to a classmate 
and you learn 
that one of 
your friends 
has been 
talking about 
your mother.  
She’s has 
been telling 
people about 
your mother’s 
illness.  
When you hear about 
what she has been 
saying, you think she 
is very 
_____________. 
Gossipy Concerned Bravery Has one of your 
classmates been 
telling people 
that your 
mother is ill? 
1 
48 In the hallway, 
you hear some 
other girls 
talking and one 
of them 
mentions your 
name.  
When they 
see you, one 
of them 
smiles at you.  
You can't hear what 
else they say, but you 
are sure it must be 
___________.  
Nasty Nice Scared Were the girls 
talking in the 
hallway? 
1 
49 You have been 
working on a 
project for 
biology class 
every day for 
the past two 
weeks.  
One day, you 
arrive at your 
room to find 
that your 
project 
materials have 
been dropped 
on the floor, 
and some of 
You think that this 
must have happened 
___________. 
Deliberately Accidentally Cheerful Did you just 
start the biology 
project 
yesterday? 
0 
  
 
1
6
4
 
them have 
been 
completely 
destroyed.  
50 You overhear 
some 
classmates 
discussing who 
they like and 
who they don't 
like.  
You can't 
really hear 
what they are 
saying, but 
you think you 
hear one of 
them mention 
your name. 
You are sure you 
must be one of the 
people that they 
___________.  
Dislike Like Scare Do you think 
you hear them 
mention your 
name? 
1 
51 You arrange to 
meet a friend at 
the movies one 
night.  
You arrive 
before she 
does.  
As you are waiting, 
you look around the 
theater and notice 
that the movie you 
had hoped to see is 
not ___________. 
 Playing Sunny Did your friend 
arrive before 
you? 
0 
52 As you enter 
the cafeteria 
one day, you 
notice your 
friends sitting 
at a table 
across the way.  
One of them 
looks at you 
and calls your 
name.  
You see her but can’t 
hear her because the 
cafeteria is very 
_________. 
 Noisy Purple Were your 
friends standing 
in line to get 
food? 
0 
53 One day, you 
hear about try-
outs for the 
Varsity field 
hockey team.  
You played in 
high school 
and decide to 
try out.  
After try-outs, you 
wait to hear the 
coach’s decisions and 
hope that you get 
__________. 
 Picked Hungry Did you play 
field hockey in 
high school? 
1 
54 You just On most days, But today, no one is  Cold Busy Do a lot of 1 
  
 
1
6
5
 
moved to a 
new school and 
don’t know 
anyone there.  
you see a lot 
of students 
walking 
around, and 
you think 
about trying 
to meet some 
of them.  
outside, and you 
guess this is because 
it is winter and the 
weather is very 
________. 
students live in 
the 
neighbourhood? 
55 You just got 
your hair cut 
and you’re not 
sure about how 
it looks.  
When you see 
your group of 
friends, one of 
them 
comments on 
your hair.  
She then asks you 
where you went to 
get it ________. 
 Cut Jumped Did you just get 
your nails 
painted? 
0 
56 Your TA is 
breaking the 
tutorial up into 
groups of three 
for a project he 
is assigning.  
You hear him 
call out your 
best friend’s 
name, and 
you know the 
next person 
he calls will 
be in your 
friend’s 
group.   
Naturally you hope 
the next name he 
calls is 
_____________. 
 Yours Funny Was the group 
project for 
psychology 
class? 
0 
57 You arrange to 
meet a friend at 
her house after 
school to study 
for a test.  
You are 
nervous about 
the test 
because the 
grade counts 
for a lot.  
When you arrive, you 
are surprised because 
her room, which used 
to be blue, has been 
_____________. 
 Painted Playing Did your 
friend’s room 
use to be red? 
0 
58 You are at a You both So the two of you  Music Popcorn Was it too loud 0 
  
 
1
6
6
 
classmate’s 
dorm room 
studying and 
you both agree 
that it is far too 
quiet.  
usually like to 
do work with 
some noise in 
the 
background.  
agree to turn on some 
____________. 
while you were 
studying? 
59 You are at a 
concert with 
some friends.  
In between 
musical acts 
your friend 
announces 
that she is 
hungry.  
Since the next act 
doesn’t start for 
another hour, you all 
decide to go find 
something to 
______________. 
 Eat Party Were you at a 
swim meet? 
0 
60 You are 
reading quietly 
in class when 
one of your 
classmates 
bumps into 
your desk.  
You look up 
to see what 
happened and 
lose your 
place in the 
book.  
Your classmate turns 
to you and says she is 
very ____________. 
 Sorry Bored Did you lose 
your place in 
your book? 
1 
61 Another 
student in your 
residence is 
having a 
costume party 
for her 
birthday and 
you are invited.  
You decide to 
dress up as a 
clown.  
When you arrive, 
several other people 
comment on your 
coloured hair and big 
red ___________. 
 Nose Table Did you decide 
to dress up as a 
pirate? 
0 
62 You are 
playing soccer 
one day, and 
you try your 
Suddenly, one 
of your 
teammates 
kicks the ball 
You turn and kick the 
ball into the 
__________. 
 Goal Room Had you played 
soccer a lot 
before? 
0 
  
 
1
6
7
 
best even 
though you’ve 
never really 
played before.  
to you as you 
stand near the 
other team’s 
goal.  
63 In the hallway, 
you hear a 
group of girls 
talking about 
the guys that 
they think are 
cute.  
One of them 
notices you 
listening and 
says “hi.” 
You decide to walk 
up to the group and 
join the 
_____________.  
 Discussion Picture Did one of the 
girls notice you 
listening? 
1 
64 You have 
planned to 
meet a friend at 
the mall. 
When you 
arrive, she’s 
not there yet, 
so you call 
her cell phone 
to find out 
where she is. 
She explains that her 
ride was late picking 
her up because they 
got stuck in 
____________.  
 Traffic Garden Did you call 
your friend to 
find out where 
she was? 
1 
65 One day you 
are a little late 
getting to 
psychology 
class.  
When you get 
there, you 
look for a seat 
near your 
friends but 
there aren't 
any.  
The professor has 
already started class, 
so you decide to 
enter quietly and just 
take a seat in the 
back of the 
_____________. 
 Classroom Stadium Were some of 
your friends in 
your 
psychology 
class? 
1 
  
168 
 
 
Appendix F 
 
Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire (SLEQ)  
Independence/Dependence Coding 
 
Item Number Item Wording Coding 
1 
You did poorly on, or failed, a test, exam, or major 
class project in an important course (i.e., grade less 
than or equal to C). 
Dependent 
2 
Received a negative reaction from family or friends 
about not doing well in school (e.g., got silent 
treatment, criticized, etc.) 
Dependent 
3 
Doing worse academically than usually did in 
previous semesters or than did in high school 
(difference of at least one grade; e.g., C rather than 
B). 
Dependent 
4 
Negative consequences from studying for long 
periods of time (e.g., exhaustion, ill health, loss of 
friends, etc.) 
Dependent 
5 
You did not have time to do well in school (e.g., 
because you worked too many hours at a job). 
Dependent 
6 
Dislike school in general, but have to stay (e.g., 
forced by parents to stay, have no skills to get a job, 
etc.). 
Neither/Unsure 
7 Not doing as well in school as you would like. Neither/Unsure 
8 Difficulties with your study or work load. Independent 
9 Difficulty mastering academic material. Dependent 
10 Negative personal encounter with a professor. Dependent 
11 
Not accepted (or not expected to be) into 
program/major of your choice. 
Dependent 
12 
Unable to complete an assignment for school (not due 
to medical or excusable reason, etc., funeral, etc.) 
Dependent 
13 
Tried to accomplish something (e.g., homework) but 
had too many interruptions. 
Independent 
14 
Received feedback or evaluation that I needed to work 
harder/perform better in my classes or job. 
Dependent 
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Item Number Item Wording Coding 
15 
Prolonged absence from school (not due to medical or 
other excusable reason, e.g., funeral, etc.) 
Neither/Unsure 
16 
Tried to accomplish something (e.g., homework) but 
wasted too much time on other activities. 
Dependent 
17 You didn’t complete the required homework for class. Dependent 
18 You didn’t get to take a class you wanted to take. Neither/Unsure 
19 
You didn’t get accepted for an extracurricular activity 
you wanted to be part of. 
Dependent 
20 Quit a job. Dependent 
21 Laid off or fired from job. Neither/Unsure 
22 
Unable to find work and need a job very much for 
financial or other reasons. 
Neither/Unsure 
23 Reprimanded or were yelled at at work. Dependent 
24 
Significant negative change in financial circumstances 
(e.g., large amount of money or valuables lost or 
stolen, significant decrease in financial support, etc.). 
Independent 
25 
Did not have enough money for one or more 
necessities and had to do without them. Or, when 
living with family, family did not have enough money 
for one or more necessities (necessities are: health 
care, food, housing, or necessary clothing). 
Independent 
26 
Have not been achieving or accomplishing as much as 
would like. 
Dependent 
27 Difficulty with the nature of your work.  Neither/Unsure 
28 Difficulty meeting deadlines or goals on the job. Dependent 
29 Problems at work with co-workers or employer. Dependent 
30 Major change in work or school hours. Independent 
31 
Organization you belong to (e.g., club, team) failed to 
accomplish an important goal. 
Neither/Unsure 
32 
Parents upset with me for not living up to their 
standards/expectations (e.g., not doing well in school, 
sports, etc.). 
Dependent 
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Item Number Item Wording Coding 
33 
Significant fight or argument with close family 
member that led to serious consequences such as self 
or family member crying, temporary loss of 
privileges, emotional distance, etc. 
Dependent 
34 
Close family member became so upset with you that 
she/he ended the relationship. 
Dependent 
35 
Trying but can't seem to please your mother and/or 
father. 
Dependent 
36 Can't tell how family member really feels about you. Neither/Unsure 
37 
Trying but can't seem to get close to one or more 
family members. 
Dependent 
38 
You did something you didn’t want to do in order to 
please a close family member. 
Dependent 
39 A close family member (parent, sibling) died. Independent 
40 
Found out that close family member has been 
criticizing you behind your back. 
Dependent 
41 
Fights or disagreements with one or more close 
family members (parent, sibling). 
Dependent 
42 Put down by your parents or parents showed dislike. Dependent 
43 
It seemed like your parents were disappointed with 
you. 
Dependent 
44 
A close family member (parent, sibling) had 
significant medical or emotional problems (e.g., heart 
disease, cancer, depression, etc.) 
Independent 
45 Family member has life threatening illness.  Independent 
46 
Conflicts with your parents over your personal goals, 
desires, or choice of friends. 
Dependent 
47 
You didn’t receive the love, respect, or interest from 
your parents that you wanted (e.g., did not receive 
compliments or praise from parents, parents did not 
call or write, parents did not listen or show interest, 
etc.). 
Dependent 
48 
Forced by parents to achieve things that you could not 
or did not want to achieve (e.g., have to be a star 
athlete even though would rather concentrate on other 
interests, punished if do not excel in everything 
undertaken, etc.) 
Dependent 
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Item Number Item Wording Coding 
49 
A close family member (parent, sibling) withdrew 
love or affection from you. 
Dependent 
50 A close family member (parent, sibling) was arrested. Independent 
51 
A close family member (parent, sibling) was 
hospitalized for serious injury or illness. 
Independent 
52 
Relationship with close relative (parents, siblings, 
etc.) became worse. 
Dependent 
53 Your parents separated or divorced. Independent 
54 
You didn’t spend as much time with close family 
members as you wanted to. 
Dependent 
55 
A close family member (parent, sibling) couldn’t 
work due to injury or illness. 
Independent 
56 
A family member let me down (e.g., didn’t call, meet 
me, or do as promised). 
Dependent 
57 Remarriage of parent. Independent 
58 A close family member (parent, sibling) lost their job. Independent 
59 
Family member(s) were too busy to talk, help, or 
spend time. 
Dependent 
60 Close family member(s) moved away. Independent 
61 
You had to take care of brothers/sisters when you 
didn’t want to. 
Independent 
62 Trying but can't seem to fully please roommate. Dependent 
63 Criticized by one or more roommates. Dependent 
64 
Can't tell how one or more roommates really feel 
about you. 
Neither/Unsure 
65 
Trying but can't seem to get close to one or more 
roommates. 
Dependent 
66 
Did something you did not want to in order to please 
roommate. 
Dependent 
67 
Found out that roommate has been criticizing you 
behind your back. 
Dependent 
68 Fight or disagreement with one or more roommates. Dependent 
69 Roommate has been withdrawing affection from you. Dependent 
70 
Friend(s)/roommate(s) were too busy to talk, help, or 
spend time. 
Dependent 
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Item Number Item Wording Coding 
71 
A close friend had significant medical or emotional 
problems (e.g., heart disease, cancer, depression, etc.) 
Independent 
72 
Close friend becomes so upset with you that she/he 
ends relationship. 
Dependent 
73 Trying but can't seem to fully please friend. Dependent 
74 Criticized by one or more friends. Dependent 
75 
Can't tell how one or more friends really feel about 
you. 
Neither/Unsure 
76 
Trying but can't seem to get close to one or more 
friends. 
Dependent 
77 
Found out that friend has been criticizing you behind 
your back. 
Dependent 
78 Death of pet. Independent 
79 A close friend died. Independent 
80 Have hardly any friends. Dependent 
81 
Not sought out by others for activities or friendships 
(e.g., not called by others and asked to do something 
fun, etc.) 
Dependent 
82 
Close friend has been withdrawing affection from 
you. 
Dependent 
83 
Did not receive an expected visit from (or couldn't 
visit) family or friends (e.g., from outside city). 
Neither/Unsure 
84 Decrease in amount of leisure time. Neither/Unsure 
85 You didn’t talk or share feelings with friends. Dependent 
86 
You aren’t friends with the people you want to be 
friends with. 
Dependent 
87 
Did something awkward or embarrassing in a social 
situation. 
Dependent 
88 Chose to terminate relationship with close friend. Dependent 
89 
You didn’t have time to spend with your friends when 
you wanted to be with them. 
Dependent 
90 
A friend let me down (e.g., didn’t call, meet me, or do 
as promised). 
Dependent 
91 You had a fight or argument with a close friend. Dependent 
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Item Number Item Wording Coding 
92 
Your friends pressured you to do things you didn’t 
want to. 
Dependent 
93 
A close friend did not treat you as well as he/she used 
to. 
Dependent 
94 A close friend moved away. Independent 
95 Found out friend(s) had a negative belief about you. Dependent 
96 Found out friend(s) spread negative gossip about you. Dependent 
97 
A close friend was hospitalized for serious injury or 
illness. 
Independent 
98 A close friend was arrested. Independent 
99 Decreased number of friends. Dependent 
100 
Learning that a close friend or relative is very 
different than you thought (e.g., sexual behaviour, 
involvement with serious drugs, criminal activities, 
etc.) 
Independent 
101 Not accepted into social organization you desired. Dependent 
102 Not invited to an important social event. Dependent 
103 
You didn’t have anyone to go out with on the 
weekends when you wanted to go out. 
Dependent 
104 Your friends didn’t seem to understand you. Dependent 
105 Found out I was gossiped about. Dependent 
106 
Close friend or relative encountered serious trouble or 
failure experience. 
Independent 
107 
Tried to share something important with a friend, 
family member, or romantic partner, and they acted 
disinterested. 
Dependent 
108 
A friend, family member, or romantic partner 
embarrassed me or hurt my feelings in front of others. 
Dependent 
109 
Argument/conflict with someone other than a friend, 
family member, or romantic partner. 
Dependent 
110 Difficulty with landlord/landlady. Dependent 
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Item Number Item Wording Coding 
111 
Significant fight or argument with 
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse that that led to serious 
consequence(s) such as self or 
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse crying, leaving common 
residence for one night, etc. 
Dependent 
112 
Boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse ends relationship, but you 
still want to be with them. 
Dependent 
113 
Boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse says he/she is not sure 
whether wants relationship to continue. 
Dependent 
114 
Trying but can't seem to fully please your 
girlfriend/boyfriend/spouse. 
Dependent 
115 Criticized by your boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse. Dependent 
116 
Trying but can't seem to get close to 
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse. 
Dependent 
117 
Found out that boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse has been 
criticizing you behind your back. 
Dependent 
118 
You found out that your boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse 
has been cheating on you. 
Dependent 
119 
You did something to please your 
girlfriend/boyfriend/spouse that you didn’t want to do. 
Dependent 
120 
While still involved with boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse, 
she/he had a date with someone else. 
Dependent 
121 Death of boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse. Independent 
122 
Fight or disagreement with 
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse. 
Dependent 
123 
Can't tell how boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse really feels 
about you. 
Dependent 
125 
Did not receive love, respect, or interest from 
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse (e.g., did not receive 
compliments or praise, boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse 
did not listen or take interest in you, etc.) 
Dependent 
126 
Boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse withdrew affection from 
you. 
Dependent 
127 
Boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse let me down (e.g., didn’t 
call, meet me, or do as promised). 
Dependent 
128 Decreased amount of dating. Dependent 
129 Showed interest in someone and they rejected me. Dependent 
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Item Number Item Wording Coding 
130 
You terminated an intimate relationship 
(boyfriend/girlfriend/partner). 
Dependent 
131 
Infidelity toward boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse (i.e., you 
cheated on them). 
Dependent 
132 Breakup of affair. Dependent 
133 
Conflicts with your boyfriend's/girlfriend's/spouse's 
family. 
Dependent 
134 
Loss of virginity which was completely or partially 
unwanted. 
Dependent 
135 You had to do chores or work you didn’t want to do. Dependent 
136 Physical appearance became worse or much worse. Neither/Unsure 
137 Failed to meet a daily fitness goal. Dependent 
138 
Had a minor illness, injury, or some other physical 
discomfort. 
Independent 
139 
Female: Possibility of an unwanted pregnancy; Male: 
Possibility of a girlfriend/wife/partner's unwanted 
pregnancy. 
Dependent 
140 
Female: Had an abortion; Male: 
girlfriend/wife/partner had an abortion. 
Dependent 
141 
Involvement in serious accident (e.g., automobile, 
work, home, etc.). 
Neither/Unsure 
142 Hospitalization of self. Independent 
143 
Physical health became worse or much worse (due to 
illness or accident). 
Independent 
144 Worsening of personal health/habits. Dependent 
145 
Victim or serious threat of natural disaster (e.g., flood, 
tornado, hurricane, earthquake, drought, avalanche, 
etc.) 
Independent 
146 
Difficulty taking care of paperwork (e.g., paying bills, 
filling out forms). 
Dependent 
147 Poor weather. Independent 
148 
Experienced a transportation problem (e.g. , car 
problems, late bus). 
Independent 
149 Misplaced or lost something. Dependent 
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Item Number Item Wording Coding 
150 
Someone cancelled an important appointment with 
little or no advanced notice. 
Neither/Unsure 
151 Was concerned about an event on the news. Neither/Unsure 
152 
Was delayed/late due to circumstances beyond my 
control. 
Independent 
153 
Committed a minor law violation (e.g. traffic ticket, 
disturbing the peace, dormitory violation). 
Dependent 
154 
Significant problem with the law (e.g., arrested, 
detained, etc.) 
Dependent 
155 Was the victim of a crime (e.g. theft, assault). Independent 
156 Witness an accident or act of violence Independent 
157 
Had a financial difficulty (e.g. unexpected expense, 
overspent, etc). 
Neither/Unsure 
158 
No enough money for extras (e.g., entertainment, 
recreation, vacations, etc.). 
Neither/Unsure 
159 
Significantly increased you level of debt beyond 
means of repayment. 
Neither/Unsure 
160 
Has anything happened to you in the past 5 weeks that 
has not been covered, but that you feel was 
important? 
Neither/Unsure 
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Appendix H 
Data Analytic Strategy and Rationale for Question 2 - Does Interpretive Bias 
Predict Stress Generation? 
Because the present study examined the frequency of dependent and independent 
life events that participants experienced over the course of a 5-week period, the 
dependent variables of interest represent count data. Count variables reflect the 
occurrence of discrete events and thus can only take the form of non-negative integers 
(e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3…). Count data present a significant challenge to researchers; however, 
these challenges can be overcome with statistical techniques specifically designed for this 
sort of data (Atkins & Gallop, 2007; Coxe, West, & Aiken, 2009; Hutchinson & 
Holtman, 2005). Despite the fact that appropriate techniques are available, many 
researchers fail to use them (Atkins & Gallop, 2007; Walters, 2007). For example, count 
data are often treated as continuous variables and analyzed through ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression. The problem with analyzing count data in this way is that, because 
such data are comprised of non-negative integers, they typically form a positively skewed 
heteroskedastic distribution (Coxe et al., 2009; Walters, 2007). Given this non-normal 
distribution, the three fundamental assumptions of OLS are violated which can introduce 
discrepancies between the stated and actual Type I error rates and/or reduce statistical 
power (Coxe et al., 2009).  
As an alternative to the OLS approach, Poisson-class regression models, utilizing 
a Poisson distribution, may represent a more appropriate approach for examining count 
data. Poisson regression can be defined by only nonnegative discrete values, uses a log 
transformation that adjusts for the skewness of the data, and estimates with maximum 
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likelihood (Gardner, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1995; Walters, 2007). However, as with OLS, 
Poisson regression also has its own set of assumptions that must be satisfied to be applied 
appropriately. The application of Poisson regression is limited by the assumptions of 
population homogeneity (i.e., that changes in the outcome variable are completely 
accounted for by the predictors included in the model) and equidispersion (i.e., that the 
conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance). These assumptions limit the use of 
Poisson regression in situations where the data are characterized by unobserved 
population heterogeneity (i.e., the difference between individual outcomes is not 
completely accounted for by the predictors), and overdispersion (i.e., when the 
conditional variance is greater than the conditional mean). In situations of population 
heterogeneity and overdispersion, Poisson regression will underestimate the regression 
coefficient standard errors and thereby inflate the Type I error rate (Coxe et al., 2009; 
Gardner et al., 1995).  
Negative binomial regression falls within the class of Poisson distributions and 
possesses similar strengths but fewer restrictions. Negative binomial regression includes 
an error term to allow for unobserved heterogeneity, and a dispersion parameter (α) to 
allow for a larger conditional variance than is expected in a Poisson regression 
(Hutchinson & Holtman, 2005; Walters, 2007). If the data are equidispersed (i.e., when α 
= 0), a negative binomial and Poisson regression produce identical results and the 
Poisson is preferred because is produces a more parsimonious model. However, if the 
data are overdispersed (i.e., when α >0), a negative binomial regression is preferred 
because it produces more robust standard errors (Coxe et al., 2009; Long, 1997; Sturman, 
1999). An estimate of the dispersion parameter can be calculated through Stata which 
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indicates whether a Poisson or negative binomial model is more appropriate. This statistic 
indicated that a negative binomial model was most appropriate for the present data (all ps 
< .001).  
An additional concern when examining life event data is the possibility of 
excessive zero counts. Zero-inflated models for Poisson and negative binomial regression 
allow for an excessive number of observed zeros (Coxe et al., 2009; Ridout, Demétrio, & 
Hinde, 1998; Ridout, Hinde, & Demétrio, 2001). In the current sample, a high proportion 
of participants reported that they experienced no independent life events (see Table 1 for 
frequency of life event counts); however, it was difficult to ascertain whether this number 
of zeros was ‘excessive’ for the purposes of the analyses. Consequentially a zero-inflated 
negative binomial regression was conducted to test whether this index provided a better 
fit than the standard model.  
The Vuong test, a product of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression, 
compares the zero-inflated model to the standard model to determine which model is a 
better fit for the data (Long, 1997). The z-values in each interpretive bias model were not 
significant when the predicted outcome involved the frequency of independent or 
dependent life events (all ps > .05) indicating that the zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression was not a better fit than the standard negative binomial regression. As such, a 
standard model of negative binomial regression was determined to be most appropriate 
for the present analyses. 
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Appendix I 
Preliminary Analyses Examining Relations Between  
Demographic Characteristics and Study Variables 
Current Depressive Symptom Severity 
There was no significant association between participant self-reported age and 
Time 1 BDI-II scores, r(206) = -.10, p = .16, or Time 2 BDI-II scores, r(206) = -.08, p = 
.26. There was no significant differences among self-reported ethnicity and Time 1 BDI-
II score, F(5, 201) = 0.77, p = .58, or Time 2 BDI-II scores, F(5, 201) = 0.97, p = .44. 
Marital status also did not vary significantly with Time 1 BDI-II scores, F(2, 204) = 2.28, 
p = .11, or Time 2 BDI-II scores, F(2, 204) = 0.34, p = .72.  
Surprisingly, current depressive symptoms did not vary as a function of self-
reported history of a diagnosis for a mental disorder. Participants who reported that they 
had a history of mental disorder had similar Time 1 BDI-II scores, t(9.35) = 1.23, p = 
0.23, as those without such a history. In contrast, Time 2 BDI-II scores did vary as a 
function of self-reported history of a diagnosis for a mental disorder. Participants who 
reported that they had received a previous diagnosis had higher Time 2 BDI-II scores (M 
= 19.00, SD = 14.59) than those without such a history (M = 12.37, SD = 9.61), t(205) = 
2.07, p = .04.  
As would be expected given the pattern of results based on self-reported diagnosis 
history, individuals who had used medication did not differ from those without a 
medication history on Time 1 BDI-II scores, t(16.16) = 1.91, p = .07. Individuals who 
reported receiving medication for an emotional or psychological problem did, however, 
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report higher Time 2 BDI-II scores (M = 19.37, SD = 13.18) than did those without a 
medication history (M = 12.13, SD = 9.48), t(205) = 2.84, p = .005.  
Individuals receiving therapy or counselling for an emotional or psychological 
problem had higher Time 1 BDI-II scores (M = 16.56, SD = 11.58) than did those without 
a therapy history (M = 11.99, SD = 7.81), t(46.34) = 2.34, p = .02.These individuals also 
had higher Time 2 BDI-II scores (M = 17.44, SD = 13.61) than those without a therapy 
history (M = 11.59, SD = 8.59), t(45.27) = 2.57, p = .01.  
Depression Symptom History 
Age was not significantly related to Time 1 IDD-L scores, r(206) = -.01, p = .95. 
There was no significant differences between Time 1 IDD-L scores and ethnicity, H(5) = 
10.36, p = .07, or marital status, F(2, 204) = 0.13, p = .88. 
Participants who reported that they did have a history of a diagnosis had higher 
Time 1 IDD-L scores (M = 32.00, SD = 17.24) than those without such a history (M = 
12.79, SD = 15.99), t(205) = 3.69, p < .001. Individuals who reported receiving 
medication for an emotional or psychological problem also reported higher Time 1 IDD-
L scores (M = 32.44, SD = 19.56) than did those without a medication history (M = 
12.15, SD = 15.30), t(205) = 4.98, p < .001. Individuals receiving therapy or counselling 
for an emotional or psychological problem had higher Time 1 IDD-L scores (M = 28.08, 
SD = 21.07) than those without a therapy history (M = 10.38, SD = 13.29), t(45.26) = 
5.02, p < .001.  
Interpretive Bias – SST  
Participant’s self-report age was significantly related to the negativity ratio on the 
no-load condition, r(206) = -.14, p = .04. There was, however, no significant association 
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between age and the negativity, r(179) = -.07, p = .33, ratio on the cognitive load 
condition. Ethnicity was not significantly related to the negativity ratio in the cognitive 
load condition H(5) = 9.58, p = 0.09. In contrast, ethnicity was related to the negativity 
ratio for the no-load condition, H(5) = 11.14, p = 0.049. Marital status was related to the 
negativity ratio for the no-load condition, H(2) = 6.70, p = 0.04. Marital status was not 
related to the negativity ratio in the cognitive load condition, F(2, 177) = 1.28, p = 0.28.  
Similarly, there were no significant differences in the negativity ratios for the no-
load or cognitive load conditions based on participants’ self-reported medication history 
(ps ranging from .19 to .44) or therapy/counselling history (ps ranging from .10 to .97). 
Negativity ratios on the no-load and cognitive load conditions did, however, differ as a 
function of the participants’ self-reported diagnostic history. More specifically, 
individuals who reported a history of a diagnosis for a mental disorder tended to have 
higher negativity ratios in the no-load condition (M = 0.39, SD = 0.25) than those who 
did not report a history of a diagnosis of a mental disorder (M = 0.22, SD = 0.21), t(205) 
= 2.34, p = .02. For the cognitive load condition, the same pattern of results was 
observed. Participants who reported a history of a diagnosis for a mental disorder tended 
to have higher negativity ratios (M = 0.42, SD = 0.25) than those without such a history 
(M = 0.23, SD = 0.23), t(178) = 2.48, p = 0.01. 
Interpretive Bias – AST  
There was no significant association between age and average reaction time for 
positive target trials, r(183) = .05, p = .47, or negative target trials, r(183) = .01, p = .92. 
Similarly, reaction time for positive target trials (F[2, 181] = 0.68, p = .51) and negative 
target trials (F[2, 181] = 1.04, p = .36) did not vary as a function of participants’ marital 
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status. Participants ethnicity was also not associated with reaction time performance on 
the positive (F[5, 178] = 1.45, p = .21) or negative (F5, 178] = 1.67, p = .14) target trials. 
As well, there were no significant differences in positive or negative target trials for 
diagnostic history (ps = .36 to .95), medication history (ps = .23 to .27), or therapy 
history (ps = .82 to .98). 
Stressful Life Events 
There was no significant association between any of the life event totals (overall, 
dependent, independent) and age (ps = .60 to .86), marital status (ps = .55 to .93), or 
ethnicity (ps = .67 to .85). In addition, there was no differences in life event totals 
depending on participants’ diagnostic history (ps = .65 to .86), medication history (ps = 
.71 to .99), or therapy history (ps = .88 to .96). 
Covariates for Main Data Analyses 
To minimize the number of covariates required in subsequent analyses, 
preliminary tests to ascertain the most ‘potent’ or necessary variables were conducted. 
This was done to minimize the potential for residual confounding due to mismeasurement 
(Christenfeld et al., 2004) and to provide stronger justification for the potential inclusion 
of covariates, should their inclusion influence the results of the main statistical analyses 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). 
The main function of Time 1 IDD-L scores in the current study was to serve as a 
covariate variable in all analyses, to control for a past history of a significant depressive 
experience. In the case of covariates for Time 1 IDD-L scores, it is not surprising that 
self-reported history of a diagnosis, self-reported history of medication use for an 
emotional or psychological problem, and self-reported history of receiving therapy or 
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counselling for an emotional or psychological problem were all significantly related to 
worst prior depressive symptom history. All of these self-reported signs point to 
significant psychological distress at some point in the lives of a sub-set of participants. 
The inclusion of these additional self-report questions was to ensure that previous 
psychological distress could be partialled out during statistical analyses. In fact, when 
entered simultaneously in a linear regression, only therapy history (β = -.24, t(203) =        
-3.18, p = .002) emerges as a significant predictor of IDD-L scores in the context of 
diagnosis and medication history. Hence, the three variables did not seem to explain a 
significant amount of variance in IDD-L scores at Time 1. 
Similarly, self-reported history of a diagnosis, self-reported history of medication 
use for an emotional or psychological problem, and self-reported history of receiving 
therapy or counselling for an emotional or psychological problem were all significantly 
related to Time 2 depression symptom severity as measured by the BDI-II, and therapy 
history was also related to Time 1 BDI-II scores. This is again, unsurprising, given that 
the best predictor of current and future depression, is past psychological distress (e.g., 
Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; Hammen, Davila, Brown, Ellicott, & Gitlin, 1992). Given that 
the IDD-L scores was used as a covariate in all analyses, the relationship between self-
reported diagnostic, medication, and therapy history were examined in a further set of 
hierarchical linear regression analyses. In those regressions, IDD-L scores were entered 
on step one of models predicting Time 1 or Time 2 BDI-II scores, followed by the 
potential demographic covariate(s) on step two to examine incremental prediction above 
and beyond IDD-L scores. In both sets of analyses, the demographic self-reported history 
of psychological distress variables did not predict a significant amount of variance 
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beyond that predicted by Time 1 IDD-L scores (p = .47 for ΔF in both instances). Hence, 
it did not appear that these variables contributed additional predictive power over and 
above that predicted by IDD-L scores alone.  
As the earlier described preliminary analyses demonstrated, self-reported 
diagnosis history was also significant related to negative ratios on the no-load and 
cognitive load conditions of the SST. Two sets of hierarchical linear regression analyses 
were conducted to determine if both IDD-L scores and diagnostic history were required 
in the main analyses, or whether IDD-L scores would suffice as the sole covariate 
subsuming the construct of ‘previous psychological distress’ relevant to the current study. 
Separate models were conducted predicting SST no-load and cognitive load scores, 
respectively. In the first set of analyses, IDD-L scores were entered on step one, followed 
by self-reported diagnosis history on step two. In these analyses, diagnosis history did not 
significantly predict variance in SST scores in either the no-load (p = .08) or cognitive 
load condition (p = .08), above and beyond the significant effect of Time 1 IDD-L (p = 
.001). In the second set of analyses, the order of entry was reversed, with diagnostic 
history entered on step one and IDD-L scores entered on step two. In both of these 
analyses, IDD-L scores explained additional variance to the negativity ratio scores for the 
no-load (p = .004) and cognitive load (p < .001) conditions on the SST, above and 
beyond the variance explained by self-reported diagnostic history (p < .05).  
Given these results and original purpose of the IDD-L in the current study, IDD-L 
scores was used as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress in the main 
study analyses. In any of the main analyses including IDD-L symptom scores as a 
covariate, self-reported diagnosis, medication, or therapy history were not also included 
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as covariates. In instances where IDD-L scores were not included (e.g., partial 
correlations among study variables), the demographic covariates were retained. That is to 
say that for any analyses where IDD-L scores, Time 1 BDI-II scores, or Time 2 BDI-II 
scores were the outcome or criterion variable in and of itself (e.g., partials correlations), 
diagnosis, therapy, and medication history were retained as covariates. Similarly, for any 
analyses where SST negativity ratios for the no-load or cognitive load conditions were 
the outcome or criterion variable (e.g., bivariate correlations), diagnosis history was 
retained as a covariate. 
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Appendix J 
Negative Binomial Models for the Prediction of Life Stress from Relevant 
Demographic Covariates and Baseline Depression  
Before reviewing the results, it is prudent to explain how model fit and gain in 
prediction were examined (Atkins & Gallop, 2007; Coxe et al., 2009). In Poisson-class 
regressions, a maximum likelihood procedure is used to estimate the parameters to 
maximize the log-likelihood, where the log-likelihood is the logarithm of the probability 
that the observed data came from a population having the estimated parameters. The 
omnibus test (i.e., LR χ2) compares the log-likelihood of the fitted model (i.e., the model 
containing the predictors identified by the researcher) to the log-likelihood of the 
intercept-only model (i.e., the model that contains no predictors). If the LR χ2 is 
significant, then there is justification to inspect the coefficients for each predictor on an 
individual basis to determine whether any are significantly different from zero.  
The significance of each regression coefficient is tested in the same way as in 
OLS: (a) the z statistic for each predictor variable is calculated by dividing the 
unstandardized regression coefficient by the standard error of the regression coefficient; 
and (b) if the absolute value of the z statistic is greater than 1.96 (assuming a Type I error 
rate of .05), then that predictor is identified as a unique predictor of the outcome variable.  
Predicted scores in Poisson-class regressions are “linear in the logarithm” (Coxe 
et al., 2009, p. 124). In other words, when all other variables are held constant, a 1-unit 
increase in a predictor results in an increase of the natural logarithm of the predicted 
count that is equal to the value of the unstandardized regression coefficient (b). To 
interpret coefficients in terms of the predictors’ effect on the actual count (instead of the 
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logarithm of the count), the unstandardized coefficient, b, must be exponentiated. The 
exponentiated coefficient, e
b
, is then interpretable as an incidence rate ratio (IRR) (i.e., 
the multiplicative change in the outcome expected with a 1-unit increase in the predictor, 
holding all other predictors constant; Coxe et al., 2009).  
Gain in prediction is tested using the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Similar to the F test of the ΔR2 in an OLS 
regression, AIC and BIC have been proposed as options for comparing alternative non-
nested models (Coxe et al., 2009).
16
 The AIC and BIC each reflect the fit of the model 
with a penalty for increasing complexity (i.e., given two models with the same fit, the 
model with the fewest estimated parameters/the more parsimonious model is preferred). 
Assuming that two models provide a fit to the same data, the model with the smallest 
AIC or BIC is preferred. Typically, the AIC and BIC both lead to the selection of the 
same model (Coxe et al., 2009). In the present study, the comparison of the AIC and BIC 
across the baseline model (e.g., model with all covariates and baseline control variables) 
versus the model with the addition of the interpretive bias variables (Table 8) is the 
crucial one. If a predictor is added to the negative binomial model and the AIC and BIC 
associated with this new model (e.g., model with an interpretive bias variable) are lower 
than the AIC or BIC associated with the model that does not include this additional 
predictor (e.g., model with only covariates and control variables), than the additional 
predictor is understood to improve prediction of the outcome variable. 
 
  
                                                 
16
 The equation for the AIC = -2lnL + 2k and the equation for the BIC = -2lnL + kln(n), where lnL is the 
log-likelihood of the current model, k is the number of parameters estimated in the model (a parameter is 
estimated for each predictor, the constant, and alpha), and n is the sample size. 
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Table A 
Negative Binomial Models for the Prediction of Life Stress from Relevant Demographic 
Covariates and Baseline Depression – SST No Load Condition (N = 205)17, 18 
Model 
IRR 
(95% C.I.) 
Z LR χ2 AIC BIC 
Predicted Outcome: Rate ILS   15.31** 647.44 670.70 
     Age 1.04 
(0.98-1.10) 
 
1.19 
 
   
     Marital Status 0.70 
(0.29-1.71) 
 
-0.77 
 
 
  
     Ethnicity 1.03 
(0.94-1.11) 
0.62  
  
     BDI-II – Time 1 1.02 
(1.00-1.04) 
 
2.65** 
 
 
  
     IDD-L – Time 1 1.00 
(1.00-1.01) 
 
1.21 
 
 
  
      
Predicted Outcome: Rate DLS   24.76*** 1149.81 1173.07 
     Age 
0.95 
(0.89-1.01) 
-1.72    
     Marital Status 
1.98 
(0.97-4.05) 
1.88 
   
     Ethnicity 1.06 
(0.99-1.13) 
1.82 
   
     BDI-II – Time 1 1.02 
(1.01-1.04) 
3.58*** 
 
   
     IDD-L – Time 1 1.00 
(1.00-1.01) 
0.52 
   
      
Note. The five covariates listed under the predicted outcome were included in the same 
model (i.e., only two models were estimated). df = 7 for LR χ2. z = b/SE. IRR = incidence 
rate ratio (i.e., the exponentiated unstandardized regression coefficient, e
b
). LR = 
likelihood ratio. AIC = Akaike’s information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information 
criterion. ILS = independent life stress. DLS = dependent life stress. BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory – II. IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
                                                 
17
 Two participants were excluded from this analysis due to extreme responding on the SLEQ. One 
participant reported 27 independent events and 88 dependent events and the other reported 33 dependent 
events, which were both extreme response patterns relative to the values associated with the majority of 
cases according to Cook’s D. 
18
 The pattern of results was identical in analyses conducted without any demographic covariates included. 
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Table B 
Negative Binomial Models for the Prediction of Life Stress from Relevant Demographic 
Covariates and Baseline Depression – SST Cognitive Load Condition (N = 178)19, 20 
Model 
IRR 
(95% C.I.) 
Z LR χ2 AIC BIC 
Predicted Outcome: Rate ILS 7.77* 553.25 565.98 
     BDI-II – Time 1 1.02 
(1.00-1.04) 
2.05* 
 
   
     IDD-L – Time 1 1.00 
(1.00-1.01) 
1.01 
 
   
      
Predicted Outcome: Rate DLS 12.38** 986.82 999.55 
     BDI-II – Time 1 1.02 
(1.01-1.04) 
2.88** 
 
   
     IDD-L – Time 1 1.00 
(1.00-1.01) 
0.73 
   
      
 
Note. The two covariates listed under the predicted outcome were included in the same 
model (i.e., only two models were estimated). df = 4 for LR χ2. z = b/SE. IRR = incidence 
rate ratio (i.e., the exponentiated unstandardized regression coefficient, e
b
). LR = 
likelihood ratio. AIC = Akaike’s information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information 
criterion. ILS = independent life stress. DLS = dependent life stress. BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory – II. IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version. 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
  
                                                 
19
 Two participants were excluded from this analysis due to extreme responding on the SLEQ. One 
participant reported 27 independent events and 88 dependent events and the other reported 33 dependent 
events, which were both extreme response patterns relative to the values associated with the majority of 
cases according to Cook’s D. 
20
 No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the 
sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See Appendix L for further details. 
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Table C 
Negative Binomial Models for the Prediction of Life Stress from Relevant Demographic 
Covariates and Baseline Depression – AST Average Reaction Time for Positive and 
Negative Target Trials (N = 182)
 21,22 
Model 
IRR 
(95% C.I.) 
Z LR χ2 AIC BIC 
Predicted Outcome: Rate ILS 10.58** 578.78 591.60 
     BDI-II – Time 1 1.02 
(1.00-1.04) 
 
2.39* 
 
   
     IDD-L – Time 1 1.01 
(1.00-1.01) 
 
1.18 
 
   
    
Predicted Outcome: Rate DLS 15.75*** 1023.91 1036.72 
     BDI-II – Time 1 1.02 
(1.01-1.04) 
 
3.45** 
 
   
     IDD-L – Time 1 1.00 
(1.00-1.01) 
 
0.57 
 
   
      
 
Note. The two covariates listed under the predicted outcome were included in the same 
model (i.e., only two models were estimated). df = 4 for LR χ2. z = b/SE. IRR = incidence 
rate ratio (i.e., the exponentiated unstandardized regression coefficient, e
b
). LR = 
likelihood ratio. AIC = Akaike’s information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information 
criterion. ILS = independent life stress. DLS = dependent life stress. BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory – II. IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version. 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Two participants were excluded from this analysis due to extreme responding on the SLEQ. One 
participant reported 27 independent events and 88 dependent events and the other reported 33 dependent 
events, which were both extreme response patterns relative to the values associated with the majority of 
cases according to Cook’s D.  
22
 No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the 
sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See Appendix L for further details. 
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CONFERENCE SYMPOSIA AND WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS: 
Seeds, P. M., & Dozois, D. J. A. (2011, June). Interpretation of ambiguous information 
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women. Paper presented at the 72
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 Annual Meeting of the Canadian 
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Workshop presented at the 70
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development of adolescent depression as moderated by perceived social support. 
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE: 
Sept. 2011 – Dec. 2011 Instructor for PSYC 2301a: Introduction to Clinical 
Psychology, King’s University College  
 
Jan. 2011 – Apr. 2011 Teaching Assistant for PSYC 2220b: Introduction to 
Behavioural and Cognitive Neuroscience (Instructor: Dr. 
Jennifer Hoshooley), The University of Western Ontario 
 
Sept. 2010 – Dec. 2010 Instructor for PSYC 2410a: Introduction to 
Developmental Psychology, King’s University College  
 
Sept. 2006 – Dec. 2006 Teaching Assistant for PSYC 364F: Child  
Jan. 2007 – Apr. 2007 Psychopathology(Instructors: Dr. Elizabeth Hayden; Dr.  
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June 2006 – July 2006; Teaching Assistant for PSYC 142A: Exceptional Children  
Sept. 2006 – Dec. 2006  –  Behavioural Disorders (Instructor: Dr. Alvin Segal), 
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January 2006 – April 2006 Teaching Assistant for PSYC 468G: Special Topics in 
Clinical Psychology – Forensic Psychology (Instructor: Dr. 
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 Thesis Title: Maladaptive self-schemas, interpretive bias, 
and dysphoria. 
Sept. 2009 – April 2010 Co-Supervisor, Student: Christine E. Kerr 
Thesis Title: Cognitive organization in the stress-
generation and diathesis-stress models of depression. 
Sept. 2007 – April 2008 Co-Supervisor, Student: Talia C. Bogler 
Thesis Title: Self-schema organization, congruent stress, 
and cognitive reactivity. 
Sept. 2006 – April 2007 Co-Supervisor, Student: Anne C. Wagner 
 Thesis Title: Organization and valence of self-referent 
attributes and their relationship to early maladaptive 
schemas. 
